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Abstract  
 
What if rape is an act of institutional wrongdoing, and becomes treated as 
such?  In 2008, Nigel Pleasants coined the term ‘institutional wrongdoing’ to 
describe acts that are “chronically embedded in lawful, socially accepted, 
collectively sustained practices.”1 In considering rape as an act of institutional 
wrongdoing, this thesis is concerned with how we can better conceptualise and 
practically address men’s violence against women. While the legal system, 
treatment of offenders, and everyday understandings of rape tend to focus 
exclusively on the individual, and particularly the psychological determinants of 
this violence, I propose that greater attention ought to be placed on its social 
and structural foundations. An attempt to reframe men’s violence against 
women as a cause and consequence of gender inequality is neither new nor 
unique. However, rape as an act of institutional wrongdoing is philosophically 
novel and provides a useful framework to combat men’s violence against 
women. Firstly, I establish how the act of rape is a complex social problem that 
cannot be addressed through legislative reform alone. Secondly, I investigate 
the wrongness of rape which reveals that it has no single wrong-making feature. 
Instead, the wrongfulness of rape is derived from the combination of individual 
features and the context in which it occurs. Finally, in assessing directions for 
future intervention and reform, I propose that men bear a collective moral 
responsibility for rape. Reconceptualising rape as an act of institutional 
wrongdoing is philosophically significant as this model provides a practical way 
to think about combating sexual violence and accounts for the very fact that 
rape is both an individual transgression and a social practice with institutional 
implications. 
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       Introduction 
  
Rape is a gendered violation that differentiates and disadvantages women on 
the basis of their biological sex and/or perceived gender identity. In England 
and Wales alone, it is estimated that approximately 85,000 women are raped, 
400,000 women are sexually assaulted, and 1.4 million women are victims of 
domestic violence each year.1 The prevalence of rape is not exclusive to the 
United Kingdom. Rape is a widespread and deeply rooted phenomenon that 
does not discriminate by nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, age, class and 
ability/disability. The World Health Organisation (2013) has described men’s 
violence against women as a “global health problem of epidemic proportions”, 
affecting over one in three women worldwide.2 Rashida Manjoo (2016) states 
that rape not only serves as a crime and violation of individual victims, but also 
as an “obstruction to full citizenship and substantive equality.” 3 In other words, 
the experience and threat of violence in women’s lives significantly impedes 
their livelihoods and prospects. In turn, this harms women’s physical and 
emotional health, restricts their sexual and reproductive choices, their autonomy, 
self-esteem, mobility and safety. The far-reaching implications of men’s violence 
against women have been reflected in influential discourse: international human 
rights organisations, legislators and social movements have all attempted to 
reduce the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. Despite significant progress in 
legislation and policies, rape remains resistant to legal, political and social 
interventions.  
 
This thesis is concerned with how we can better conceptualise and practically 
address rape and kindred phenomena. While the legal system, treatment of 
offenders, and everyday understandings of rape tend to focus exclusively on the 
individual, and particularly the psychological determinants of this violence, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ministry of Justice (2013) ‘Chapter 1: Executive Summary’, An Overview of Sexual Offending 
2	  World Health Organisation (2013) ‘Violence against Women: ‘a global health problem of 
epidemic proportions’, (Online) Available: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_against_women_20130620/en/, 
Accessed: 24/04/17.	  	  
3 Rashida Manjoo (2016) ‘Special Guest Contribution: Violence against Women as a barrier to 
the realisation of human rights and the effective exercise of citizenship’, Feminist Review, Vol. 
112, No. 1, p. 12. 
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propose that greater attention ought to be placed on the social and structural 
foundations of this violence. Although individual agents are active interpreters of 
culturally prescribed norms, rules and practices, the unwritten rules of society 
facilitate violence against women and diminish the perceived wrongness of 
particular experiences of men’s violence against women. This position is not 
intended to remove the focus from the individual at fault, or mitigate legal and 
moral responsibility for his actions. Rather, it is to state that if the act of rape is 
fundamentally linked to systemic gender inequalities, then it should be treated 
beyond the level of the individual. 
 
A few preliminaries are in order. Firstly, for my discussion, I am particularly 
interested in demonstrating how dominant constructions of heterosexuality and 
hegemonic forms of masculinity and femininity can be linked to the prevalence 
of rape. While sexual violence exists in myriad forms: same-sex violence, 
female perpetrated violence, violence against gay and lesbian individuals and 
so on, one feature that makes rape unique is that it is overwhelmingly a crime 
perpetrated by men against women. One may think that a proper analysis of 
rape as a gendered violation should involve a consideration of all potential 
victims, not just women. However, given that I am primarily concerned with the 
collective perpetration and suffering of rape, this thesis focuses on the broad 
categories of men as the main perpetrators of this crime and women as the 
primary victims. 4  In doing so, the institutionalised nature and collective 
implications of rape are made clear. On a similar note, the terms ‘sexual 
violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’ are often used interchangeably. However, 
as Michael Messner et al (2015) identifies, “gender-symmetrical language risks 
rendering women invisible – and women are still by far the most common 
targets of sexual and domestic violence.”5 Similarly, terms such as ‘violence 
against women’ render men invisible as the primary perpetrators of this violence. 
Throughout this thesis, I will therefore use the term ‘men’s violence against 
women’. Moreover, the term ‘men’s violence against women’ is also used 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Although	   I	   do	   not	   make	   any	   explicit	   reference	   to	   trans-­‐men	   or	   trans-­‐women	   throughout,	   I	   do	   not	  
believe	   that	   there	   is	   any	  particular	   reason	   to	   not	   consider	   trans-­‐women	  as	  women	  and	   trans-­‐men	   as	  
men.	  
5 Michael A. Messner, et al (2015) ‘Plugging in: The Professional Cohort – Mid 1990s to the 
Present’, Feminist Allies and the Movement to End Violence against Women (New York: Oxford 
University Press), p. 102.  
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consistently throughout to capture the continuum of sexual and non-sexual 
violence women experience and/or fear, including; harassment, coercive or 
controlling behaviour, and physical expressions such as sexual assault and 
rape. Secondly, for manageability, my analysis primarily focuses on rape in the 
UK. However, I do not believe this poses a potential exception to the generality 
of my thesis. While cultural attitudes, police procedures and legal definitions 
surrounding sexual offences may vary considerably around the world, rape as a 
phenomena at a societal level is not so culturally variable. Lastly, although a 
predominantly philosophical approach is taken, the nature of reflecting on rape 
as an act of institutional wrongdoing requires interdisciplinary input. 
Consequently, this thesis draws upon a large body of feminist, legal, 
psychological and sociological scholarship. 
 
An attempt to reframe the act of rape as a cause and consequence of gender 
inequality is neither new nor unique. Feminist scholars and activists have long 
been dissident critics of the institutional implications of men’s violence against 
women. In 1975, Susan Brownmiller published a comprehensive history of rape 
that set many of her readers into thinking critically about the subject for the very 
first time. 6  Brownmiller’s ground-breaking book made it possible to 
conceptualise rape as something entirely different: a highly regulated practice or 
institution. Brownmiller famously states, “From prehistoric times to the present, I 
believe rape has played a critical function. It is nothing more or less than a 
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of 
fear”.7 In other words, rape is a paradigmatic expression of men’s dominance 
over women and is the product of patriarchal power relations that are reinforced 
both ideologically and institutionally.   
 
Brownmiller’s aim in writing Against Our Will was to “give rape its history” in 
order to “deny it a future”.8 Building on Brownmiller’s aim, my objective for this 
thesis it to better understand how this future can be denied. My philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Keith Burgess Jackson (1999) ‘A History of Rape Law’, in Keith Burgess Jackson (eds.) A 
Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays in Rape (Oxford University Press: Oxford), p. 
1.  
7 Susan Brownmiller (1975) ‘The Mass Psychology of Rape: An Introduction’, Against Our Will, 
(Middlesex: Penguin Books), p. 15.	  	  	  
8 Susan Brownmiller (1975) ‘Women Fight Back’, Against Our Will, p. 859.   
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aim is to ask important conceptual questions about the nature of rape in order to 
determine whether it should be considered a wholly individualistic act, or a 
highly regulated practice where individual perpetrators actions are inextricably 
tied to institutional rules. Questions such as: What is rape? What are its 
essential features? And why is it wrong? If rape is an act of institutional 
wrongdoing, are all individuals collectively responsible for ending acts of men’s 
violence against women that contribute to its prevalence? Assuming that most 
people know what rape is and intuitively believe that rape is wrong, these 
questions may appear unusual at first. However, as a crime so deeply captured 
in the public imagination, embedded with gendered meaning, and following the 
increasing trend towards the ever-broadening use of the term, there are good 
reasons to investigate its ambiguity as a legal and moral violation.    
 
For those more sceptical of the moral argument, there is also a strong incentive 
for the State to investigate how to best protect women from men’s violence. In 
2004 it was estimated that sexual offences have an overall cost to UK society of 
£8.5 billion per year, with each rape costing over £76,000.9 In March 2016, the 
UK government pledged £80 million in funding through to 2020 to support 
tackling Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) by providing stable national 
funding for specialist services and national helplines, and the overall provision 
of services from health care to law enforcement. 10  While government 
recognition and financial commitment to combat sexual offences are significant, 
I argue that greater attention ought to be placed on developing primary 
prevention strategies that seek to directly address the causes of this violence. If 
there is State funding for the prevention of crimes of sexual violence, policy 
makers need to get it right. I therefore hope to find sufficient grounds on which 
to evaluate whether current policies, legal practices and social interventions are 
effectively maximising protection for women.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 National Archives (2017) ‘Cross Government Action Plan on Sexual Violence and Abuse’, April 
2007, p. iii (Online) Available: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/Sexual-
violence-action-plan2835.pdf?view=Binary, Accessed: 17/01/17. 	  
10 GOV.UK (2017) ‘£80 million to stop violence against women and girls’, March 2016 (Online) 
Available:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522166/VAWG_S
trategy_FINAL_PUBLICATION_MASTER_vRB.PDF, Accessed: 17/01/17.  
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So, what if rape is an act of institutional wrongdoing, and becomes treated as 
such? 
In 2008, Nigel Pleasants coined the term ‘institutional wrongdoing’ to describe 
systemic practices that are neither unlawful nor (generally) recognised by 
agents as palpably wrong.11 While the extent to which institutional conditions 
influence individual morality remains heavily contested, episodes of institutional 
wrongdoing (such as colonialism, racial segregation and slavery) are implicated 
in complex legal and social structures that can be seen to prevent individuals 
from perceiving the wrongness of their actions. For example, it is often 
questioned whether the social, cultural and historical conditions of ancient 
Greek slave owners or German citizens during the Second World War rendered 
them unable to question the morality of their practices.12 In virtue of the fact that 
acts of institutional wrongdoing are typically “chronically embodied in lawful, 
socially accepted and collectively sustained practices”,13 it can be argued that 
agents belonging to the society in question do not have a good reason to 
recognise or even suspect wrongdoing.14 With the exception of a few dissident 
critics, it is only after a “change in the normative consensus over their legitimacy” 
that such practices come to be unanimously condemned and unequivocally 
regarded as wrongful.15 At first glance, it may appear unclear how rape could fit 
this very definition. Almost everybody intuitively believes that rape is morally 
wrong, individual perpetrators are generally deplored in society and rape is a 
crime within most jurisdictions an offence that warrants the most severe 
punishments – in the United Kingdom, for instance, up to a life imprisonment. 
Indeed, the claim that rape is an act of institutional wrongdoing involves two 
views that some may find surprising. One is that rape is an institution and the 
other is that it has collective wrong-making features.  
Rape as an institution   
Firstly, in stating that rape is an institution, I do not mean to imply that 
institutions of the State or dominant groups in society outwardly promote acts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 96-115.   
12 Michele M. Moody-Adams (1994) ‘Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance’, Ethics, 
Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 291-309.   
13 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, p. 96.   
14 Neil Levy (2003) ‘Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility’,The Monast, Vol. 86, No, 2, 
p. 157.	  	  
15 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, p. 96. 
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men’s violence against women. Rape is an institution not in the sense that it 
names an organisation, such as MI5 or the CIA, but rather, the act of rape 
operates within a practice; similar to racism, with many social, cultural and 
historical embodiments.16 Similarly to Foucault’s (1975) analysis on punishment, 
a practice can take root and become institutionalised so that it is not necessary 
for anyone to supervise the operation as a whole.17 As Claudia Card (1991) 
asserts, defining rape as an institution does not mean to say that a group of 
powerful men sit in a smoke filled room in some sort of patriarchal conspiracy.18 
Rather, the institution of rape is deeply entrenched in multiple complex networks 
and reinforced through the law, sets of interpersonal relations, collective 
ideologies, and discourses on genders and sexualities. While UK laws officially 
prohibit rape, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that we have collectively (and 
somewhat inadvertently) supported men’s violence against women by 
regulating practices and implementing policies based on false theorising.  
 
Rape as an act of collective wrongdoing  
In proposing that rape is an act of collective wrongdoing, I aim to highlight the 
various ways in which we are all collectively implicated in the institution of rape. 
Similarly to murder, battery and theft, rape too is widely defined as an act of 
individual wrongdoing, where deviant individuals “act in violation of the laws, 
rules, norms and values of their society.”19 However, individualistic explanations 
of rape explicitly ignore the socio-cultural context in which rape occurs and its 
wider relationship to dominant cultural ideologies, normative practices and 
social, political and economic institutions. In doing so, many participants in the 
institution of rape may not think of themselves as participants. Instead, they are 
encouraged to believe that acts of men’s violence against women belong to 
deranged men, men who were unfairly provoked by a woman, or falsely 
accused. Indeed, rape continues to be conventionally defined as either a 
pathology or an individual transgression - both of which portray the crime of 
rape as only a consequence of an individual’s wrongful action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Claudia Card (1991) ‘Rape as a terrorist institution’, in RG Frey and CW Morris (eds.), 
Violence, Terrorism and Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 297. 
17 Michel Foucault (1977) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (London: Penguin 
Books).   
18 Claudia Card (1991) ‘Rape as a terrorist institution’, p. 300.	  	  
19 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, p. 98.   
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In December 2012, Jyoti Singh, a 23-year-old physiotherapy student was 
brutally gang-raped by six men on a bus in Delhi. During an interview with one 
of the six rapists, Mikesh Singh declared “housework and housekeeping are for 
girls, not roaming in discos and bars at night doing wrong things, wearing wrong 
clothes… If women are not good, men have a right to teach them a lesson”.20 
Triggering a global outcry, media coverage became fixated on demonising not 
only the six perpetrators of this horrific crime, but also Indian culture. In claiming 
that “India should be ashamed”, 21  Western countries exposed a double 
standard by minimising the nature of systemic violence in their own countries 
while simultaneously righteously condemning India as a paradigmatic example 
of a ‘rape culture’. That is, a society that condones, accepts, normalises and 
even facilitates rape through various cultural practices that are based on 
ideologies surrounding the inferiority of women and superiority of men, or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.22      
 
Just two years after the Delhi gang-rape, the Home Office, Ministry of Justice 
and Office for National Statistics released their first ever report on sexual 
violence, finding that annually approximately 400,000 women are sexually 
assaulted, 85,000 women are raped and 1.4 million women are victims of 
domestic violence in England and Wales alone.23 Globally, a recent study by the 
World Health Organisation (2013) indicates that sexual violence affects one in 
three women.24 With many incidences of men’s violence against women going 
unreported, these figures are believed to understate the real scale of this issue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 BBC (2015) ‘India’s Daughter’, 4th March 2015 (Online) Available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05534p0, Accessed: 23/09/16.   
21 Anita Anand (2013) ‘India Should Be Ashamed: Being born a girl isn’t a crime’, The Telegraph, 
11th September 2013, (Online) Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-
life/10299640/India-should-be-ashamed-Being-born-a-girl-isnt-a-crime.html, Accessed: 23/09/16.   
22 Emilie Buchwald, et al (1993) ‘Introduction’, Transforming a Rape Culture, (Minneapolis: 
Milkweed Editions), p. 1.   
23 Ministry of Justice (2013) ‘Chapter 1: Executive Summary’, An Overview of Sexual Offending 
in England and Wales, p. 6 (Online) Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214970/sexual-
offending-overview-jan-2013.pdf, Accessed: 13/04/15.  
24 World Health Organisation (2013) ‘Global and regional estimates of violence against women: 
prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence’, pp. 
1-50 (Online) Available: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua=1, Accessed: 
07/12/16.   
12	  
	  
Given the international prevalence of violence against women, it would be a 
serious mistake in psychological categorisation to continue assuming that acts 
of sexual violence are only committed by deviant, violent, or psychologically 
disturbed men. As Michael Kimmel (2008) questions, “how can such a 
pervasive event be the work of a few lunatics?”25 If the existence of men’s 
violence against women cannot be explained through individual anomalies, it is 
therefore important to consider how normative practices shape moral 
perceptions concerning the permissibility of violence towards women.  
  
While it may seem innocuous, the way in which we collectively think about rape 
is harmful to a large number of people. The language and categories we use 
can construct problems in particular ways which further implies certain solutions. 
The language we use also reflects a subtle, yet significant power in determining 
who has control over the way rape is defined and who is silenced by this 
representation. Jackson Katz (2012) identifies how even the term ‘violence 
against women’ is problematic because it is a passive construction that renders 
men invisible by removing the active agent in the sentence.26 ‘Men’s violence 
against women’ is a far more accurate term.27 Given that almost all rapists are 
men and almost all victims of rape are women28, this statement highlights that 
men’s use of sexual violence towards women is a gendered problem grounded 
in the patterns of masculine and feminine socialisation, and patriarchal social 
organisation.  
 
To demonstrate how men are collectively rendered invisible from a conversation 
that is primarily about them,, Chapter 1 explores how discourses on issues 
relating to men’s violence against women can have a significant influence on 
both individual moral perception and the capacity of the criminal justice system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael Kimmel (2008) ‘The Gender of Violence’, The Gendered Society, 3rd Edition, (New 
York: Oxford University Press), p. 329  
26 Jackson Katz (2012) ‘Be the Hero’, YouTube, (Online) Available: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnthcrRJ_Kc, Accessed: 07/12/16. 	  
27 Ibid.  
28 In 2011, males accounted for the overwhelming majority of offenders found guilty of sexual 
violence: rape (94%) and sexual violence (90.3%) in the Ministry of Justice (2013) 
‘Demographic breakdowns of offenders convicted for sexual offences’, An Overview of Sexual 
Offending in England and Wales, pp. 33-34 (Online) Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/214970/sexual-
offending-overview-jan-2013.pdf, Accessed: 13/04/15. 
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to respond effectively to sexual offence cases by absolving men of responsibility 
and blaming women for provoking it. For example, there is a long history of 
telling women how to avoid sexual violence, instead of telling men how to stop 
using it. Indeed, rape myths and rape avoidance rules have played a powerful 
role in perpetuating fear and legitimising superficial responses to rape. Rather 
than seeking to create a society in which women need not fear male sexual 
aggression, women are told they are not being fearful enough by constantly 
admonishing women for not taking precautions against the ever-present risk of 
men’s violence. Women are regularly warned not to drink too much, walk alone 
at night, accept an invitation to a man’s room, or dress too ‘provocatively’. While 
such rules imply that there are legitimate measures women can take in order to 
avoid being raped, sexually assaulted or harassed, these claims are empirically 
unfounded and significantly limit women’s ability to participate fully in society as 
equal citizens. 
  
It is important to note that classifying gender as a key feature of rape does not 
mean to imply that men do not also suffer from the fear and prevalence of rape. 
Rather, it is to assert the empirical fact that men and women are unequally 
socially situated in regards to the experience of rape.29 While the rules of rape 
are empirically unfounded, rape avoidance rules become second nature and 
operate in the backdrop of most women’s daily lives. Regardless of whether or 
not a woman has experienced rape, the threat of rape shapes the spaces we 
inhabit, the types of relationships we build with men, and the opportunities 
available to us. Similarly to punishment, the threat does most of the work.30 
Claudia Card (1991) provocatively claims that rape avoidance rules have 
“terrorist implications” in their ability to manipulate target populations into 
compliance by creating a state of affairs that people would rationally reject in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Catharine A. MacKinnon (1989) ‘Rape: On Coercion and Consent’, Towards a Feminist 
Theory of State, (Harvard University Press), p. 176.   
30 For example, in Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault (1977: 177) states “at the heart of all 
disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism”. While normalising judgements, 
surveillance and the geometry of space form the basis of disciplinary systems, the small penal 
mechanism acts as a significant deterrent. This functions as an extremely effective method of 
social control as individuals begin to internalise the notion that if they act outside of normative 
social conventions, there will be consequences for their actions. See Michel Foucault (1997) 
Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Books). 
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different circumstances.31 For example, women may not allow themselves to 
walk alone at night, even though they believe that women should be able to 
walk alone at night. In focusing exclusively on the individual disposition of the 
victim and what she was doing or wearing at the time, it is unsurprising that the 
sexual violence endemic we’re experiencing today has been resistant to legal, 
political and social interventions.  
   
If we continue to culturally define rape as a wholly individualistic act committed 
only by psychologically disturbed men who attack women at night, then the 
solutions we devise to combat its prevalence will inevitably be superficial at best 
(e.g. gender policing and implementing curfews). Not only do the number of 
potential rapists remain the same, but such measures validate the persistence 
of men’s violence against women by reminding women that rape is a women’s 
problem and they must bear the cost of living and moving about in fear, instead 
of addressing the real causes of rape. In further reflecting on the link between 
how we socially imagine rape to how we practically choose to combat it, 
Chapter 2 argues that the act of rape and prevalence of men’s violence against 
women in society is best understood as a moral violation to all women. To be 
forced to have sex, and then be told that such force was “part of what you 
risked” is not only used to absolve men of responsibility for that force, but also 
to deprive women of the moral grounds necessary to insist that certain 
behaviour towards them is unacceptable. It is therefore important that we 
continue to critically explore and challenge the cultural beliefs that rationalise 
men’s violence against women in a twisted reversal of responsibility and 
question whose interests are being served by these claims and whose values 
are being privileged and why. 
  
Rape and collective responsibility 
While it is culturally unsettling to comprehend a social order that permits men’s 
violence against women as a way of life, there are good reasons to believe that 
a belief system reinforced by institutions and embodied by a collective can 
significantly infringe on our individual ability to grasp important moral facts. The 
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  Claudia Card (1991) ‘Rape as a terrorist institution’ p. 301.	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debate surrounding the various ways in which individual morality is constructed, 
conditioned and constrained is significant as it holds profound implications 
concerning whether or not cultural membership alone can diminish or absolve 
individual responsibility for acts of institutional wrongdoing. As Pleasants (2008) 
identifies, the idea that an individual’s beliefs, perceptions, and values can be 
influenced by social rules and institutional structures have been widely criticised 
by social theorists who claim that such an assertion unfairly reduces moral 
agents to passive, “cultural dopes”.32  However, historical evidence strongly 
suggests that there is of course a strong link between cultural conditions and 
individual moral agency. For example, Hannah Arendt’s (2003) book Eichmann 
in Jerusalem places significant emphasis on the pervasive influence of a 
bureaucratic system on an individual’s moral perceptions.33 Similarly, Daniel 
Goldhagen’s widely cited and highly controversial book Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust demonstrates how 
institutionalised anti-Semitism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
induced ordinary Germans to become “willing genocidal killers”.34 While culture 
does not wholly determine action, it can close off certain possibilities in limiting 
the evidence available for agents to critically question the morality of their 
current practices. 
 
I conclude my analysis of rape as an act of institutional wrongdoing with an 
assessment of men’s collective moral responsibility for rape. Depending on 
whether we conceptualise institutional wrongdoers as having been unable to 
see the wrongness of their society’s practices or whether they actively chose to 
remain ignorant, the controversial question remains as to whether individuals 
can be held culpable for their actions.35 As Larry May and Robert Strikwerda 
(1998) identify, discussions on collective responsibility tend to elicit extreme 
responses in the fear that conceptualising moral culpability in this way will 
somehow absolve or diminish the blameworthiness of individual offenders by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, p. 97.  
33 Hannah Arendt (2003) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: 
Penguin Books), pp. 5-6.   
34 Daniel Goldhagen (1996) Goldhagen, D. (1997) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary 
Germans and the Holocaust, (New York: Vintage Books), p. 3.   
35 Nigel Pleasants (2008) ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, pp. 97-99.  
16	  
	  
allowing individual men to get “off the hook too easily”.36 However, I argue that 
significant concerns surrounding the principle of diminished responsibility are 
misguided. In challenging the orthodox view that rape is only the responsibility 
of rapists, this line of inquiry has significant practical implications for prevention 
work by exposing the systemic nature of rape and possibilities for resistance. 
Given that it is largely men and boys who promote and perpetuate violence 
against women, the imposition of collective responsibility provides a means to 
engage men and boys to critically reflect on their beliefs, values and practices, 
and in turn, potentially transform the institution of rape and patriarchal 
operations.  
  
If rape is to be theoretically and practically understood as an act of institutional 
wrongdoing, there are real challenges. Addressing men’s violence against 
women in a meaningful way requires a paradigm shift in the way we collectively 
construct and perceive masculine and feminine identities, heterosexual sex, and 
assessments of moral and legal culpability, therefore resulting in revolutionary 
changes in both interpersonal and institutional relations. As Susan Griffin (1977) 
asserts “rape is not an isolated act that can be rooted out from patriarchy 
without ending patriarchy itself.” 37  Pragmatically, such a significant social 
change is unlikely to occur in the near future. However, there is an obvious link 
between how we think about a problem and the practical solutions we choose to 
combat it. If we continue to classify rape as only an individual crime, we will 
continue to understand rape as a morally abhorrent, yet seemingly natural and 
inevitable feature of our social world rooted in the psychology of disturbed men. 
However, if we reconsider the moral and legal status of rape as a complex act 
of institutional wrongdoing, and understand rape as an act that is inextricably 
linked to a masculine identity that is socially and institutionally formed, there are 
good reasons to believe that the social conditions which shape individual 
attitudes and learned behaviours can be reformed.   
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This thesis is divided into three chapters: 1 Problematising Sex, 2 The Wrong of 
Rape, and 3 Collective Responsibility for Rape. In Chapter 1, I explore the 
prevalence and implications of rape myths and the question of consent to 
establish that the act of rape is a complex social problem that cannot be 
addressed through legislative reform alone. While the wrongness of rape 
appears unadorned and obvious, in Chapter 2 I argue that it matters why we 
collectively think rape is wrong. In doing so, I demonstrate how scholarly 
attempts to classify the wrongness of rape in individualistic terms are 
philosophically misguided, instead favouring the view that the wrongness of 
rape is best understood by the way in which it is a moral violation to all women. 
Lastly, in Chapter 3 I explore the vexed question of collective responsibility. If 
rape is to be accepted as an act of institutional wrongdoing, to what degree is 
this conception useful to its eradication? I argue that while we are encouraged 
to believe that responsibility for acts of men’s violence against women belong 
solely to deranged men, it is men as a collective who bear the greatest ethical 
responsibility to act against the institution of rape.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problematising Sex 
 
“I am of the opinion that even the most perfect rape laws in the land, strictly 
enforced by the best citizens will not be enough to stop rape” 
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(Susan Brownmiller, 1975)38 
 
In recent years, there has been an official recognition that steps need to be 
taken in order to deal with the poor conviction rates for rape in England and 
Wales.39 Following the first ever report on sexual offending which revealed that 
approximately 85,000 women are victims of rape every year, much attention 
has been placed on the shortcomings of law enforcement agencies and the 
criminal justice system in their failure to encourage reporting, support victims, 
and secure rape convictions.40 However, in representing what David Ormerod 
(2011) describes as “the most comprehensive and radical overhaul of law 
relating to sexual offences ever undertaken in England and Wales”, 41  the 
Sexual Offences Act (SOA) [2003] has improved the law surrounding sexual 
crimes immensely. Despite this, the power of the police and capacity of the law 
in addressing sexual offences remains somewhat limited. Men’s violence 
against women is arguably still as “prevalent, menacing, and limiting to women 
as it has ever been.”42  While the legal system holds an instrumental and 
symbolic function, this chapter will argue that rape must be understood as a 
complex social problem that cannot be addressed through legislative reform 
alone.   
 
While rape is now defined broadly as non-consensual sex, the law does not 
adjudicate impartially on the question of rape. Rather, it participates in social 
constructions surrounding what counts as rape, and whose violation is deemed 
legitimate enough to amount to ‘rape’. Conventional social understandings of 
rape continue to limit the imagination of those who enact, enforce and interpret 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Susan Brownmiller (1975) ‘Women Fight Back’, Against Our Will, (Middlesex: Penguin Books), 
p. 400. 
39 Home Office (2016) ‘Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) Strategy Report’, March 
2016 (Online) Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/violence-against-women-and-
girls, Accessed: 15/06/16.  
40 Ministry of Justice (2013) ‘An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales’, 10th 
January 2013, pp. 1-73 (Online) Available: 
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offending-overview-jan-2013.pdf, Accessed: 13/04/15.   
41 David Ormerod (2011) ‘Sexual Offences’, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edition, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 716.   
42 Patricia Smith (1999) ‘The Persistence of Rape’, in Keith Burgess-Jackson A Most 
Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 
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rape laws - individuals who work within the police, legal profession and the 
courts are all part of the institutionalisation of rape. As Robin West (1996) 
identifies, the State has been reluctant to prosecute, or juries to convict, the 
rapes of “promiscuous” victims, women of colour, and women who, simply by 
their dress, location or behaviour were “asking for it”.43 While law reform in this 
area has been important, the divide between how jurors interpret and then 
make decisions about cases concerning sexual offences remains large. It is 
therefore equally as important that we continue to critically examine the values 
which underpin our current legal framework concerning sexual offences and 
question whose interests are being served by these cultural beliefs and why.  
 
This chapter will argue that combating the prevalence of rape is severely limited 
in a legal capacity unless there is a broader approach to educational and 
behavioural change strategies which recognise the various socio-cultural 
conditions that make women vulnerable to sexual violence, and increase men’s 
propensity to use violence. This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, part one 
will explore legislative reforms and their relationship to social meanings of rape. 
It will demonstrate how blaming the law’s failure to protect women misses more 
fundamental biases within the law. Consequently, widely accepted prejudices 
leave victims of men’s violence to be discriminated by a system which ought to 
protect them.44 Part two offers a more forensic examination of this argument, 
with an exclusive focus on the question of consent. In critically assessing 
whether consent to sex can ever be fully understood in terms of a free and 
equal agreement, this section argues that the law’s egalitarian framework for 
thinking about an individual’s capacity to consent to sex cannot practically 
provide a sound basis for sexual interactions. Lastly, part 3 reiterates the moral 
limits of criminal law. Such an assertion is not intended to undermine the law, 
but rather, to emphasise the simple fact that addressing men’s violence against 
women in a meaningful way requires a substantial revision of accepted social 
practices. While UK laws officially prohibit rape and sexual assault, I attempt to 
demonstrate that we have collectively (and somewhat inadvertently) supported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Robin West (1996) ‘A Comment on Consent, Sex and Rape’, Legal Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 
238.	  	  
44 Dorothy E. Roberts (1993) ‘Rape, Violence and Women’s Autonomy’, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review, Vol. 69, No. 2, Symposium: Is the Law Male? p. 363.  
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men’s violence against women by regulating practices and implementing 
policies based on false theorising. Thus concluding that attempting to deter rape 
on an individual basis through legislation alone will never be enough. Instead, 
we must focus on changing the social and structural foundations of this violence. 
 
Part One  
 
The legal and social meaning of rape  
 
Historically conceptualised through the “purview of ancient masculine codes”, 
the Sexual Offences Act (1956) outlined that a man was found guilty of rape if: 
(a) he had sexual intercourse (vaginal or anal) with a person who at the time did 
not consent, (b) knew that the person did not consent or was reckless to 
whether that person consented to it, and (c) If he induced a married woman to 
have sexual intercourse with him by impersonating her husband.45 Described by 
one commentator as “cumbersome and inadequate” and “archaic, incoherent 
and discriminatory”, 46  the Sexual Offences Act (1956) was merely a 
consolidation of various statutes dating back to the late nineteenth century.47  
 
Despite massive legal reform in the forty-seven year period between 1956-2003, 
such changes have done little to eliminate the pervasive myths surrounding 
rape that permeates many aspects of the laws governing sexual offences. The 
law surrounding rape, like any other body of law, criminal or civil, reflects and 
reinforces certain societal values.48 Following amendments made to the Sexual 
Offences Act (1956), The Sexual Offences Act [SOA] (2003) redefined the act 
of rape as the intentional penile-penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Legislation.gov.uk (2017) ‘Sexual Offences Act 1956’ (Online) Available: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/4-5/69, Accessed: 27/09/15.  
46 Jonathan Herring (2015) ‘Sexual Offences’, Criminal Law, 9th edition, (London: Macmillan 
Publishers) p. 134.  
47 David Omeron (2011) ‘Sexual Offences’, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th Edition, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford), p. 716. – Notably the Offences against the Person Act (1861).  
48 Keith Burgess-Jackson (1996) ‘Conclusion’, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation, (Hants: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited), p. 207.   
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male or female, without consent or reasonable belief in consent. 49  This 
amendment was significant in recognising marital rape, oral penetration, male 
victims of sexual offences, and consequently decriminalised homosexual 
offences (buggery).50 One of the most noteworthy aspects of the SOA (2003) is 
that it continued to classify rape as one of the few offences capable of being 
committed only by a male, therefore establishing a hierarchy of sexual offences 
rather than just one all-purpose offence. By virtue of not carrying the risks of 
disease and pregnancy, the SOA (2003) outlines that ‘assault by penetration’ is 
criminal, but not ‘rape’.51 This means that it is an offence for a male or female to 
penetrate the vagina, anus or mouth of another person without their consent.52 
The Sexual Offences Review found that despite the fact that there was 
sufficient evidence that a woman could force a man to penetrate her against his 
will, it rejected any suggestion that rape should be redefined to recognise this 
fact in an attempt to ensure that the offence of rape corresponds broadly with 
the general public’s understanding of the term – “We felt rape was clearly 
understood by the public as an offence that was committed by men on women 
and men.”53 In some ways, this reasoning appears unusual given that the public 
have often had unjustified beliefs about criminality, such as laws surrounding 
the illegality of homosexuality. While the intimate relationship between the law 
and prevailing social attitudes should not be considered as inherently positive, 
in this case it appears justified. In emphasising the gendered element of rape, it 
reduces the ability of the public to falsely conceptualise the reality of rape as 
somewhat gender neutral. 
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Hierarchy of offences in the legal code  
While it is generally accepted that rape involves the forcible sexual penetration 
of the human body, continuing to define rape gender specifically by penile 
penetration has attracted widespread criticism for classifying what are deemed 
to be equal acts of violation into a lesser category.54 On one hand, the law’s 
continued equation of rape with penile penetration implies that sexual assaults 
vary in the nature of seriousness. However, the difference between what is 
defined as ‘rape’ and ‘assault by penetration’ seems negligible given that the 
assault on the victim’s autonomy is hardly diminished by such a slight 
classificatory distinction. As William Wilson (2014) asserts, “If rape is committed 
irrespective of the orifice, then why should it not also be committed irrespective 
of the instrument or the gender of the perpetrator?” 55  Moreover, while 
pregnancy, or the fear of it, will undoubtedly exacerbate trauma, the same can 
be said for the transmission of sexual infections, which are not only required 
through penile penetration. On the other hand, in aiming to protect vulnerable 
groups and ensure that the penalties available are commensurate with the 
gravity of the offence, providing a range of offences rather than a single all-
purpose offence allows for the possibility of increasing the numbers of charges, 
guilty pleas and convictions.56  In other words, a hierarchy of sexual offences 
may ensure that an accused person is charged with a sexual offence of some 
form rather than with none at all. In terms of specification, this does not mean 
that the law is necessarily enlightened. As Lord Hansard declared when 
debating the Sexual Offences Act in parliament - “it is simply no good providing 
a definition of rape which would satisfy a philosopher or a logician; it has to be 
readily understood by a jury”. 57  Given that men are the overwhelming 
perpetrators of sexual offences, the law simply reflects the reality of the act as it 
happens in our world, in our culture, at this time.  
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The public’s perception of a crime can therefore be seen to have a significant 
influence on law reform and policy decisions relating to sexual offences by 
dictating what counts as a legal violation. Given that juries are made up of 
members of the public and ultimately decide verdicts, this is an important 
consideration. The instrumental role that the public play in influencing legal 
definitions and verdicts mean that a misinformed public poses a significant 
threat to just outcomes for victims. Indeed, public perceptions can be seen to 
have a profoundly negative impact in the case of rape and other sexual 
offences. “Institutionalised rape myths” refer to a set of preconceived ideas 
surrounding who the ‘real’ victims and perpetrators of rape are.58 For example, 
the paradigmatic ‘real rape’ commonly refers to scenarios where a stranger 
attacks an unsuspecting victim in an outdoor location, involving the threat or use 
of force by the assailant and active physical resistance by the victim 59 . 
Unfortunately for prosecutors, this type of scenario is uncommon. Although it is 
extremely difficult to accurately assess the extent of offending due to the very 
nature of the crime, widespread underreporting and extremely high acquittal 
rates, evidence demonstrates that this model of how a real rape exists in the 
public imagination is empirically unfounded.  It is estimated that only eight per 
cent of all rapes are committed by strangers,60 only thirty seven per cent of rape 
victims suffer from a major physical injury61 and victims of rape are more likely 
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to be attacked in their own home.62 Rape myths paint an unreflective picture of 
its reality and are unaligned with laws governing sexual offences in England and 
Wales. Despite this, research demonstrates that rape myths are widely 
accepted and have worrying implications.63  
 
Rape in the social imagination  
Described by Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahe (2008) as the “justice gap”, 
rape myths can be seen to have an insidious influence on every stage of the 
criminal justice system, from the rate of reporting, victim support and the 
performance of the jury.64 Louise Ellison and Vanessa Munro’s (2009) widely 
cited study on mock jury deliberations found that rape myths not only influence 
the plausibility of the allegation, perceived credibility of the complainant and 
culpability of the alleged offender, but also the whole narrative a juror constructs 
about a case. For example, in one mock trial, Ellison and Munro (2009) found 
that jurors exhibited a “strong and, in many cases, unshakeable expectation that 
a genuine victim of rape would engage in vigorous physical resistance against 
her attacker, and that, as a result, there would be corroborative evidence of 
injury on the body of either the complainant or defendant, or both”.65 A lack of 
such features played a profound role in diminishing the credibility of a woman’s 
claim during deliberations from jurors who expressed that “if she really wanted 
to protect herself, she would have put up more of a fight”.66 The unsympathetic 
public morality of rape in this case appears to suggest that unless there is 
tangible evidence of a victim being mutilated or brutalised, one is suspected of 
having provoked, initiated or complied with the sexual interaction. This clear 
discrepancy between the legal definition of rape, the general public’s 
understanding of rape, and the reality of rape is extremely problematic as 
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cultural stereotypes can be seen to take precedence over the unique features of 
individual cases by dictating what counts as a real violation.  
  
Strictly speaking, jurors are told to assess evidence for the acts that constitute 
the offence. Suppose jurors believe that non-consensual sex between a man 
and wife is not ‘rape’, but they will be told that the law says it is; their role is to 
work out if the alleged acts occurred, not to dispute the law. How then, can the 
influence of rape myths in trials be explained? I propose it can be explained 
partly, if not wholly, by implicit biases. Psychological research strongly suggests 
that people have two different types of mental representations: explicit and 
implicit attitudes.67  For example, individuals may profess a commitment to 
gender equality, but still have implicit biases that women are more ‘naturally’ 
suited to caregiving and domestic roles. Similarly, jurors may be able to 
understand that the law says a man can rape his wife, but may implicitly form 
the belief that the act did not occur, or believe that unwanted sex occurred, but 
implicitly think that it should not be classified as an act of ‘rape’. It is therefore 
plausible that implicit biases relating to rape change what it is that jurors are 
supposed to be deciding on. As a result, jurors will, in a sense, be asking the 
wrong type of questions when they hear evidence. Consequently, the inherent 
seriousness of rape as an offence and the associated punishment creates a 
more explicit problem where jurors may be more reliant on tangible evidence in 
order to be convinced that a crime occurred.  
 
The tendency for jurors to rely on their implicit evaluations is inevitably 
exacerbated by the very nature of sexual offences. Sexual offences remain one 
the most difficult crimes to prosecute within our adversarial legal framework 
because most acts of men’s violence against women occur in private and often 
lack corroborating evidence, meaning that it is extremely difficult to prove to the 
Court beyond reasonable doubt, with no other supporting evidence, that a crime 
was committed. Unlike homicide where there is a body, or burglary where there 
may be signs of forced entrance, evidence of sexual intercourse and a woman’s 
testimony alone are rarely sufficient to conclude that an offence occurred. A key 
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difficulty here is that while the absence of consent does not necessarily have to 
be communicated in words or actions (a person being sexually assaulted may 
freeze, say no or do nothing, but this does not equal consent), jurors may query 
a claim of non-consent if the complainant did not verbalise it or physically resist. 
Moreover, in facing a judge, several barristers, a jury and members of the public, 
complainants often describe their experience in court as a “second rape”. 
Defence lawyers during cross examinations are able to prey upon a victim’s 
inability to accurately recall the event, to the extent that it becomes conflated 
with a lack of credibility and weakness in their story, making it very difficult for 
rape victims to utter the words needed to secure a conviction.68 Rape myths 
inevitably allow for jurors to draw upon dominant narratives of men’ violence 
against women and draw inferences based on deeply rehearsed cultural 
assumptions surrounding how women should behave where evidence in a court 
case is unclear or unavailable. The seriousness of rape and the minimum 
sentence of five years means that jurors may rely more heavily on physical 
evidence to help form a consensus. The combination of implicit biases and the 
evidential difficulties associated with rape makes it a particularly difficult crime 
for the legal system to adequately address.  
 
Even in rare cases where there are eye witnesses, physical evidence and a 
recent complaint, both jurors and judges continue to display a reluctance to 
convict and sentence young, white men who deviate from cultural depictions of 
rapists as perverted and psychologically disturbed men. For example, in March 
last year, twenty-year old student Brock Turner was convicted on all three 
counts of felony sexual assault following an incident on 18th January 2015, 
where two Stanford University graduate students caught Turner sexually 
penetrating a half-naked unconscious woman with his fingers. Described as an 
“All-American swimmer” with a “squeaky clean image”, Brock was convicted to 
only six months imprisonment after Judge Aaron Perksy stated that anything 
more would have a “severe impact on Turner’s future”. As a commentator on 
the case astutely identified, “If you ask someone on the street what a rapist 
looks like, they’ll tell you a stranger with a ski mask and a gun. You get this 
superstar athlete white kid from a fancy university, and he doesn’t fit that 
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image”.69 In circumscribing the validity of all women’s experiences of rape 
based on deeply embedded social prejudices, courts risk assessing the severity 
of rape based on conditions that are not relevant or appropriate. In determining 
what constitutes a ‘real rape’ by considering the factors of location, physical 
injury and the time taken to report the offence, rape myths reinforce the 
problematic belief that the value of consent is contingent upon the perceived 
credibility of the alleged offender, or a woman’s status, appearance or 
behaviour – the victim’s degree of resistance, consumption of alcohol, and the 
time of day and place of the attack.70 The discrepancy between normative 
expectations and reality is problematic as it makes it difficult for victims to 
convince officials that a rape was really a rape and blinds jurors in their attempt 
to invoke an array of empirically unfounded assumptions concerning 
‘appropriate’ behaviour and misconceptions concerning the capacity of victims 
to physically resist an attack.71  
 
Much of the focus here has been placed on the limitations of juries in rape trials 
and not on the problems rape myths create for victims of sexual offences. If 
individual victims hold the same problematic understandings of rape, it is 
important to consider how societal misconceptions may play a role in preventing 
them from fully comprehending their experience and placing it in the reality of 
what actually happened.72 Katherine Jenkins (2016) defines this phenomenon 
as a ‘hermeneutical injustice’, whereby somebody has a significant area of their 
social experience obscured from understanding due to “prejudicial flaws in 
shared resources for social interpretation”.73 In light of the social acceptance of 
rape myths, is it then possible for a woman to have been raped or sexually 
abused and not know it? And what does it say about our culture that there can 
be so much ambiguity between rape and sex? Dominant discourses on men’s 
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violence against women reflect a stealthy, yet significant power in shaping how 
we collectively define and understand what constitutes an act of rape. For 
example, a woman may describe an experience of unwanted sexual intercourse 
with her partner that by all accounts fits the legal definition of rape. However, 
due to the fact that mainstream discourses on rape tend to focus exclusively on 
sensationalised images of sexual offences whereby women are raped by a 
deranged stranger involving bodily harm, she may not label it as such. 
Consequently, her acceptance of rape myths affects her interpretation of her 
own experience when the abuse did not take the form of severe physical 
violence and wasn’t perpetrated by someone unknown to her. Given that over 
90% of women know their perpetrators, this is an important consideration.74 The 
prevalence of rape acceptance myths in mainstream discourse obscure and 
distort the reality of women’s everyday experiences of sexual violence, thereby 
maintaining a routine invisibility of men’s violence against women. 
 
In influencing both women’s understandings of their own experience and jurors 
interpretations of the evidence, the existence of rape myths further obstructs the 
administration of justice by creating a restrictive criteria for what types of cases 
make it to courts in the first place. Of the estimated 85,000 victims of rape per 
year in the UK, under 20% of these rapes are recorded by the police, with just 
3.5% taken to court and a mere 1.2% leading to a conviction.75 Once rape 
cases reach the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), prosecutors have a duty to 
assess the credibility and reliability of the victim in order to determine whether 
there is enough evidence to prosecute.76 Based on explicit assumptions of how 
the judge and jury are likely to perceive the complainant and her story; a lack of 
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medical evidence,77 a delay in reporting the offence, prior relationship with the 
defendant, alcohol consumption, and the character of the complainant 
(appearance and respectability) are all factors that are considered “serious 
setbacks” for prosecutors.78  All of the considerations above reflect societal 
misconceptions surrounding what a ‘real’ rape involves and the problematic 
requisite for physical evidence. A case may not proceed if there is not enough 
evidence to meet the evidential stage of the ‘Code Test’.79 In understanding the 
gap between the 15,670 cases that are recorded by the police and the 
astonishingly low number of the 2,910 cases that are taken to court, it is clear 
that rape myths have an insidious influence in manipulating the standards of 
truth used to determine which cases are pursued. In a sense, the legal system 
requires a certain level of severity (in direct relation to rape myths) in order to 
make a rape claim plausible, therefore barring many women from being legally 
acknowledged as victims of rape and pursuing justice against their perpetrator. 
This point is supported by the fact that one of the most frequently cited reasons 
for not reporting was because women believed that their experience was “too 
trivial” or just simply “not worth reporting.”80 
 
The persistence of social misconceptions surrounding sexual offences can 
therefore be seen to play a considerable role in making the plausibility of rape 
claims contingent upon one’s position in society and their ability to fit the model 
of the ‘ideal victim’. This is extremely problematic as cultural understandings of 
rape dictate and legitimise a tunnel vision approach to rape trials by 
perpetuating a particular kind of cultural ‘truth’ to the systematic exclusion of 
lived experiences of sexual violence. In countering the effects of rape myths, 
Western courts have introduced the use of expert witnesses in order to dispel 
some of the common misconceptions surrounding what constitutes ‘normal’ 
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behaviour consistent with that of a ‘real’ rape victim.81 The introduction of expert 
witnesses has been important in restoring the credibility of rape victims by 
ensuring that stereotypes surrounding rape do not take precedence over the 
unique features of individual cases. However, rape cases continue to have one 
of the highest acquittal rates of all crimes and research continues to 
demonstrate that complainants still struggle to gain credibility in eyes of the 
police, prosecutors and jurors.82 Given that victims, jurors and individuals who 
work within crime prosecution interpret what they see in light of their own beliefs, 
experiences and expectations, we need to know what these belief structures 
are and how they directly impact judgements in rape trials and victims of sexual 
offences if conviction rates are to improve. Until then, justice cannot be pursued, 
processes of the victim’s healing may be delayed or prevented entirely, and 
crucial protective steps that aim to address the underlying causes of men’s 
violence against women may not be followed.   
 
Part one of this Chapter has argued that the act of rape and the legal rules that 
govern sexual offences cannot be understood in isolation from the dominant 
norms, values and practices of any given culture. Drawing upon common rape 
myths as a primary example, I’ve established that there are striking differences 
among jurors and their interpretation of the law, thus demonstrating that while 
legislative reform has been significant, broader socio—cultural reforms are 
necessary if women are to have any confidence in the criminal justice system. 
In part two, I will go into finer detail to demonstrate how legal principles are 
applied. Focusing specifically on consent, I will argue that while the law upholds 
the idealistic image of men and women as equal agents, until social institutions 
follow, the law remains limited in its capacity to encourage reporting and 
successfully prosecute acts of rape.  
 
Part Two   
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The question of consent  
The legal rules and procedures that currently govern sexual offences have 
developed in subtle, complex and interesting ways.83 For centuries, consent did 
not draw the dividing line between rightful and wrongful sexual acts. Moral and 
legal assessments depended on marital status and the nature of the sexual act, 
often in reference to religious laws. Sexual activities were considered wrongful if 
they were deemed to be an affront to male privilege and property. During this 
time, consent could not possibly have been paramount to sex because a 
recognition of women’s sexual autonomy was socially, politically and legally 
non-existent. As Patricia Smith (1999) highlights “one earth-shattering change 
in modern society has been the decline during the past two centuries of the 
general view of women as property and the emergence of the idea of women as 
autonomous (or at least individual) human beings with interests of their own”.84 
It is therefore a relatively new idea that consent by all persons involved can 
suffice to make a sexual encounter morally permissible and that a lack of 
consent constitutes serious wrongdoing that may warrant criminal punishment. 
 
Coinciding with the development of modern liberal democratic societies, the 
increased value placed on individual sovereignty has allowed for the notion of 
consent to have significant moral force. 85  Consent serves two overlapping 
functions. Firstly, consent serves a protective function in safeguarding 
individuals from unauthorised invasions of their body and property.86 Secondly, 
consent makes interpersonal conduct that would otherwise be considered 
prohibited or wrongful, permissible. Heidi Hurd (2013) describes the normative 
power of consent as “moral magic” in its ability to transform the morality of 
another person’s conduct. Socially, we value having this control, and other 
people respecting this control. In a sense, it allows us to restrict the bodily 
interference of others.  
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Given the strong rhetorical and transformative power of consent, it is no 
surprise that rape has come to be conventionally defined as “sex without the 
consent of the victim”.87 However, the primary use of consent in medical and 
legal contexts has limited mainstream understandings of consent almost entirely 
to notions of informed consent,88 which cannot be easily transposed to intimate 
situations. Unlike signing a medical consent form, expressions of consent in 
sexual relations can be ambiguous and often fail to meet the criteria of consent 
as competent, voluntary and informed, therefore making it difficult to definitively 
determine the difference between sex and rape based on the minimum legal 
requirement of consent alone. While it remains uncontroversial that it is both 
legally and morally impermissible to engage in sexual relations without consent, 
locating the boundary between sex and rape calls for some clarification. Despite 
the obvious problem that this definition poses in suggesting that sex is wrongful 
if, and only if, there is an absence of an ‘agreement’, the concept of consent 
itself provides several practical and theoretical challenges. In redefining rape 
broadly as non-consensual sex, current laws have opened a new host of 
questions concerning the definition of ‘consent’. For example, what does 
consent fundamentally consist of? What conditions make consent morally and 
legally transformative? And lastly, is consent really all that’s needed to 
distinguish sex from rape?89   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Legally, consent has two main components. Firstly, it outlines who has the 
capacity to give consent, and secondly, it broadly identifies what counts as 
consent. According to section 74 of the SOA (2003) consent is broadly defined 
as whether the individual “agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity 
to make that choice”.90  Prosecutors consider this in two stages:  
 
 i. Whether a complainant had the relevant capacities (i.e. age and 
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understanding) to make a choice about whether or not to take part in a 
sexual activity at the time in question. The question of capacity to 
consent is also particularly relevant when a complainant is intoxicated by 
alcohol or affected by drugs. 
ii. Whether he or she was in a position to make that choice freely, and 
was not unduly constrained.91   
Therefore, sex that is coerced92 and sex that is imposed on a minor, the 
unconscious, intoxicated or mentally incapacitated are all legally understood as 
some degree of sexual assault.  
 
Over the past three decades, there has been a growing disenchantment among 
legal and feminist scholars with the use of consent as the primary criterion for 
defining and understanding rape. 93  Traditionally, it has been a woman’s 
responsibility to communicate her non-consent to sexual activity. For example, 
in the United States, a rape conviction required evidence of the “utmost 
resistance” from victims until the 1980s in some jurisdictions.94  Given this 
requirement, a failure to protect oneself with the “utmost resistance” was 
equated with consenting to the sexual interaction, thereby protecting men’s 
interests in sexual access by making it difficult to obtain a criminal charge for 
rape unless there was sufficient evidence of a physical struggle. As noted in 
part one, jurors still remain sceptical of victims who haven’t engaged in physical 
resistance and show tangible evidence of the altercation. Indeed, a negative 
standard of consent based only on the absence of overt resistance among 
women to men’s sexual advances remains a powerful social norm.95 However, 
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93 Keith Burgess-Jackson (1999) ‘Introduction’, in Keith Burgess-Jackson (eds.) A Most 
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a ‘positive standard’ of ‘free agreement’ is now being called for, and also men’s 
role in managing and negotiating this agreement. Crucially, the law seeks to 
define consent objectively based on the explicit assumption that each party 
possesses the requisite autonomy to reject the terms of contracts that are not in 
their best interests or simply do not want. As defined in section 74 of the SOA, 
consent is based on the idealistic principle that all individuals are equal, rational 
and autonomous agents. The use of the words ‘choice’, ‘freedom’, and ‘capacity’ 
reflect a commitment to a communicative model of sexuality based on an 
implied sense of mutual agreement and expectation of reciprocal 
responsibilities. The “no means no” messages of previous consent campaigns 
are now being replaced with “yes means yes” and “sex is only sexy when both 
people want it”.96 In many ways, the shift in law towards a positive standard of 
consent is to be welcomed.  To some degree, it holds potential perpetrators of 
sexual assault accountable to a high standard, whereby both men and women 
must take reasonable steps to ensure that consent was given and obtained.  
Proponents who uphold a positive standard argue that consent amounts to a 
simple duty: all he or she has to do is express themselves clearly. Indeed, 
communicating “yes” or “no” to sex does not appear to be an unreasonable or 
unduly challenging demand.   
 
Given that the process of law reform surrounding sexual offences has 
accelerated so rapidly over the past four decades, educating the public on 
sexual behaviour not previously considered a crime has been placed firmly on 
the public agenda among UK law enforcement agencies and activist 
organisations in recent years.  For example, in February this year, Devon and 
Cornwall Police were one among many departments to launch ‘The Good 
Consent Guide’ campaign to raise awareness on giving and obtaining consent. 
With an explicit commitment to a communicative model of sexuality, the 
campaign aims to promote the view that there are “#noblurredlines” when it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sexual activity. While the limited sample size means that this research is not generalisable, it 
provides a valuable insight into the disconnect between the new legal approach to consent and 
how young people understand and communicate consent to sex. 
See Melanie Ann Beres (2015) ‘Rethinking the concept of consent for anti-sexual violence 
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comes to sex in order to prevent crime, reduce the number of incidences 
through raising awareness, and to encourage reporting both to police and 
partner agencies. 97  Similarly, in collaboration with the Crown Prosecution 
Service and Thames Valley Sexual Violence Prevention group, Thames Valley 
Police Department used the popular ‘Sexual Consent and Tea’ video to launch 
their “#ConsentIsEverything” campaign.98  The three minute animated video 
explains how understanding sexual consent is as straightforward as making a 
cup of tea for a visitor.  Towards the end, viewers are asked:  
If you can understand how completely ludicrous it is to force people to 
have tea when they don’t want tea, and you are able to understand when 
people do want tea, then how is it so hard to understand when it comes 
to sex?99  
 
Following the increasing trend to remove any ‘gray’ areas surrounding consent 
and educate the public based on a positive standard, this clear, simple, and 
accessible analogy is intended to be effective in educating the public on the 
minimum requirement for legally permissible sex. Detective Chief Inspector 
Justin Fletcher from Thames Valley Police confidently claims “Together we can 
prevent rape by ensuring everyone knows when they have sexual consent”.100 
While it is clear that procedural care needs to be taken in order to ensure that 
the public are well aware of the legal requirement for non-criminal sex, 
operating on the explicit assumption that educating people on the legal 
definition of consent alone will somehow end sexual violence is fundamentally 
misguided. It is very easy to say yes or no to a cup of tea, and very easy to offer 
a cup of tea. This is precisely because a cup of tea is not part of your body, 
identity, or wrapped in wider socio-cultural constructions of genders and 
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sexualities. Perhaps if consent was as simple as giving or asking for a cup of 
tea, then cases of sexual violence would not be so prevalent and widespread. 
 
While most people can grasp the legal definition of consent, research 
demonstrates that they simply fail to see how it applies to them. Michael Flood 
(2011) observes that “among young men most invested in notions of male 
sexual entitlement, the biggest obstacle to practicing consent is not that they 
don’t know how, but that they do not feel the need to do so.”101 In other words, it 
is not a case of “I wonder if she’d like to have a cup of tea with me”, it is “I want 
a cup of tea and I’m going to have one with her”. In many ways, the irrelevance 
of consent stems from the way in which ordinary men are taught to behave and 
see women which makes a woman’s choice or active participation seem 
secondary. This is not to say that a focus on consent is necessarily misguided. 
Rather, that using a strict legal definition in educational campaigns is too 
detached from reality and therefore largely ineffective.  
 
Perhaps practicing consent is in some ways analogous to drink driving. While 
most people are able to articulate why drink driving is wrong, it is only 
considered wrong over a certain level (both legally and through personal 
discretion). Consequently, campaigns which emphasise the message as ‘don’t 
drink and drive’ enable readers of this message to exercise discretion with its 
interpretation. One can simultaneously agree that drink driving is bad yet feel it 
is okay to have two glasses of wine before driving home. The problem with drink 
driving, like consent campaigns, is that it uses an objective criteria that is too 
unreflective of everyday practices and allows one’s own practices to go 
unexamined. Most men would agree that sex without consent is abhorrent but 
could simultaneously fail to ensure consent is present in their own sexual 
relations. As Fee Scott from Devon Rape Crisis and Sexual Abuse Services 
states, campaigns like the tea and consent video allow for people to say “yeah 
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yeah yeah absolutely, not me though”.102 A man may continue to drink two 
glasses of wine and drive home every day for the rest of his life, similarly, a man 
may continue to never actively ensure consent but believe his sexual 
encounters are consensual. In both cases, emphasising the legal standard of 
consent or drink driving do little to change his individual behaviour. When 
campaigns portray consent or non-consent as objective features, they 
fundamentally miss how most people understand and communicate consent to 
sex. They also allow for men to only consider clear cut cases, for example sex 
with an unconscious woman, instead of the complexities of communicating 
consent that may be relevant to their own sexual experiences. This is significant 
as it means that the harmful, everyday practices of non-consent fail to be 
subject to critical reflection. Consequently, a strict adherence to the legal 
definition would mean that many more men than previously thought may be 
either committing or are in danger of committing rape.  
 
Moreover, it is important to highlight here what a truly ambitious model of 
consent this is. To have the freedom, capacity and choice required to consent to 
sex, decision-makers would need to know all the relevant facts, be competent to 
assess them, and be capable of asserting themselves against others. Humans 
in real life hardly ever conform to this ideal. Imagine a situation where consent 
to sex is made between parties who are equal in power and knowledge; who 
are identically socially, economically and politically situated. A contract like this 
would leave no room for coercion, deception and unfair advantages. The law 
idealistically defines consent like this situation, as if an individual’s capacity to 
consent to sex can be categorised objectively.103 A seemingly obvious point 
here is that people in real life are situated differently, meaning that differences 
in knowledge and bargaining power are common. As long as this is the case, 
the ideal of an agreement among equals does not by itself, guarantee the 
ethicality of the sexual conduct. Having addressed the criteria for non-criminal 
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sex, I will now explore whether consent is a meaningful criterion for morally 
permissible sex.  
 
There are real challenges in establishing a positive standard of consent based 
on voluntary agreement as such an objective standard also fails to recognise 
the contextual factors within which sexual relations may take place. Given that 
consent is understood as an exercise in individual autonomy, it is important to 
consider whether conditions of social oppression or unequal power relations 
undermine its legitimacy or cast doubt upon the legal permissibility of the act. 
As identified in clause two: section 74 of the SOA, consent is not given unless it 
is given freely.104 In expressing concerns about the role of gender-based power 
in sexual relations, feminist theorists have long called into question whether a 
woman’s consent can ever be free, informed and valid under the “coercive 
conditions of a sexist society”.105 In stating that “a lot of not-saying-no passes 
for consent to sex”,106 Catharine MacKinnon (1989) made a pivotal contribution 
to our understandings of rape (and heterosexual sex more broadly) by 
highlighting that while consent can include sex that is wanted, it can also 
include sex that is unwanted and forced by inequality. In other words, for 
MacKinnon, the issue of consent for women under the law is that all sexual 
relations between men and women occur within a realm of power that actively 
places women in a subordinate position.  
 
In drawing attention to the relevant forces and pressures that may render a 
woman’s “yes” as something coerced rather than freely given, MacKinnon and 
so-called “radical” feminists alike are often accused of condemning all 
heterosexual sex as rape. However, MacKinnon does not mean to say that 
women are incapable of having voluntary sex in male-female sexual relations, 
or imply that women cannot tell the difference. In an interview with MacKinnon 
published in the Guardian newspaper in 2006, the interviewer asks, “Doesn’t 
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what you have said make any heterosexual act problematic?” To which 
MacKinnon replies, “It problematises those that take place under conditions of 
sex inequality, yes. In a certain structural sense. In the same way that, say, 
friendships between black and white people in societies that are racist 
do…People work it out with great difficulty. But the first step is not to deny that 
it’s there.”107 In conflating the distinction between sex and rape, MacKinnon’s 
claim isn’t merely hyperbole, such a claim is intended to push the reader or 
listener to a re-examination of the orthodox view. In this case, to re-evaluate the 
view that consensual sex is always morally permissible by virtue of being 
consensual.  
 
For my discussion, the insight of MacKinnon’s argument is two-fold. Firstly, 
MacKinnon accounts for the very real fact that simply saying “yes” to sex does 
not necessarily capture a willingness to engage in sex. As Robin West identifies 
(2010), there is an ambiguity and hence complexity in the phrase ‘consensual 
sex’.108 Consensual sex may include sex that is actively wanted and desired, 
and also sex that is consensual but unwanted. Drawing upon interviews with 
heterosexual women, Nicola Gavey (2005) supports this claim and proposes 
the existence of a “gray area” in sexual relations, whereby women may consent 
to sex, but did so because they did not feel they had a choice.109 Importantly, 
Gavey is not referring to cases of hermeneutical injustices as identified by 
Katharine Jenkins, where women have been victims of a serious sexual assault 
but fail to label their experience correctly. Rather, Gavey maintains that there is 
an ambiguity between some heterosexual sex and rape – an ambiguity in 
everyday, taken-for-granted experiences of ‘consensual sex’ that may not rise 
to the criminal category of sexual assault, but are at the very least morally 
questionable. 
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One may experience difficulty in understanding why a woman would repeatedly 
engage in unwanted and unpleasing sex. However, as West (2010) identifies, 
married women are a primary example.110 A married woman’s consent to sex 
was not required by law in the UK until 1991. Until then, the importance of a 
married woman’s sexual autonomy was irrelevant and minimised by both the 
law and powerful social norms. While legal immunity no longer exists, within 
patriarchal structures ‘consensual’ but undesired sex within marriage may be 
attributed to: an understanding of the requirement of wifely duties, financial 
dependence, to avoid a hassle or fight, or simply because she cares for a 
partner who really wants to have sex. Similarly, there are a myriad of reasons 
why heterosexual women generally may engage in unwanted ‘consensual’ sex 
– to gain the approval of their peers, fear of abandonment or violence, out of 
self-interest to get a job promotion, or because they simply have been taught to 
do so.111 While women of course still have the capacity for individual choice, 
they may make decisions to consent to sex within a limited framework shaped 
by social, political and economic disadvantage.   
 
Secondly, MacKinnon demonstrates that there are distinct conceptual 
similarities between what is legally defined as rape and what is often eroticised 
as desirable types of heterosexual sex. MacKinnon (1989) states that “women 
live in sexual objectification the way that fish live in water… the question is, 
what can life as a woman mean? What can sex mean to targeted survivors of 
rape culture?”112 In other words, there are many complex ways in which women 
are also socialised in the institution of rape. Devaluing and disrespecting 
women through sexual penetration remains a consistent theme in our cultural 
depictions of sexual interactions. Within dominant discourses and 
representations of heterosexuality, we have culturally constructed the idea that 
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sex with a woman who is unwilling can be erotic - that it is okay for men not to 
take no for an answer, to ignore women’s signs of disinterest and push past 
resistance. 113  Women too may take on a set of ideas about gender and 
sexuality which may increase the likelihood of their own victimisation.  For 
example, heterosexual women learn an investment in being seen as desirable 
by men and an ethic of sexual service where women learn the role of putting the 
needs of their male partner first.114 Women may put up with and go along with 
sexual interactions that are in fact coercive, abusive, or at least very unhealthy. 
There are an array of heterosexual interactions that would satisfy the legal 
definition of rape, but are heavily normalised and conventionally understood as 
typical features of heterosexual sex.  
 
Despite these conceptual similarities, it does not follow that consensual and 
non-consensual sex are in all ways the same. Dripps (1992) and West (1999), 
among other feminists, justifiably express the concern that conflating all acts of 
unwanted consensual sex with rape may trivialise men’s violence against 
women.115 Of course, there is a real, and presumably felt difference between 
coercive factors that elicit consent (consensual, but unwanted sex) and coercive 
force by a perpetrator who overrides and ignores a lack of consent or exploits a 
situation where the individual’s capacity to consent is inoperative (rape or 
sexual assault). Rape is coercive in an entirely different way. However, it is 
clear that framing the ethical distinction between the presence and absence of 
consent alone is insufficient. In asking what distinguishes heterosexual 
interactions in the gray area from acts that constitute sexual assault, Ann Cahill 
(2016) was the first to provide a theoretical account of how the two categories 
differ by exploring how women’s sexual agency is deployed in each 
interaction.116 Cahill highlights that interactions in the gray area are marked by 
the presence of a split will, where women usually display a hesitant, reluctant or 
ambivalent kind of willingness. Although this can be seen as more of a 
concession rather than an active affirmation of consent, unlike cases of rape or 
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sexual assault, women in these situations are still making a contribution to the 
interaction. In other words, a woman’s sexual agency is in play, but in a weak 
and passive way. While Cahill notes that there is a phenomenological distinction 
given that women do not always feel harmed when they have sex in the gray 
area, she avoids concluding that instances of rape are clearly more harmful to 
individuals than instances of unjust sex. Similarly to Cahill, I am also wary of 
hierarchising the harm of each interaction. While the wrong and harm of rape 
and sex will be discussed more closely in chapter 2, the tension between these 
two categories is significant because it demonstrates that the legal construct of 
consent as the sharp dividing line between rape and sex is unable to provide a 
sound ethical basis for sexual interactions and fails to correspond to women’s 
everyday experiences of heterosexual sex.  
 
MacKinnon’s argument is significant as it highlights the various ways in which 
power operates through contemporary cultural norms to render some choices 
unequal, therefore casting doubt upon the extent to which we can rely on the 
“moral magic”117 of consent alone to redeem a sexual act. The unilateral nature 
of consent can therefore allow for gendered power to take precedence over the 
value of the agreement. As a consequence, women may experience and even 
desire sex that is forceful, violent, degrading and humiliating, but not question it 
as being problematic. West (2010) argues that the commonality of sexual 
experiences in the gray area among women might do more widespread harm in 
the aggregate in the same way that economic exploitation might do more long-
lasting damage than an individual experience of theft.118  Legally, women’s 
capacity to consent is assumed to be equal to men. However, this assumption 
is actually unfair in a society where institutional respect for women’s sexual 
autonomy is largely absent. While an egalitarian basis for consent to sex is an 
ideal that we as a society should strive towards, the practical application of a 
positive standard of consent seems inevitably thwarted by unequal power 
relationships, the absence of strong norms promoting sexual negotiation, and 
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an increasing pornographic culture based on sexist narratives of male sexual 
prowess and female submission.119  
 
In combating the difficulty of establishing the actus reus of a rape based on the 
absence of consent alone, the law also requires the intention to penetrate the 
vagina, anus or mouth of another person.120 While it is unanimously accepted 
that an assessment of an individual’s state of mind is necessary for criminal 
liability, determining the mens rea of someone accused of rape is not always 
straightforward.121   For example, is failing to obtain consent the same as 
intending to engage in non-consensual intercourse? In the widely cited DPP v 
Morgan [1976] case, three appellants were convicted of rape following an 
incident that occurred on a night out drinking with a fellow officer in the Royal 
Air Force, who invited them back to his house to have sexual intercourse with 
his wife while he watched. According to the appellants, he had told them that his 
wife would be consenting, although “she was kinky” and would protest in order 
to enhance her sexual arousal.122 Their defence therefore depended on their 
belief that Mrs Morgan had consented to the violent sexual acts. However, Mrs 
Morgan had made it quite clear that she was in fact not consenting and 
sustained significant physical injuries that later required hospital treatment.123 
Given the circumstances, the House of Lords was of the opinion that no jury 
would have considered the belief of the defendants as genuine and the three 
men (including Mr Morgan) were consequently charged with rape. As a result, 
the court established the current principle of intention for rape law in England 
and Wales whereby the accused’s belief in consent must be genuine and 
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honest.124 While the ‘reasonable person’ test is entrusted to juries in a variety of 
criminal cases, the precedent set by the DPP v Morgan case was referred to by 
the press as the ‘Rapist’s Charter’ as it raised the vexed question as to whether 
a genuinely mistaken belief in consent to sex is legitimate in absolving criminal 
liability for sexual offences.125  
 
Consider the following five examples as set out by Dini Rosenbaum (2008):  
A man is found guilty of rape when:126 
1) He intends to have non-consensual intercourse – i.e. he desires and 
wants the sex to be non-consensual.   
2) He knows they are having non-consensual intercourse – i.e. he would 
prefer if the sex was consensual but commits the act knowing it’s non-
consensual.    
3) He consciously disregards the possibility that he is having non-
consensual intercourse – i.e. he is unsure about whether the intercourse 
is consensual and decides to remain unsure.   
4) He is unaware that he is having non-consensual intercourse, but it is 
unreasonable for him to be unaware that it is non-consensual, or to 
believe that it is consensual.  
5) He is unaware that he is having non-consensual intercourse, but it is 
reasonable for him to believe that it is consensual.127    
 
In the first scenario, the man acts with purpose, in the second with knowledge, 
the third he acts recklessly, in the fourth he is negligent, and in the last scenario 
he is considered not to be at fault at all. However, this seems like the wrong 
approach to take.  Regardless of our moral intuitions and evaluations of his 
behaviour, a man or woman was subjected to unwanted sexual intercourse in 
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all five scenarios. In only criminalising those whose actions are accompanied by 
a guilty intention, current rape law in the US and England and Wales places 
greater emphasis on punishing a person who is at fault for their conduct rather 
than ensuring that individuals are not subjected to unwanted sexual intercourse. 
However, as Mary Heath (2011) asserts, the law is a blunt instrument. While 
there needs to be a strict moral regime that rigorously defends everyone’s rights 
to engage in or refuse sexual contact, the law cannot safeguard an individual’s 
autonomy, it can only attempt to punish serious violations of it.128 It is therefore 
important to note that the law surrounding sexual offences is not discriminately 
unjust in this respect. Despite the peculiar possibility of saying that a victim has 
been raped, but not by a rapist, a mistake of fact is often considered an 
adequate defence for most offences in criminal law.129  At the same time, 
allowing an individual’s false beliefs to exonerate criminal liability by implication 
regardless of what the victim said or did, or however violated he or she was, 
could further contribute to the extremely high acquittal and low prosecution 
rates of all rape cases. As reiterated by British feminist and academic Jane 
Ussher, “all the man has to say is ‘I thought she really wanted it’ and the law 
may be lenient”.130 Indeed, the most usual mistake defence in sexual offence 
cases is “but I thought she consented”.131 
 
I believe this poses a practical challenge worthy of consideration. If an individual 
is operating on beliefs that stem from accepted social conventions, is it fair to 
hold them criminally liable for their actions?  As H.L.A Hart (1968) notes, the 
term mens rea is misleading in assuming that criminal laws are only violated 
with the presence of a guilty mind.132 For example, dominant constructions of 
male and female sexuality can be seen to have a profound influence in defining 
and shaping interpretations of consent. Michael Flood (2016) observes that we 
teach men to be rapists in all sorts of ways – “We teach men not to take a 
woman’s no for an answer, to see women as being perpetually sexually 
available, to ignore women’s signs of disinterest, and to push past women’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Rachel King (2011) ‘Reflecting on sexual ethics and sexual assault prevention education’, 
Interview with Associate Professor Mary Heath, Australian Institute of Family Studies, no. p. 18. 
129 Marcia W. Baron (2001) “I Thought She Consented”, in Philosophical Issues, no. 11, p. 1.  
130 Sara Hinchliffe (2000) ‘Rape Law Reform in Britain’, Society, Vol. 37, no. 4, p. 57.   
131 Marcia W. Baron (2001) “I Thought She Consented”, in Philosophical Issues, no. 11, pp. 1-4.  
132 Robert Summers (1969) ‘Book Review: Punishment and Responsibility by H.L.A Hart’, 
University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 19, no. 4, p. 645.	  	  	  
46	  
	  
resistance”.133 This view is similarly expressed by Burgess-Jackson (1996) who 
highlights how an individual’s beliefs may lead them to have a genuine and 
honest belief that he or she is consenting to sex, even though it may be based 
on false premises:  
He may believe, as a result of his sex-role socialisation that many, most, 
or all women put up “token” resistance to sexual intercourse when they 
really desire it… Women are not supposed to be sexual, he thinks.  They 
are coy.  They play games. He may, as a result, interpret the victim’s 
“No”, “Maybe”, or “I’m not sure” as an affirmation of consent.134 
This statement is empirically supported by Melanie Ann Beres (2014) whose 
qualitative study on casual sex found that many young men continue to rely on 
problematic indicators of consent, such as the absence of physical resistance, 
body language, and previous sexual activity. For example, male participants 
stated that consent is “the butt lift”,135 “going home with someone” and “not 
saying no”.136  There are no actual words in any of these statements that 
indicate a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse. It is therefore 
easy to imagine scenarios where ‘reasonable’ adults are capable of committing 
a sexual offence without actually realising that he or she is doing any wrong.  
 
The more interesting question is therefore not to decide whether defendants 
who have made an unreasonable mistake about consent should be liable for 
rape, but to understand how a mistake about consent could be reasonable.137 
Suppose that a man believes that a woman has given her consent to a sexual 
activity. What counts as a good reason to conclude that his belief is reasonable? 
The law as outlined in the SOA [2003] s 1 (2) does not require any specific 
steps to be taken:  
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Whether a belief in consent is reasonable is to be determined having 
regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A (the defendant) 
has taken to ascertain whether B (the complainant) consents.138  
While one may fulfil the legal criteria of consent in agreeing by choice and 
having the relevant capacities and freedom to make that choice, the law fails to 
outline what principles of consent are legally sufficient. If consent is treated as a 
matter of what a reasonable person would do, then it is entirely possible for the 
absence of consent to exist without ever being overtly expressed in that 
person’s behaviour. 139  One may object to this position by suggesting that 
consent needs to be adequately communicated if the other party is to have a 
fair opportunity to recognise it.  However, as Archard (1998) highlights, sex is 
“an activity characterised by informality, spontaneity, and heightened 
senses”.140 Evidence from studies exploring the use of consent to sex suggests 
that consent is more frequently communicated non-verbally. 141  From this 
conventional expression of consent, silence could be reasonably interpreted as 
an indication of consent.  
  
Given that acts of men’s violence against women exist on a continuum and 
often stem from what most reasonable people consider to be innocuous socio-
cultural practices, the very possibility of having negligent or accidental 
perpetrators of rape poses a significant threat to the legitimacy of criminal 
liability - ignorance of fundamental criminal acts should be no excuse before the 
law.142 Indeed, major criminal offences, such as rape and sexual assault, should 
not require specialised education or theoretical insight. However, as evidenced 
by the inadequacy of the tea and consent campaign, it is clear that they do. This 
is significant as it demonstrates that while cultural conditions do not determine 
individual action, they can close off certain possibilities in limiting the evidence 
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available for agents to critically question their current sexual practices. For 
example, taking sufficient steps to ensure consent to sex is not an 
unreasonable or challenging task – to stop and think and to ask certain 
questions. At the same time, this type of communication is largely absent from 
mainstream representations of sex and is framed as being ‘unsexy’. We are 
quick to assume that the legalistic, contractual basis for engaging in sexual 
relations, at least with a new partner, is destructive of genuine intimacy. 
Although men may act in the clear violation of the law in failing to secure 
consent, they are not necessarily acting outside the dominant rules, norms and 
values of their society. While a communicative model of sexuality would 
undoubtedly result in a better ethical standard for everyone, the very legal 
construct of consent to sex fundamentally misdescribes how most people 
communicate a willingness to engage in sexual relations. Criminal law currently 
risks upholding and reinforcing these accepted (and highly problematic) socio-
cultural conventions. However, until educational changes happen, the law has 
little recourse but to follow.143 
 
Part Three 
 
The Moral Limits of Criminal Law  
Generally speaking, laws are not self-activating and will always lag behind the 
public’s understanding. However, the law surrounding consent to sex is 
unreflective of society and in a sense, almost too progressive. As highlighted, 
consent to sex is rarely communicated verbally and made between parties who 
are equal in power and knowledge, therefore leaving room for coercion, 
deception and unfair advantages. It is therefore important to question whether 
consent is socially rich enough in providing justification for what is otherwise 
considered a lawful act. This point is clearly reflected by MacKinnon (1987), 
who questions whether consent is a meaningful concept considering the 
broader contextual factors that pervasively shape sexual relations between men 
and women. In light of these cultural conditions, the masquerade of an 
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‘objective’ reasonable standard of consent appear utterly useless in educational 
campaigns used to promote the law surrounding sexual offences given that we 
collectively rely on deeply embedded societal, patriarchal and pornographic 
assumptions for what counts as a woman’s consent to sex.    
 
Despite this, it is unrealistic to expect laws and legal procedures governing 
sexual offences to consider social context and disadvantage in a meaningful 
way. If concern for the preconditions of women’s meaningful choice in sexual 
relations is to be taken seriously, how then should criminal law identify and 
address sexual acts in the context of power? Are we to assume that some 
cases of ‘consensual’, but undesired acts of sex are rape too? Legally speaking, 
it is understandably difficult to appreciate why women faced with pressure to 
have unwanted sex wouldn’t just say no. While it seems a gross 
oversimplification to say that all that distinguishes rape from sex is a lack of 
consent, the concept of consent has remained remarkably durable in British 
common law because it satisfies public policy concerns about not intervening 
too paternalistically in people’s lives by providing a minimum standard for non-
criminal sex. Indeed, the law must only seek to define behaviour so 
fundamentally inappropriate that it should rightfully be called criminal. Morally 
speaking, there are a myriad of coercive sexual acts that lie somewhere in 
between rape and sex but fall outside the purview of state intervention. 
However, in seeking to punish only those who are exceptionally deviant, the law 
cannot be expected to decisively clarify these ambiguities and enforce a 
positive moral ideal surrounding an individual’s sexual relations.  
 
Culturally redefining sex  
It seems that we live in a world obsessed by sex and sexuality. Following the 
sexual liberation during the 1960s and 1970s,144 sex and sexual choice has 
become far more permissible than it was fifty years ago. In many ways, we have 
more liberalised sexual attitudes; a greater acceptance of non-marital and extra-
marital sexual relations, casual or experimental sex, acceptance of same-sex 
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relationships, masturbation and pornography use.145 However, the idea of a 
repressive power infringing on sexuality is far from irrelevant today. It still seems 
that we are very conflicted as a society and as individuals in how to talk about 
sex. It tends to evoke a visceral reaction of extreme awkwardness. This is 
clearly reflected by the fact that sex education in schools remains a contentious 
issue. While the government maintains that “all young people should have high 
quality teaching in this area”, 146  teacher embarrassment and a lack of 
knowledge are often to blame in failing to extend lessons beyond reproductive 
biology. While it is all very well and good for young people to know where their 
reproductive organs are located, such education fails to give them the much 
needed skills surrounding how to have positive, respectful and healthy 
relationships. There is a huge difference between knowing that you have a 
choice to consent to sex and knowing how to exercise this choice within real life 
circumstances. 
 
While the law cannot enforce a positive moral ideal surrounding an individual’s 
sexual relations, we can as a society through institutions concerned with the 
maintenance of moral standards (such as the family, education system, 
religious organisations, and peer groups), promote them. In order for consent to 
become a meaningful concept, I believe this needs to start with changing the 
social conditions surrounding the various ways in which we culturally 
understand, represent and talk about sex. There is a cultural tendency to 
equate what is legal with the good or harmless.147 The orthodox view that sex is 
only wrong when it is accompanied by the absence of consent is relatively 
unquestioned. Given that it is held that rape is bad because it is non-consensual 
– it then seems to follow that consensual sex must be good or have a neutral, 
merely permissible value by virtue of simply being consensual.148 However, as I 
have demonstrated with reference to MacKinnon’s, Cahill’s and Gavey’s works, 
this is a simplistic view. While it may be appropriate to focus on consent in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Michael Flood (2016) Fostering boys’ and men’s resistance to pornography. Keynote 
address, Pornography and Harms to Children and Young People Symposium, University of New 
South Wales, Sydney, February 9. 
146 BBC (2010) ‘Sex Education Could Be Better’, BBC, 23rd July, 2010, (Online) Available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-10727656 , Accessed: 09/10/16.  
147 Robin West (1995) ‘The Harms of Consensual Sex’, The American Philosophical Association 
Newsletters, Vol. 92, No. 1, pp. 52-55.   
148 Ibid, p. 55.	  	  
51	  
	  
criminal law, where the basic project is to satisfy a minimum requirement for 
non-criminal sex, consent is not always a meaningful marker that can be used 
to clearly distinguish between rape and sex, and therefore cannot be relied 
upon as a good proxy for sexual wellbeing. How then, can we have sexual 
intimacy without sexual coercion, or sex that is at the very least not morally 
wrong to varying degrees?  
 
I propose that it is unhelpful to continue assuming that sexual intercourse is 
normally equal and separate from social norms, practices and institutions. The 
act of rape is a part of a complex system in which women’s submission, 
humiliation, violation and injury defines sexual excitement. A recent analysis of 
top-renting pornography titles in the US found high levels of violence in 
pornographic content. Of the scenes analysed, 88.2% contained physical 
aggression against females through slapping, gagging, spanking, hair-pulling 
and choking. While only 10% of scenes contained positive behaviour such as 
kissing, laughing and embracing. 149  This is significant as cultural 
understandings of sex become dichotomised into an act whereby the woman is 
rendered less powerful and less human in comparison to her male counterpart 
whose status becomes elevated. As reiterated by Germaine Greer (1970) in her 
classic text The Female Eunuch, “sex must be rescued from the traffic between 
powerful and powerless and the masterful and mastered”. This does not mean 
to say that men consciously (although presumably some do) disrespect or 
devalue women in acts of sexual penetration. Rather, it is to highlight the very 
important fact that sex can imply something about one’s worth.  
 
It is therefore extremely difficult to promote an objective legal definition of 
consent against the backdrop of a deeply unequal society that does not actively 
encourage sexual negotiation or mutuality in choice. As Brownmiller (1975) 
asserts, “even the most perfect rape laws in the land will not be enough to stop 
rape”.150  In other words, the extent to which the law alone can influence 
people’s values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours to protect women from men’s 
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violence and successfully prosecute cases of sexual violations will remain 
extremely limited unless the features of women’s continuing inequality are 
addressed first. Justice cannot be achieved by a set of rules without a 
simultaneous shift in public opinion. In order to find conditions under which 
sexual desire can work ethically, we need to address the conditions that 
promote male sexual entitlement and the states of mind and social structures 
that overwhelmingly prompt, suggest or compel women to consent to sex they 
do not truly want or desire.  
 
Given the importance of public opinion, how we collectively think about rape 
matters. It determines how we talk about rape, how the law defines rape, how 
the media writes about rape, and ultimately, it determines what we do as a 
society to combat rape. Chapter 1 has established that the law of rape, and how 
effective it is, is largely dependent upon which values are brought to bear upon 
it.151 Chapter 2 argues that if we wish to change the way we think about rape, 
we need to re-evaluate why we think rape is wrong.  
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The Wrong of Rape 
 
“One of the most important aspects of rape as it occurs in our society is the way 
in which it is a moral injury to all women, not merely to the woman who 
experiences it, insofar as it is part of a pattern of response of many men 
towards many women that aims to establish their mastery qua male over a 
woman qua female.” 
(Jean Hampton, 2001)152 
 
Why is rape wrong? Remarkably, few contemporary philosophers have 
proposed a coherent answer to this pertinent question. As noted earlier, this 
may appear like an unusual question to ask given that almost everyone 
intuitively believes that rape is palpably wrong. It is the very unadorned and 
obvious belief that rape is wrong that has left many philosophers to accept rape 
as a settled paradigm of wrongdoing, with little agreement as to why. 153 
However, I think this is an interesting question deserving of careful attention. In 
reflecting on rape as an act of institutional wrongdoing, I will argue that it 
matters why we believe that rape is wrong. In highlighting how misguided 
beliefs surrounding the wrong of rape have allowed for the act of rape to flourish, 
the moral certainty ascribed to the act is insufficient to understand its 
wrongfulness. Arguably, the sheer prevalence of rape in society alongside 
widespread moral condemnation is a clear paradox.154  In part one, I then 
critically assess how some philosophers have attempted to articulate the wrong 
of rape in terms of non-consent, the unjustified use of violence, the sexual 
nature of the crime, and in Kantian terms, the sheer use of a person as a means 
to an end. While some of these propositions plausibly count as wrong-making 
characteristics of rape, they are not what distinguishes rape as a crime. Indeed, 
philosophers’ efforts to articulate a unique feature of rape to explain its universal 
wrongness have been inadequate. Instead, I will argue that it is the combination 
of its wrong-making features, alongside the context in which it is so prevalent in 
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our society, which makes rape such a grave moral wrong. While I uphold that it 
is the combination, arguably, the most morally relevant feature to the 
wrongness of rape, is the fact that rape is overwhelmingly committed by men 
against women. In the pursuit of a unique wrong-making feature of rape, 
philosophers have also tended to focus on individualistic accounts of its 
wrongness. I conclude that this has acted as an impediment to understanding 
the systemic nature of rape’s wrongfulness which has impacted the measures 
taken to address rape. Subsequently, rape has not been addressed in society 
as an institutional failing and remains a structural injustice and violation to all 
women.  
 
Moral certainty on the wrongness of rape  
Unlike topics such as abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights, we exhibit an 
uncontroversial and collective moral certainty that the act of rape is 
unequivocally wrong. However, mere moral certainty does not make rape 
immune to justification and critical reflection. Indeed, our moral evaluations of 
rape, and thus the reason for its wrongness, have changed significantly over 
time, from conceptualising the wrong of rape as an affront to male privilege and 
property, to reconsidering the wrongness of rape to be in its violation of 
individual autonomy. There is a tendency to believe that we have somehow 
evolved to have superior moral views simply by virtue of living in a later time 
period. However, the different characterisations of rape clearly reflect the 
dominant socio-cultural ideologies surrounding the status of women in society 
and underlying assumptions about male and female sexuality at the time. For 
example, the ethical wrongs of rape were historically defined in relation to the 
belief that women were the valuable sexual property of men. 155  This is 
significant, as it problematises our assumed sense of moral progression by 
demonstrating how our judgements and justifications for the wrongness of rape 
are socially, culturally and historically situated.  
  
Intuitively, socio-legal understandings surrounding the wrong of rape have 
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profound practical implications for thinking about rape as a social problem and 
developing appropriate strategies to combat its prevalence. In historically 
defining the wrong of rape as a crime against male property, the legal severity 
of the rape in question was largely dependent on the type of woman who had 
been victimised, most notably regarding the rape of virgins as the most serious 
given its assumed depreciation of the woman’s value.156 Consequently, this 
understanding created an institutional blindness which made the rapes of 
women by their husbands entirely permissible. Today, conceptualising the 
wrongness of rape based on the violation of individual autonomy alone appears 
sufficient. However, this conception is incomplete because it obscures the fact 
that rape disproportionately affects women and ignores how acts of men’s 
violence against women belong to broader patriarchal processes. In doing so, 
the legal system and current social interventions continue to emphasise the 
individualised nature of rape, rather than its collective implications. This is 
extremely problematic as our exclusive fixation on rape myths and the individual 
victims or perpetrators of this crime function as an insidious distraction, 
meaning that we are collectively less likely to critically reflect on the systemic 
causes and consequences of men’s violence against women. A critical 
evaluation of why rape is wrong is therefore significant because it demonstrates 
the very obvious point that why we think rape is wrong matters. In doing so, this 
assessment provides important directions for future intervention and reform.  
 
Part One  
 
The wrong-making characteristics of rape  
In the popular American television show Law and Order, the introduction starts 
with the line “in the Criminal Justice System, sexually based offences are 
considered especially heinous”. This type of statement is reflective of societal 
beliefs, but what is it precisely that makes the act of rape particularly egregious 
in comparison to other crimes? Given that rape is defined as non-consensual 
sex, presumably the wrongness of rape must be explicable in terms of its non-
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consensuality.157 Traditionally, scholars who have sought to understand the 
wrongness of rape have based their analysis on the explicit assumption that 
rape is wrong because it is a violation of individual rights based on a non-
consensual interaction. In other words, rape is a serious moral wrong because it 
bypasses the consent of the victim, therefore violating their right to bodily 
autonomy, integrity and self-determination.158 However, this explanation is far 
too sweeping. While it is of course plausible to think of actions without an 
individual’s consent as seriously wrongful, I uphold the view that it is not the 
fundamental wrong-making feature of rape. As John Gardner (2007) identifies, 
consent fails to sufficiently capture precisely what the wrongness of rape 
consists of given that the same could be said for virtually any other crime 
against the person.159 For example, theft, assault, kidnapping and murder are 
all equally defined by an absence of consent and violation of individual 
autonomy. Where does the ‘worseness’ in rape then lie?  
 
In October 1977, French philosopher Michel Foucault posed the highly 
provocative question “Why isn’t rape the same as a punch in the face?” at a 
roundtable discussion in Paris. In stating that “there is no difference, in principle, 
between sticking one’s fist into someone’s face or one’s penis into their sex”, 
Foucault called for the decriminalisation of rape as a sexual crime.160 This view 
is similarly supported by Laurie Calhoun (1997) who states that “the fact that 
rape involves sex is irrelevant to its wrongness.”161 However, the suggestion 
that rape belongs strictly to the realm of physical violence appears somewhat 
inappropriate. Given the fact that rape falls under the category of the Sexual 
Offences Act, it is generally assumed that rape is some kind of sexual 
intercourse. Indeed, on the surface, the two acts could look virtually 
indistinguishable except the presence of consent makes one legally permissible 
and the other to warrant legal intervention with severe penalties. Intuitively, rape 
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is seriously morally wrong in ways simple assault is not. As Ann Cahill (2001) 
asserts “… few women would agree that being raped is essentially equivalent to 
being hit in the face or otherwise physically assaulted.”162 How then, can rape 
be considered as an act of violence? 
 
In answering this question, a popular analogy comes to mind: ‘Rape is about 
violence, not sex. If a person hits you over the head with a spade, you wouldn’t 
call it gardening’. In other words, just because the ‘tools’ are the same, rape 
should not be viewed as a sexual activity on the basis of the fact that it targets 
the victim’s sexual organs. Generally speaking, this statement reflects the long-
standing feminist tradition to broaden the divide between sex and rape. Susan 
Brownmiller (1975) for example, is well-known for her statement that rape is 
about violence, not sex. Indeed, this view has some merits given that classifying 
rape as a sexual offence has had a number of negative legal and social 
consequences. For example, it has perpetuated victim-blaming attitudes by 
supporting claims that men rape because they simply cannot control their 
overwhelming sexual urges or that women secretly desired it. Moreover, 
classifying rape as a sexual offence may contribute to the shocking, but still 
prevalent tendency to see a complainant’s sexual history as relevant to the 
issue of consent.  
 
Despite these justified concerns, such an abstraction seems rather curious 
given that by virtue, the very act of rape appears inherently sexual. Unlike with 
gardening, in which hitting someone over the head with a shovel would never 
constitute part of the process, penile penetration is a common feature in both 
consensual sex and rape. This analogy further denies how the sexed body is 
imbued with social meaning which adds to the significance of rape compared to 
other acts of violence, such as assault with a shovel. Winifred Woodhull (1988) 
articulates this point clearly: “If we are to seriously to come to terms with rape, 
we must explain how the vagina comes to be coded—and experienced—as a 
place of emptiness and vulnerability, the penis as a weapon, and intercourse as 
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a violation”.163 One may then argue that rape is not like a punch in the face 
precisely because sexual organs aren’t like a nose, an arm or a leg. In many 
ways, it is easier to think of rape as a violation if one does not think of rape as a 
type of sex. Indeed, conceptualising rape as an act of violence would make for 
a relatively straightforward offence. However, if the wrongness of rape is 
defined in relation to the unjustified use of violence or force, this reclassification 
could hold profound consequences in judging how severely rape should be 
punished. If rape is merely considered an act of physical aggression, like a 
punch in the face, is a minimum prison sentence of at least five years still 
justified? Moreover, statistics indicate that most rapes do not involve the actual 
use of physical violence. Identifiable physical signs of trauma such as a blood, 
bruises, genital injury and torn clothing are all atypical features of sexual 
violence. Practically, such a reclassification could potentially increase the 
dependence on evidence of a physical struggle in judging the severity and 
sincerity of alleged rapes. Conceptually, a description of rape as violence fails 
to capture what is distinctly unique and therefore specifically morally egregious 
about the crime. As MacKinnon (1987) observes, “So long as we say that [rape, 
sexual harassment, and pornography] are abuses of violence, not sex, we fail to 
criticise what has been made of sex, what has been done to us through sex”.164 
To desexualise the act of rape as a form of violence and “nothing but”,165  is to 
ignore how the act itself is inscribed with a host of bodily and sexually specific 
meanings – all of which contribute to its wrongness.  
 
Penile-penetrative sex: a prima facie wrong? 
In comparing rape from other acts of violence, it is clear that non-consent alone 
is not the determining wrong-making feature of rape. Perhaps then, it is the 
sexual nature of the act that adds a morally relevant dimension to rape. Legally, 
what makes rape particularly egregious is not just the fact that it is a non-
consensual act, but that it is an act of non-consensual sex; more specifically, 
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non-consensual penile-penetrative sex. As outlined in Chapter 1, the Sexual 
Offences Act (2003) created a hierarchy of sexual offences by drawing a divide 
between the seriousness of assault by penetration and rape (both of which 
violate the same orifices) based on the instrument used, concluding that the act 
of rape is deserving of a higher prison sentence because unlike an object, 
tongue or fingers, penile penetration carries the risks of disease and 
pregnancy. 166  However, consensual penile-penetrative sex can also 
unknowingly impose these harms.167 Therefore, if it is to be held that rape is 
bad because it is non-consensual sex – it must follow that consent adds a 
positive moral dimension to the act.168 What relative value does consensual 
penile-penetrative sex then have that makes non-consensual penile-penetrative 
sex such a grave moral wrong?   
 
In understanding the wrong of rape in these terms, one must first understand 
what, if anything, is valuable about sexual activity. In mapping the moral 
landscape of sexual penetration, Jonathan Herring and Michelle Madame 
Dempsey (2007) claim that sex constitutes a prima facie wrong.169 In other 
words, when a man penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of a woman with his 
penis, he ought to have a good reason to do so. The claim that sexual 
penetration itself calls for justification, as opposed to sexual penetration without 
consent, will undoubtedly strike many as counterintuitive, or at least have Freud 
rolling over in his grave. Indeed, the orthodox view that sex is only wrong when 
it is accompanied by the absence of consent is relatively unquestioned. 
However, it is important to note that Herring and Dempsey’s claim is not “any 
form of legal moralism or prudish attitudes towards sexual penetration.”170 
Rather, the prima facie wrongness of sex can be substantiated in the use of 
force, risks of harm and negative social meaning of the conduct:  
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i. Physiology/force  
Firstly, Herring and Dempsey assert that a man who penetrates the vagina, 
anus or mouth of a woman with his penis commits a prima facie wrong in virtue 
of using physical force. One reason why penile penetration of the vagina or 
anus is properly understood to require justification is due to the physiological 
fact that force is required to achieve such penetration. Due to the physical 
structure of sphincteric muscles, a penis cannot simply fall into the vagina, 
mouth or anus. While it is of course plausible to conceive a circumstance where 
sexual intercourse is accomplished without the use of force by a male (e.g. a 
man who may be completely immobile), generally speaking, a man engages in 
pushing movements to achieve initial penetration or thrusting movements during 
intercourse, to which constitutes the use of force.  
 
ii. Risks of harm  
Secondly, Herring and Dempsey claim that the non-trivial risks of harm from 
sexual penetration constitute a prima facie wrong. There are many things we do 
in relation to other people that have the potential to risk harm. For example, 
when walking in public we might risk bumping into someone, setting back their 
interests in causing pain, or making them late to an important meeting.171  
However, in order for conduct to be properly classified as a prima facie wrong 
due to the risk of harm it poses, Herring and Dempsey assert that it is a 
threshold concept that demands a combined degree of risk that is sufficiently 
serious in nature. For Herring and Dempsey, the seriousness of sexual 
penetration is captured in its capacity to involve causing harm in the risk of 
unwanted pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, vaginal infections and a 
degree of abrasion, slight chaffing or even the tearing of vaginal tissue. 
 
iii. Social Meaning  
Lastly, Herring and Dempsey conclude that the prima facie wrongfulness of 
sexual penetration can be found in the negative social meaning of the conduct 
in relation to dominant ideologies in society. Most notably, the perceived value 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Jonathan Herring and Michelle Madame Dempsey (2007) ‘Why Sexual Penetration Requires 
Justification’, p. 476. 
61	  
	  
and status of women. This point does not mean to say that all men express 
something negative about women when they sexually penetrate them (although 
presumably some do), it is to highlight how given the current institutional 
conditions, the act of sexual penetration has the capacity to render women “less 
powerful and less human whilst the man is rendered more powerful and more 
human.” 172  For example, the devaluing and disrespecting of women is a 
consistent theme in all of our representations of heterosexual sex and male and 
female sexuality, through films, advertising, literature, television, pornography 
and a general level of social discourse on the topic. These socio-cultural 
messages are significant as they make the act of sexual penetration 
normatively meaningful.173  
 
If one accepts Herring and Dempsey’s classification of sexual penetration as a 
prima facie wrong, it would then seem that at a baseline level, the wrong of non-
consensual penile-penetrative sex (rape) is exacerbated by the prima facie 
wrongness of sexual penetration more generally. The force involved, risk of 
harm and the social meaning of sex appears intuitively convincing, as it 
demonstrates why consent matters to rape in the first place. Indeed, these are 
not features shared by other crimes against the person. However, while the 
serious risks of harm may constitute the prima facie wrongfulness of sex, the 
risk of physical and/or psychological harm cannot make a rape a wrong. In other 
words, even the inherent sexual nature of rape itself is unable to wholly 
articulate its wrongfulness. For example, even if a rape existed by itself, in 
absolute isolation where the individual did not experience feelings of violation, 
hurt or distress, we would still intuitively believe that she has been seriously 
wronged. While a wrongful action has something to do with harm, the 
connection is not direct or straightforward because harm is not necessary for a 
wrong to exist.  
 
A harmless rape? 
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In an attempt to demonstrate that the existence of harms are not necessary to 
the wrongness of rape, and in turn, delineate the precise wrong of rape, John 
Gardner and Stephen Shute (1998) developed a ‘pure case’ of rape. Consider 
the following:  
A victim may be forever oblivious to the fact that she was raped, if, say, 
she was drugged or drunk to the point of unconsciousness when the 
rape was committed, and the rapist wore a condom. […] Then we have a 
victim of rape whose life is not changed for the worse, or at all, by the 
rape. […] She has no feelings about the incident, since she knows 
nothing of it. Indeed, the story has no prospective dimension for the 
victim, except possibly a hangover in the morning; otherwise the victim’s 
life goes on exactly as before. […] (Let’s add, for complete insulation, 
that the rapist, who told no one of what he did, is run over by a bus as he 
leaves the house, and that this would have been no less likely to happen 
to him even if he had not perpetrated the rape, since that didn’t either 
delay or precipitate his leaving. So the rape doesn’t even make a 
difference to his prospects.)174 
  
It is therefore plausible that under certain circumstances the act of rape does 
not directly harm a victim (or anyone else). Some commentators have 
condemned the idea of a ‘harmless rape’ as being inconceivable.175  Even 
Gardner himself notes that using an unlikely scenario may make the pure rape 
case “philosophically hazardous to reply upon.”176 However, while a harmless 
rape may be atypical, it is of course, entirely possible. For example, in April 
2015, British nurse Andrew Hutchinson was jailed for eighteen years following 
the rape of a woman under general anaesthetic while under his care in hospital. 
The victim was unaware that she had been raped until the police arrived at her 
home and showed her images of the attack recorded on CCTV from February 
2012.177 Similarly to the pure case, the victim was oblivious to the fact that she 
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had been raped until she had been alerted by the police. The victim’s lack of 
knowledge about her experience meant that she did not suffer any 
psychological trauma and no known physical harm directly following the incident.  
  
In more typical cases, rape is, of course, seriously harmful. As Gardner 
identifies, victims may suffer “unspeakable harms” in sustaining severe physical 
injuries, being deprived of a sense of security, suffering psychological trauma, 
the possibility of pregnancy and/or sexually transmitted diseases and so on.178 
However, the likelihood of these harms cannot be said to make rape a wrong 
given that they are largely dependent on a victim’s individual experience and 
her interpretation or evaluation of what has happened to her. In taking away the 
“distracting epiphenomena”,179 the pure case of rape highlights that while the 
harms of rape may exacerbate how people perceive the wrongness of rape, the 
wrong of rape remains even in the absence of such harms. In Kantian terms, 
rape is a categorical wrong which means that the ‘pure case’ of rape is no less 
wrong than rapes that involve serious bodily and psychological trauma. 
Consequently, the wrong of rape is not contingent upon harm. 
 
In establishing how the wrong of rape is independent from physical harms and 
evaluation-dependent reactions, Gardner’s analysis appears promising. Indeed, 
eschewing the temptation to conflate the wrong and harm of rape has significant 
normative implications. As outlined in Chapter 1, placing the harms of rape on a 
linear scale manifests in prejudicial characteristics of what a ‘real rape’ is. This 
is extremely problematic as it establishes a ‘hierarchy of suffering’ which serves 
to define some rapes as less harmful, or not harmful at all if they do not include 
certain characteristics that are deemed to constitute a ‘real rape’. 
Understanding rape as a categorical wrong therefore reinforces the fact that 
rape is unacceptable in any circumstances and helps to dispel claims used to 
exonerate an accused rapist on the basis that the alleged victim did not suffer 
greatly, or was somehow responsible for what happened to them.  
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Despite the benefits of Gardner’s analysis, he dubiously concludes that the 
basic wrong of rape lies in how the “rapist objectifies his victim by treating her 
as a mere repository of use-value.”180 Gardner is not alone in his attempt to 
invoke a Kantian argument in order to make the wrong of rape explicable. 
Calhoun (1997) for example, states that “rape is a crime of invasion in which an 
aggressor appropriates another human being at his personal possession and 
acts completely without regard to the fact that she is an intelligent, sentient 
human being with rights to self-determination and to live in peace and 
security.”181 Ruth Herschberger (1970) believes that because the pleasure is so 
one sided rape is really a form of “intravaginal masturbation” where the woman 
is merely the object that contains the means to sensory simulation.182 Similarly, 
during Foucault’s discussion on rape in Paris, one of the participants contributes 
by stating that “rape is non-orgasmic. It’s a sort of rapid masturbation in 
someone else’s body.”183 A merit in Gardner’s line of inquiry is that it is so broad 
that it appears to hold true for all cases of rape whether or not they are 
accompanied by further affronts. However, the vagueness of this proposition is 
also where its weakness lies. Gardner claims that the most fundamental wrong 
of rape, which differentiates it from other assaults, is the sheer use of the 
person raped.184 However, the sheer use of a person as a means to an end fails 
to capture what is unique and distinctive about the wrongness of rape. The 
sheer use proposition could similarly hold true for the wrong of torture, where 
the physical body of a person is used as a mere tool to extract information or 
fulfil other aims of the torturer. Both Herschberger and the panellist in Foucault’s 
discussion on rape allude to the idea that the appropriation of the victim’s body 
is a means to a sexual end. However, this would then narrow the wrong of rape 
to the sexual motivations of the perpetrator, therefore failing to account for how 
rape is used strategically in war or in cases of domestic violence where 
husbands might deny what they do is ‘rape’.  
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Not a wrong, not a harm, but a moral violation to all women  
So far, all of the accounts identifying the wrong-making characteristics of rape 
fail to succeed in detecting one feature that is unique to its wrongness. 
Conceptually, gender-neutral explanations based on non-consent, unjustified 
use of violence, risk of harm and objectification all miss the mark in 
distinguishing precisely what differentiates the act of rape from other crimes 
against the person. It is helpful to borrow Wittgenstein’s analogy of a rope to 
articulate the wrongfulness of rape. Like fibers in a rope, the previously 
discussed philosophical accounts can be considered valuable but not strong 
enough to function independently. In other words, the philosophical accounts 
offer only a partial explanation of the wrongfulness of rape. However, when 
considered in combination, the philosophical account of the wrongfulness of 
rape, like combined fibers, is strengthened. To extend the analogy further, the 
context in which rape occurs can be considered the bond that binds the rope 
which facilitates the individual fibers to strengthen.185 In other words, traditional 
moral categories restrict us from considering the overlap and the overarching 
structure that contributes to the wrongfulness of rape. On an individual level, 
rape is an invasion of the body that treats the victim as inferior. In an 
institutionalised sense, the experience and prevalence of rape is located within 
a power structure that differentiates and disadvantages women, making rape a 
performative act of oppression that not only wrongs individual victims of rape, 
but also women as a collective. 
 
Although the involuntary invasion of one’s body and the sexual nature of the 
crime are particularly egregious wrong-making characteristics, arguably, the 
most morally relevant feature that makes rape unique is that it is 
overwhelmingly a crime committed by men against women.186 Indeed, rape, 
unlike a punch in the face, is a specific offence that is primarily perpetrated 
against women, making the female sex and/or perceived female gender identity 
the primary targets of perpetration. It is important to highlight that classifying 
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gender as a key feature of rape does not mean to imply that men may not also 
suffer from the fear and prevalence of rape. Rather, it is to highlight the simple 
fact that men and women are unequally situated with regard to their experience 
of rape. Both Calhoun (1997) and Berkich (2009) respectively view this social 
fact as an incidental, rather than as an essential feature of rape. However, the 
statement that the sex-linked pattern is neither fundamental nor essential to the 
moral wrongness of rape is puzzling because it makes rape 
incomprehensible.187 Of course, one may hypothesise what the wrong-making 
characteristics of rape could be in alternative realities. However, in viewing the 
normative fact that rape is predominately committed by men against women as 
a mere ontological accident, this proposition holds no value in answering what 
the essential features of rape are today, in our world, as we know and 
experience it in society.  
 
In declaring that rape is a crime against human beings, not women,188 both 
Calhoun and Berkich mistakenly ignore two of the most fundamental aspects of 
rape as it exists today. Namely, its wider relationship to institutional rules and 
the historical and continued oppression of women – both of which certainly 
contribute to its wrongness. Throughout history, rape has primarily been a crime 
against women. Burgess-Jackson (2000) asserts that any plausible theory 
which seeks to understand the nature and wrongness of rape must account for 
this very fact, as to ignore is it to “distort the act beyond recognition”.189 In 1993, 
the UN General Assembly recognised that: 
Violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power 
relations between men and women, which have led to the domination 
over and discrimination against women and to the full advancement of 
women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social 
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mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position 
compared with men.190 
A substantial account detailing the wrongness of rape must account for how 
rape is a violation to not only individual victim’s autonomy and bodily integrity, 
but also grasp the systemic social role of rape in a patriarchal political structure. 
It is therefore very important that we, both socially and philosophically, respond 
to wrongdoing in a way that affirms this fact.   
 
Part one has critically assessed how some philosophers have attempted to 
articulate the wrong of rape. While I agree that some of these propositions 
plausibly count as wrong-making characteristics of rape, I maintain that they are 
insufficient as they obscure what is morally distinctive about rape, namely, its 
systemic character. In evaluating rape in individualistic terms, one denies the 
bond between the fibre and the rope. This is not to say that gendered nature of 
the crime is a central wrong-making characteristic of rape. Rather, it is to 
emphasise that meaningful explanations must account for how the act of rape is 
implicated within a larger system of domination and oppression as a crime 
predominately committed by men against women. In looking at how we might 
seek to properly account for the systemic character of rape, Part two will now 
outline how rape came to be labelled as a crime against humanity and discuss 
the applicability of this definition to rape in everyday contexts.  
 
Part Two 
 
Rape: A crime against humanity 
To be able to respond appropriately to the wrongs suffered by a collective, we 
must first give the correct name to these wrongs. Following the combined 
atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda during the 1990s, the systemic character of 
rape was acknowledged in international law and human rights discourse as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 United Nations (2017) ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’, 
Proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 48/104 on the 20th December, 1993. (Online) 
Available: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ViolenceAgainstWomen.aspx, 
Accessed: 14/04/17.	  	  
68	  
	  
‘crime against humanity’. The International Criminal Court defines the elements 
of rape as a crime against humanity in Article 7 paragraph 1 when:  
i. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the 
victim with any object or any other part of the body. 
ii. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of genuine consent. 
iii. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population 
iv. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the 
conduct to be part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against a 
civilian population.191  
The reconceptualisation of rape as a crime against humanity was significant as 
it reinforced that rape is not merely an unfortunate accidental by-product of war, 
but rather, a strategic method used to humiliate and destroy communities. In 
recognising the act of rape as a human rights violation in conflict-related 
contexts, the moral wrong and harm of rape have consequently been 
conceptualised in collective terms. For similar reasons that rape is considered a 
crime against humanity in conflict related contexts, I will demonstrate how this 
definition might apply in everyday contexts and the implications of doing so.  
  
The wrong of rape in everyday contexts 
In outlining how terrorism is not always public or committed by enemies of the 
State, Claudia Card’s (1991) chapter ‘Rape as a terrorist institution’ provides a 
thought-provoking basis to demonstrate how rape as a crime against humanity 
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in conflict-related contexts can be extended to the everyday experiences of 
women.192 Unlike rape in war, the institution of rape operates covertly. Rape is 
not committed by a defined enemy, but rather, an unstructured collective of 
individual men who single out women for victimisation on the basis of their sex 
and gender identity.193 While laws officially prohibit rape, rape is systemic and 
widespread. The type of violence I am referring to is therefore not limited to 
personal experiences of rape, but also the threat of men’s violence. As 
Christopher Heath Wellman (2006) highlights “the oppression of violence 
consists not only in its direct victimization but also in the daily knowledge shared 
by members of oppressed groups that they are liable to violation, solely on 
account of their group identity.”194 Indeed, rape is an act which poses a constant 
threat to women and operates in the backdrop of most women’s daily lives. 
Susan Griffin (1971) declares that she has “never been free from the fear of 
rape”. Similarly, Cahill (2001) states that although she has not been a victim of 
rape herself, “the threat of rape has a profound effect on the structure and 
quality of [her] life.”195 The commonality in women’s heightened sense of fear is 
significant as it makes women vulnerable to manipulation by creating a coercive 
environment and state of affairs that they would rationally reject in different 
circumstances.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, women are sometimes perceived to be “asking for it” if 
they walk home alone at night, drink excessively, or dress too provocatively.196 
As a consequence, women may not allow themselves to walk alone at night 
even though they believe that they should be able to. While such rules imply 
that there are legitimate measures women can take in order to avoid being 
raped, sexually assaulted or harassed, they are irrational given that women are 
statistically more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted by someone that they 
know in a private place. Indeed, rape myths and rape avoidance rules have 
played a powerful role in perpetuating fear and legitimising superficial 
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responses to rape based on unfounded socio-cultural assumptions that are 
inextricably tied to dominant ideologies concerning the status of women in 
society. Rather than seeking to create a society in which women need not fear 
male sexual aggression, women are told to be evermore careful. This is 
extremely problematic as the ever-present fear of rape significantly limits 
women’s capacity to participate fully in society as equal citizens. 
   
From this, the wrongness of rape as a crime against humanity can be found in 
the way in which it is a moral violation to all women. As Burgess-Jackson (2000) 
identifies, crimes such as murder, theft and kidnapping set back their victims’ 
interests in numerous ways, but few crimes set back the victim’s interest in 
moral, political and legal equality in the way that rape does.197 In shifting the 
onus onto women, the widespread acceptance of rape myths and in turn, 
compliance with rape avoidance rules, have resulted in a paternalistic approach 
to women’s safety by systematically policing women’s behaviour and impairing 
their ability to move about freely in ways that simply do not affect men. Consider 
Larry May’s (1994) experience:  
Several years ago, at a social occasion in which male and female 
professors were present, I asked offhandedly whether people agreed 
with me that the campus was looking especially pretty at night these 
days. Many of the men responded positively. But all of the women 
responded that this was not something that they had even thought about, 
since they were normally too anxious about being on campus alone at 
night, especially given the increase in reported rapes recently.198 
 
May’s experience is significant as it highlights the very banality of rape in 
women’s everyday lives. As Claudia Card (1999) highlights, “similarly to the 
rules of grammar, the rules of rape are second-nature to women.”199 Women 
are forced to accept that there are geographical areas that are deemed 
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dangerous. Consequently, women’s daily lives are ordered around the threat of 
men’s violence. While the prevalence of rape may not stop women from 
pursuing all of their interests, it seriously subverts or thwarts individual agency 
and mobility. In a society where women are constantly threatened by rape, the 
livelihoods and prospects of women are significantly altered. Timothy Beneke 
(1982) notes that the prevalence of rape “hurts women economically, undercuts 
women’s independence, destroys solitude and restricts expressiveness.” 200 
Similarly, Rashida Manjoo (2016) states that “the experience or threat of 
violence can further deprive women of their right to participate in the political, 
social and cultural life of the country within which they live.”201 In short, men’s 
violence against women not only serves as crimes and violations of individual 
victims, but also as an “obstruction to full citizenship and substantive equality” 
by impeding and obstructing women’s capacity to participate in public life as 
equal citizens.202  
 
At first glance, the claim that rape could be considered a crime against 
humanity in an everyday sense appears merely hyperbolic. However, when 
considering everyday experiences of rape and the fear of it against the 
International Criminal Court’s criteria as outlined on pages 67-68, it is only 
clause iv of Article 7(1) which is incongruent. Given that individual perpetrators 
invade the body of another through penetration by force or the threat of force,  
take advantage of a coercive environment or commit the act against a person 
incapable of genuine consent, and it is part of a widespread or systemic attack 
against a civilian population, clauses i to iii are sufficiently met. Clause iv states 
that the perpetrator must have an awareness of how his actions are intended as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack on a specific group.203  For the 
reasons I have already discussed, this cannot clearly be said to be the case for 
everyday incidences of rape. Despite this, intention is only a requirement in a 
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criminal sense, not moral. While fully assessing rape as a crime against 
humanity is beyond the scope of this chapter (and thesis), it appears that rape 
cannot be understood as a crime against a collective given the lack of intention 
and the implausibility of imposing criminal sanctions. Instead, the act of rape 
should be considered as a moral violation to a collective. 
If we want to effectively combat the prevalence of rape, how rape is understood 
should capture the moral essence of its wrongness. It is philosophically, socially 
and legally crucial that we have a sufficient and coherent understanding of rape 
and its wrong-making characteristics. Given the complexity and widespread 
harm of rape to women, any attempt to treat it as an isolated phenomenon is 
bound to be insufficient. Although it would be a mistake to ignore why rape is 
wrong on an individual level, individualistic accounts assessing the wrongness 
of rape are fundamentally flawed as they fail to account for the underlying 
forces that shape how the act of rape has existed historically and continues to 
persist today. While the men responsible for acts of violence against women in 
an everyday sense are not a highly organised collective, this does not mean 
that we cannot accept that rape is a collective violation which encompasses a 
wide variety of human rights abuses. While rape as a crime against humanity 
does not wholly apply, it offers an insight into what it would mean to think about 
rape as a systemic violation to a specific social group. 
 
Based on individualistic conceptions of the wrongness of rape, the law and 
social interventions have sought to deter and control the prevalence of rape on 
an individual basis, instead of focusing on how the practice of rape can be 
eradicated entirely. In continuing to ignore the systemic nature of rape as a 
gendered crime, systems of oppression are maintained. If we accept that rape 
is a grave moral wrong grounded in patterns of inequality and institutional roles, 
positions and powers, how then, do we understand responsibility for its 
consequences? Given the systemic character of rape, individualistic 
conceptions of responsibility fall short in addressing collective moral violations. 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 provides a theoretical and practical consideration of 
collective moral responsibility for rape. 
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Collective Responsibility for Rape 
 
“Ironically, often those with the greatest interest in reproducing structural 
injustices are also those with the greatest power to influence their 
transformation”  
(Iris Marion Young, 2003)204 
  
Violence against women is a men’s issue. While only a minority of men are 
violent and sexually abusive towards women, all men can have a positive 
influence on the culture and environment that facilitates and allows for other 
men to be perpetrators. In this final chapter, I will challenge the common sense 
view that rape is only the responsibility of individual rapists. Drawing upon the 
notion of collective responsibility and the long-standing structure/moral agency 
problem, I will demonstrate that rape is soluble,205 but not within the narrow 
confines of individualistic conceptions. In recent years, a number of scholars in 
the UK, US and Australia have persuasively argued that men should take 
responsibility for preventing rape and kindred phenomena by challenging the 
behaviours and attitudes that feed into men’s violence against women: (Paul 
Kirby [2012], Claudia Card [1991], Jackson Katz [1999], Larry May and Robert 
Strikwerda [1998], Michael Flood [2009] and R.W Connell [1995]). Despite this 
growing recognition, attempts to establish men’s collective responsibility for 
rape remain highly controversial. This largely stems from widespread sceptical 
considerations and objections to the very use of collective responsibility itself.  
  
Indeed, there are even difficulties in talking about men as a group and 
discussing them as a ‘collective’ in themselves. For my discussion, I do not 
mean to imply that men and boys are a homogenous group, who are all equally 
socially situated and share the same relationship to acts of violence against 
women. Men’s lives, similarly to women’s, are of course also shaped by multiple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Iris Marion Young (2003) ‘Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice’, Presented as the 
Lindley lecture, Philosophy Department, University of Kansas, 5th May 2003, p. 18, (Online) 
Available: 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/sociology/pdf/PoliticalResponsibility.pdf, 
Accessed: 15/04/17.  
205 What I mean by ‘soluble’ is that it is possible to have a large reduction in the incidence and 
prevalence of rape.	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forms of social and personal difference, including: ethnicity, sexuality, class, age, 
and ability/disability. Although highly structured in a strictly biological and social 
group sense, I define men as an unstructured collective, where they constitute a 
large and uncoordinated set of individuals who are not generally knowing 
participants in collectively harmful practices against women. While individual 
intentions may vary considerably, at a fundamental level, men share collective 
intentionality in their basic beliefs, values and way of life.206 This is significant, 
as it is this underlying set of attitudes that brings about the material, harmful 
outcome of rape and kindred phenomena. It is therefore possible to think of 
patriarchy as the oppressive practices of men coordinated by common interests, 
but not organised intentionally. As Claudia Card (1991) identifies, to claim that 
all men are implicated in the practice of rape is not the equivalent to saying that 
men sit together in smoke-filled rooms in some sort of patriarchal conspiracy.207 
Rather, it is to describe the complex and various ways in which individual men’s 
roles as bystanders, facilitators and beneficiaries of rape constitute a spectrum 
of harm against women. As a group, men have sufficient structure, and 
therefore the necessary agency needed to disrupt the reproduction of 
patriarchal structures that distribute benefits and harms inequitably. 
 
This type of classification has justifiably raised concerns as to whether or not it 
is ever appropriate to hold individual group members morally responsible for the 
harm that other group members cause. However, as this thesis has attempted 
to establish, rape should not be understood as isolated acts, but rather, as a 
social practice belonging to larger systems of attitudes, values and cultural 
practices that are taught and learned early in life. This point is clearly reflected 
in Michael Flood’s (2013) assertion that “when an individual man hits an 
individual woman, pressures her into sex, or sexually harasses her, his actions 
are only made possible because of a wider web of collective and structural 
conditions”.208 In other words, men’s individual actions, although sometimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 For example, based on dominant constructions of what it means be a ‘real man’ (these 
features will be expanded on later in the chapter), men may see their way of life as being the 
protector of the family or their career as being the most important.  
207 Claudia Card (1991) ‘Rape as a Terrorist Institution’ in R. Frey & C. Morris (Eds.), Violence, 
Terrorism, and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
208 Michael Flood (2013) ‘Involving men in ending violence against women: Facing challenges 
and making change’, Keynote address, White Ribbon Conference, Sydney 13-15th May 2013, p. 
4 (Online) Available: 
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seemingly innocuous, contribute to wider social and structural dimensions of 
men’s violence against women. Men’s responsibility as a group therefore lies in 
the uncoordinated, but nonetheless systemic activity of men, whose individual 
actions each contribute only imperceptibly to processes that lead to unjust 
outcomes. For example, men may justifiably struggle to understand how their 
particular actions can be significantly attributed to the prevalence of rape given 
that there is not a clear line of direct causality between say making a rape joke 
or talking about women in derogatory ways to a friend and that friend going on 
to rape a woman. In other words, a lack of clear causality is used to deny the 
harmful contributions individuals can make to the collective culture which 
facilitates individual actions. However, while an individual man may not 
perceptibly harm any victim directly, the sum of harm to all women is morally 
significant. Even though the majority of men may disapprove of or even protest 
against violence against women, their relation as individuals to these collective 
harms constitutes a domain of complicity.209  
   
This chapter is divided into three sections. Part one challenges the 
individualistic notion of responsibility that currently prevails by addressing some 
of the main conceptual issues relating to the legitimacy of collective moral 
responsibility in order to highlight its use as both an applied and theoretical 
concept. In exploring how moral agents should think about their complicity in 
relation to social and structural injustices, I maintain that collective moral 
responsibility, far from diluting or removing the responsibility of individuals or 
merely acting as a means of ascribing guilt, has the potential to influence 
individuals to take part in collective action, and to stimulate them into imagining 
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209 David Miller also makes this point powerfully in relation to racial violence in the early 
twentieth century US. In stating that individuals can share a collective responsibility for 
outcomes that they did not specifically intend, Miller identifies how acts of violence against 
blacks were carried out in the context in which Southern whites passively sympathised, even if 
the overwhelmingly majority of whites condemned the behaviour or were not actively involved 
themselves in perpetrating harm. In virtue of participating in their community, Southern whites 
generally helped to sustain a climate of opinion that allowed for blacks to remain in a state of 
subjugation. The more general point here is that when a community of people shares a set of 
cultural values, one of these effects is to encourage behaviour that may result in an undesirable 
outcome, meaning that the community shares responsibility for that outcome, even if they 
disapprove.  
See David Miller (2004) ‘Holding Nations Responsible’, pp. 252-253.  
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new possibilities for positive change. Part two addresses the sources of men’s 
moral paralysis. While it is uncontroversial that rape and acts of sexual violence 
are overwhelmingly carried out by men against women, most men do not regard 
violence against women as something for which they are responsible. In 
understanding why this is, I draw upon the long-standing structure/agency 
problem to examine how current socio-cultural conditions constitute a serious 
impediment to men’s moral perception and agency on the issue. Lastly, part 
three argues that there are grounds for cautious optimism in ascribing collective 
moral responsibility for rape.   
 
Part One 
 
Individual vs Collective Responsibility 
 
If I were asked to put forward an ethical principle which I considered to 
be especially certain, it would be that no one can be held responsible, in 
the properly ethical sense, for the conduct of another. Responsibility 
belongs essentially to the individual. 
             (H.D Lewis, 1948)210  
 
Although there has been a burgeoning body of literature in recent years, moral 
philosophers have tended to avoid the problem of collective responsibility.211 
Indeed, Western philosophical tradition is well accustomed to the common 
sense view that we can, and should, only regard an individual blameworthy for 
wrongs and harms that they produce on their own. The concept of collective 
responsibility is condemned in the belief that it is incoherent and inappropriate 
to blame or punish an abstract identity for what they did or did not do. H.D 
Lewis’ (1948) statement above reflects the widely shared view that 
responsibility belongs essentially to the individual and that ascriptions of 
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Vol. XXIII, No. 84, January 1948, p. 3.  
211 Christopher Kutz (2000) ‘Introduction’, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 2.  
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responsibility to collectives are a metaphysical absurdity.212 While individual 
responsibility provides clear boundaries to apply traditional moral principles, 
there are many cases, past and present, of harms inflicted by people in 
aggregate where ascribing responsibility at a group-level seems appropriate. No 
one individual can be said to be responsible for massive atrocities such as the 
Holocaust or colonial injustices on indigenous populations. A recognition of 
shared responsibility is already present in everyday discourse, and people 
frequently speak in this way. For example, we might say that “Germans are 
responsible for the atrocities of the Second World War”, or “humans are 
responsible for climate change”. Although members may not fully satisfy the 
conditions of being held personally responsible, many of the most serious 
harms cannot be solely attributed to the actions of individual agents. 
 
In many ways, there is both an intuitive and practical sense that individual 
responsibility is not enough. Consider Brian Lawson’s (2013) example: 
Imagine a scenario in which three individuals, A, B and C, conspire to 
stab a victim, D to death. Each of the perpetrators manages to land a 
substantial blow, but each subsequently panics and runs off. Suppose, 
further, that none of the individual wounds alone, nor any two of the 
wounds, are sufficient to kill D, but that the three wounds taken together 
are sufficient to cause D to bleed to death.213 
Intuitively, we want to be able to say that the group has murdered D. However, 
while each individual’s actions have wounded D, neither A, B or C performed an 
action that was sufficient alone for D’s death. Each member of the group could 
plausibly say that they individually did not murder D. If none of the three 
individuals are responsible for D’s death, presumably no one is responsible. 
Lawson (2013) states that in terms of criminal prosecution, we could easily 
charge A, B and C with assault with a deadly weapon. However, this offence 
fails to sufficiently capture the gravity of the offence given that the victim has 
died. The problem with an exclusive focus on individual responsibility is that this 
approach leaves us without the tools necessary to hold groups responsible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Jan Narveson (2002) ‘Collective Responsibility’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 179-
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wrongs that are brought about together. Conceptually and practically, it seems 
that we gain little from segregating the harm done by a single agent to that of a 
collective. The simple fact is that the whole often constitutes more than the sum 
of its individual parts. In this context, it means that applying individual 
responsibility neglects the crucial impact of collective action. In order to 
adequately understand and assess harm caused by groups, we require tenable 
ascriptions of collective responsibility.  
 
It is an undeniable feature of our social life that we will inevitably find ourselves 
connected to wrongs and harms that fall outside the paradigm of individual 
wrongdoing. As human beings, we are implicated in wrongdoing through our 
geographic location, nationality, and associations with other people and 
institutions. Given that people often have little or no choice in their membership 
of any given collective, a question of fairness arises in ascribing responsibility 
for faults the individual alone did not intend to produce. This is particularly 
pertinent given that we have involuntary membership to all sorts of collectives 
based on our sex, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and even the families that we 
are born into.214 For example, we have little direct control over being a citizen of 
a nation that drops bombs and kills other populations. What moral 
responsibilities do citizens then bear for the actions that the state undertakes in 
their name or on their behalf? Phillip Pettit (2007) argues that while it may not 
always be wholly appropriate to hold loose groups, such as citizens of a nation, 
responsible, ascribing collective responsibility can have positive consequences 
in placing an incentive for members of groups to organise themselves against 
the condemned behaviour.215  In the case of citizens belonging to a nation 
wrongfully dropping bombs, the implication of complicity may provide an 
incentive for them to come together and develop ways of holding their 
government accountable, thus preventing further violence.  
 
A consideration of Pettit’s (2007) argument is particularly relevant to building the 
case for men’s collective moral responsibility for rape, where men, on the basis 
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of their biological sex and gender identity, may find themselves morally 
responsible for harms caused directly by a minority of that collective. Bob Pease 
(2015) states that “most men are not violent and most men treat the women 
close to them with respect and care.”216 It would then seem that most men do 
little to contribute to the prevalence of men’s violence against women and 
therefore have no responsibility for preventing it. However, in terms of bearing 
the cost for fear-reducing measures, it is men as a collective, not just rapists, 
who are the source of women’s fear of rape and of those crimes associated with 
rape. The claim that most men are not violent is not incompatible with the fact 
that violence against women is primarily perpetuated by men against women. It 
may seem unfair that in virtue of belonging to a collective men acquire certain 
moral duties. However, implicating all men in the prevalence of rape reinforces 
the idea that as a group, men can do more to avoid the wrongful harm instead 
of just avowing that some men’s use of violence against women is morally 
abhorrent. In expanding the scope of individual moral responsibility to include 
assessments of what men do in relation to others it is highlighted that it is not 
beyond the capacity of men as a group to end violence against women.  
 
We seem to have great difficulty in accepting that our society is fundamentally 
structured by collectives in which we, as individuals, all play a part. In thinking 
about men’s violence against women in purely individualistic terms, we have 
created a system that offers protection to the consequences of harm induced by 
men as a collective. For example, in vocalising a hypothetical sexual interaction 
with a female through common phrases such as “I would”,217 the consent of the 
woman in question is irrelevant and a sense of male sexual entitlement is 
strengthened. When one places the actions of individuals against this harmful 
context, a link between individual acts are made apparent. Yet, in focusing on 
only the responsibility of rapists, these comments, beliefs and attitudes towards 
women are able to operate covertly without critical reflection. If we are to 
facilitate real change, men’s individual actions must be understood as 
interconnected, as morally pressing issues call for synchronised actions by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Bob Pease (2015) ‘Disentangling Men from Patriarchy: Rethinking the Man Question in 
Masculinity Studies’, in Michael Flood and Richard Howson’s (eds.) Engaging Men in Building 
Gender Equality, (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), p. 58. 
217 “I would” is commonly used within certain male peer groups with regards to whether a female 
meets a standard to which they would want to have sex with them.  
80	  
	  
dominant groups responsible for the harm. Although it may seem unfair to some, 
a recognition of collective responsibility in an increasingly interdependent world 
makes it even more important to think critically and reflectively about what we 
do as collectives and what responsibilities we stand to bear in virtue of 
belonging to various collectives. 
  
Legal vs. moral responsibility  
Discussions on collective responsibility tend to elicit extreme responses in the 
fear that conceptualising moral culpability in this way will somehow absolve or 
diminish the blameworthiness of individual offenders by getting them “off the 
hook too easily”.218 On the 10th February 1992, former heavyweight boxing 
champion Mike Tyson was convicted of raping Desiree Washington, an 
eighteen-year-old college student. In an attempt to persuade the Judge to show 
leniency, Tyson’s lead defence lawyer, Vincent J. Fuller, stated that Tyson grew 
up in a “male dominated world” and therefore had trouble “relating well to 
women.”219As Larry May and Robert Strikwerda (1992) identify, this is largely 
true. At the age of sixteen, Tyson was taken from a home for juvenile 
delinquents in New York and raised by boxing promoters.220 While noting all of 
this, Joyce Carol Oates’ Newsweek essay on Tyson’s rape trial condemns 
attempts to use ‘culture’ to excuse Tyson’s behaviour. Oates concludes by 
stating that “no one is to blame except the perpetrator himself.”221 However, 
objections to collective responsibility based on the belief that it will exonerate 
individuals from criminal responsibility are based on a false dichotomy between 
personal responsibility and structural causation.  
  
The tendency to think of collective responsibility as irreducible and believe it will 
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somehow supersede individual responsibility and criminal liability is further 
reflected in Jan Narveson’s (2002) assessment of collective responsibility:  
And that is what is wrong with collective responsibility. Precisely because 
it will not reduce, it precludes you from getting at anybody – all you can 
do is wave flags and write poems. But in fact, it was this person’s 
grandfather who was brutally murdered by that solider and his buddies, 
this other person’s sister who was raped and tossed down a well, these 
people over here who were herded into a gas chamber, by these 
particular soldiers. Only individual agents can do such things – this 
grandfather and that sister were not murdered by an irreducible entity. 
And neither was anyone else who was in any way harmed.222 
 
However, the assertion that collectives are not the kind of thing of thing that can 
be held responsible for wrongdoing ignores the clear distinction between 
individual legal responsibility and collective moral responsibility. Individual legal 
responsibility designates guilty subjects for conviction. In contrast, collective 
moral responsibility provides appropriate strategies for addressing widespread 
harm and wrongdoing associated with the actions of collective groups. For 
example, there is a clear difference between how we might hold a German 
citizen morally culpable in comparison to a member of an execution squad for 
their role in the Holocaust. Similarly, ordinary men’s participation in society does 
not, by default, make them subject to the same sanctions as if they committed 
the crime of rape themselves. My argument is not that men as a collective 
should have a legal responsibility. The imperceptibility of individual actions 
which may facilitate men’s violence against women would make any legal claim 
absurd. My claim is that men as a collective have a moral responsibility. 
Moreover, it also does not follow that collective responsibility would allow 
perpetrators to escape their own culpability on the grounds that they are mere 
products of their society and thus implicated in processes beyond their control. 
In making the case for men’s collective responsibility for rape, the framework of 
collective responsibility allows for the same standards and consequences of 
legal responsibility to apply to individual wrongdoers deemed more culpable for 
their direct contributions to the harm in question.   
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In recognising this fact, we therefore need not choose between punishment and 
prevention, or between personal and social responsibility. Individual and 
collective responsibilities are complimentary, not mutually exclusive categories. 
Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s (1993) famous slogan “tough on 
crime and tough on the causes of crime” clearly highlights this point.223 What 
this means is that if we want to address criminal behaviour, we need a strategy 
that deals with the underlying causes of crime, as well as an effective criminal 
justice system that punishes individuals committing crimes. In the same vein, to 
prevent acts of men’s violence against women, we must not only address 
individual offenders, but also the socio-cultural conditions that foster criminality. 
If we do not address both the structural and individual determinants of criminal 
behaviour, it is like trying to use a seesaw with just one person. It is only when 
both are in place that any sort of progress is made. While Tyson’s defence 
lawyer was almost certainly using ‘culture’ to mitigate legal culpability, there is a 
genuine insight in his statement. The claim that men who grow up in hyper 
masculine environments may have trouble “relating well to women”224 points us 
towards the broader context of rape in a deeply gender unequal society, where 
dominant constructions of masculinity can be a significant risk factor for 
perpetration. Together, a recognition of both individual and collective 
responsibility provides a more nuanced conception of accountability, and in turn 
can help form a practical basis to address cases of institutional wrongdoing.  
 
Backward-looking vs. forward-looking claims of collective responsibility 
The legitimacy of collective responsibility as a tenable concept has further been 
challenged by claims that it does little more than operate as a means of 
assigning blame and moral guilt for what a group of people indirectly did, or 
failed to prevent.225 Following the end of the Second World War, discussions on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 I’m grateful to Nigel Pleasants for suggesting Tony Blair’s famous slogan to help explain this 
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224 E.R Shipp (1992) ‘Tyson gets 6-year prison term for rape conviction in Indiana’. 
225 As discussed in Margaret Gilbert’s (2006) article on collective moral responsibility and its 
implications for group members, the language of collective responsibility has primarily been 
used to determine “who’s to blame”. See Margaret Gilbert (2006) ‘Who’s to blame? Collective 
Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, pp. 
94-114. 
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collective responsibility in philosophical thought have primarily focused on 
negative, backward-looking types of collective responsibility that are tied to 
ascriptions of blameworthiness, indignation and remorse. Backward-looking 
types of collective responsibility refer to considerations of responsibility applied 
retrospectively to past generations and/or present members for historical 
misdeeds. For example, backward-looking forms of collective responsibility are 
captured in the view that past German citizens were responsible for the rise of 
Nazism. Alternatively, backward-looking collective responsibility can also be 
applied to present members who inherit moral culpability because they may be 
living in a region seized long ago from its Indigenous occupants. Such claims 
have been vehemently criticised for imposing ‘collective guilt’ on generations 
who are believed to be held unfairly responsible for what others did.  
 
For example, the 26th May marks ‘National Sorry Day’ in Australia,226 where 
Australian people and politicians commemorate and apologise for the historical 
injustices done to Aboriginal people:  
For the pain, suffering and hurt of those stolen generations, their 
descendants and their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers 
and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of 
families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and 
degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say 
sorry. 
(Former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd’s address to the nation in 2008)227 
 
However, in prompting current generations to apologise for acts of historical 
wrongdoing, this is a case where collective responsibility for past wrongs can be 
seen to function as an impediment to peace-building and reconciliatory 
ambitions. As Raimond Gatia (2000) identifies “it matters to us, as individuals, 
and members of political communities, that we are just and honourable, that our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Australian Government (2017) ‘Sorry Day and the Stolen Generations’, (Online) Available:  
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/sorry-day-stolen-generations, 
Accessed: 08/04/17.  
227 Australian Government (2017) ‘Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples’ (Online) Available:   
http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/apology-to-australias-
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institutions are decent.”228 Attempts to comprehend and reconcile Australia’s 
fraught past have therefore been particularly socially and culturally unpalatable. 
Raymond Evans and Bill Thorpe (2001) observe that it has been deeply 
unsettling for national audiences to come to terms with a more critical 
interpretation of their national history that recognises the existence of a social 
order that once permitted the state-sponsored extermination of a vulnerable 
minority’s cultural identity.229 Consequently, Australians continue to maintain a 
narrow and defensive form of nationalism that keeps Indigenous experiences 
and questions of genocide peripheral to dominant narratives of British 
Imperialism.230  
 
The parochial use of collective responsibility in these contexts has therefore 
understandably resulted in visceral reactions against its practical applicability. In 
making the claim that men are collectively responsible for violence against 
women, men tend to immediately feel guilt-tripped about the issue. Adrian Howe 
(2008) observes that even calling men’s violence against women “men’s 
violence” incites outrage: “but not all men are violent, women are violent too.”231 
In the absence of direct harm from their own individual actions, it is easy for 
men to turn away, to assert that they do not commit this violence and believe 
that it is unfair to impose collective guilt on all men for the crimes of a minority. 
The tendency for men to feel blamed and defensive about their individual role in 
enabling violence against women is clearly evidenced in the widespread 
dismissal of women who attempt to engage men as being ‘anti-male’, ‘men 
haters’ or ‘feminazis’.   
 
However, there is nothing ‘anti-male’ in calling attention to the various ways in 
which masculinity is connected to these problems. Rather than imposing blame 
for facilitating acts of rape, the application of collective responsibility in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Raimond Gatia (2002) ‘Introduction – Take Your Time’, A Common Humanity: Thinking 
about love, truth and justice, 3rd edition, (London: Routledge), pp. 12-13. 
229 Raymond Evans & Bill Thorpe (2001) ‘Ingenocide and the Massacre of Aboriginal History’, in 
Overland, Vol. 163, No. 1, p. 29.  
230 Sarah Maddison (2012) ‘Postcolonial guilt and national identity: Historical injustice and the 
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context aims to promote the positive influence men can play as partners in 
prevention. Unlike Australians taking responsibility for the past treatment of 
Indigenous peoples, or Germans for the Holocaust, an assessment of men’s 
collective responsibility for rape is fundamentally different. This conception 
extends beyond negative backward-looking considerations of moral 
assessments to positive forward-looking considerations of moral obligation. 
Backward-looking collective responsibility is counter-revolutionary as the 
association with guilt and blame functions as an insurmountable barrier for 
engaging men. For example, a backward-looking claim is “we are responsible 
for the act”, whereas a forward-looking claim is “we are responsible for cleaning 
this up”. Contemporary men as a group cannot be meaningfully collectively 
responsible for all acts of rape and violence against women that have occurred 
in the past. However, they are morally responsible for improving the ideologies 
and structures that maintain it. In this view, acceptance of collective moral 
responsibility can create positive roles for men in violence prevention as 
bystanders, role models, supporters and advocates.  
 
Question of equal responsibility  
Now that I have addressed the main criticisms of collective responsibility as a 
concept, there is still a difficulty in determining whether individuals bear similar 
degrees and forms of responsibility for the institution of rape. In a Foucauldian 
sense, everyone is complicit and implicated in gendered and other modes of 
power. 232  Sam Keen (1991) sees both men and women as participating 
together to perpetuate a system of violence, erroneously concluding that both 
men and women should share an equal responsibility for rape.233 As identified 
in both the Introduction and Chapter 1, women are also bound up in the 
institution of rape. Women can be thought to be responsible through complicity 
or lack of challenge in their shared contribution to patterns of socialisation that 
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Sheridan (London: Penguin Books).  
233 Sam Keen (1991) Fire in the Belly: On Being a Man, (London: Piatkus), p. 47. 
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may reinforce or legitimise problematic forms of masculinity and femininity. The 
acknowledgement that women are complicit in the institution of rape appears 
akin to the controversial claim made by Raul Hilberg (1961), among other 
prominent Jewish scholars, that elements of Jewish society, such as Jewish 
councils, were complicit in the Holocaust. This view is significant, as it is 
consistent with the point that women bear some responsibility for tackling the 
injustice. However, it does not follow that all those who are complicit should be 
considered equally responsible. The language of women having equal 
responsibility is fundamentally dangerous because it detracts from the fact that 
it is the perpetrators and beneficiaries of inequalities that structure this violence. 
Women’s contribution and inaction cannot therefore be understood as morally 
culpable in the same way as men’s, as women may act from a coerced or 
restricted starting point. While both men and women bear a shared 
responsibility for addressing rape, groups who hold the most power and 
privilege should bear the greatest ethical responsibility to act against injustice.  
 
Although it is clear that women are made worse off by the prevalence of rape in 
society, Keen’s (1991) claim of equal responsibility represents an unwillingness 
to see all women as victims and all men as perpetrators or beneficiaries of this 
violence. In many ways, this view is justified in the sense that the dichotomy 
between universal perpetrators and victims ignores the various ways in which 
the act of rape is part of a larger system of patriarchal relations that are 
damaging to both men and women. Of course, there is no single experience of 
masculinity, meaning that not all men may feel harmed by patriarchal relations 
in the same way. No doubt few men feel harmed, but the point is they may be 
harmed nonetheless. What it means to be a man is influenced by multiple forms 
of social difference, including the intersectionalities of class, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, age and level of ability/disability. While lived experiences of 
masculinity vary considerably, it can be argued that there is still an overarching 
cultural message about what it means to be a ‘real man’. Robert Brannon (1976) 
was the first to identify this with his description of the four main pillars of 
hegemonic masculinity: men should not be feminine in any way (“no sissy stuff”), 
men should strive to be respected for status and achievement (“the big wheel”), 
men should never show weakness (“the sturdy oak”), and men should seek 
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adventure and risk, even accepting violence when necessary (“give ‘em 
hell”).234  
  
Based on these four ideals, there is a substantial body of empirical evidence 
which supports the view that men bear significant costs in terms of their 
relationships with others and their emotional and physical wellbeing.235 For 
example, the first principle of anti-femininity explicitly asserts that to be feminine 
is to be weak. This may mean that characteristics predominately considered to 
be exhibited by women such as negotiating, talking about feelings, and 
empathising with others are all behaviours that are considered to be ‘feminine’, 
and therefore undesirable. Due to fears of being perceived as feminine, or in 
turn, ‘gay’, an adherence to these ideals mean that men may be less likely to 
seek help for mental-health related issues, less likely to form strong bonds with 
their children, more likely to abandon or hide ‘unmasculine’ interests that may 
be deeply fulfilling to them, and more likely to participate in violent or risky 
behaviour.236  
 
In turn, the ideals surrounding what it means be a ‘real man’ preserve and 
perpetuate the conditions that facilitate men’s violence against women. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, accepted social conventions and ideals surrounding 
what it means to be a man in sexual encounters or relationships means that 
men may partake in risky sexual behaviour by not taking sufficient steps 
necessary to ensure consent, or not respect women’s consent to sex at all. 
What is deeply unsettling about the possibility of negligent rapists is that while 
men are acting in clear violation of the law, they may not be violating any 
procedural norms. In other words, their investment in problematic forms of 
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pp. 1-12, (Online) Available: 
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masculinity means that they are all still operating within the confines of the 
dominant rules, norms and values of their society. Men who adhere to norms 
which diminish the importance of consent effectively play a game of Russian 
roulette with their sexual practices, and there is a degree of moral luck as to 
whether or not a woman will label her experience as rape and the man as a 
rapist. These conditions make men, as a group, more susceptible to be 
perpetrators of sexual crimes.  
 
Moreover, the prevalence of men’s violence against women is damaging to men 
because it makes all men seem like a potential threat. Even something as 
simple as walking alone at night can induce a woman into a state of fear in 
wondering who is walking behind her and why. Men themselves may not even 
realise how their very own presence in this situation constitutes a legitimate 
threat to a woman’s perceived sense of safety. As May and Strikwerda (1998) 
assert, “Until socialisation patterns are changed, it is not absurd for women to 
view every man as a potential rapist.” 237  Individual men therefore have a 
responsibility to recognise that they belong to a stigmatised group which is 
largely perceived by women as the side of the oppressors. This of course 
requires a large degree of critical self-reflexivity, as men must be able to 
conceive of themselves as complicit in social relations that are not always 
benign in their effects on women.  
    
While it is within everyone’s interests to re-examine masculinity, this can only be 
fairly conceptualised as a shared, but not equal responsibility between men and 
women. It has been highlighted that the very same argument of a shared, but 
not equal responsibility could be made against the attribution of collective 
responsibility to all men. In other words, it may seem unfair or appear 
incoherent to label all men as collectively responsible given that men also have 
varying degrees of involvement in rape culture. Therefore, the responsibility of 
individual men should be proportionate to their involvement. However, 
practically speaking, little would be gained in prescribing sub sets of 
responsibility; it is fair to assume that most men would deny any responsibility in 
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relation to harmful patriarchal relations. Indeed, the claim that all men are 
collectively morally responsible in a forward-looking sense is not the equivalent 
of saying that all men are equally socially situated or share the same 
relationship to acts of violence against women. Rather, it is the claim that while 
only a minority of men are violent towards women, all men can be seen to have 
a positive influence on the culture and environment that facilitates and allows for 
other men to be perpetrators. For example, for the well-educated liberal man 
who never makes degrading jokes about women, his responsibility is not to 
refrain from making crude jokes, but to join activist communities, to engage 
other men to talk about the issue and to challenge those who do make 
degrading comments.  
 
Indeed, as the group with the most power and privilege, men have a greater 
capacity to rectify harm. On one hand, men have a difficult starting point. 
Generally speaking, men are limited in their ability to understand men’s violence 
against women in virtue of not being susceptible to rape, street harassment, or 
sexism more broadly. Michael Flood (2016) notes that men tend to “define 
violence more narrowly, blame victims more enthusiastically and subscribe to 
rape myths more strongly.”238 On the other hand, men are in some ways better 
epistemically and socially positioned to address this harm. In a recent TED talk, 
Michael Kimmel (2015) reflects on teaching a sociology of gender course with a 
female colleague. When Kimmel walked into the room to give a guest lecture, 
one of the students looked up and remarked “oh finally, an objective opinion!”239 
In other words, every time his colleague spoke, what the students heard was a 
woman. When she spoke of structural inequalities based on gender in the 
United States, they thought “of course you’d say that, you’re a woman.”240 
Kimmel’s experience as an educator demonstrates how women’s attempts to 
engage men on issues related to gender inequality and violence more 
specifically are met with hostility or attempts to discredit them. In doing so, it 
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gives men an excuse not to pay attention. While men of course still need to 
listen to women and their experiences, men hold a unique position as positive 
agents of social change based on their shared intentionality, and consequently, 
their ability to relate to and engage other men.  
      
Part one of this chapter has assessed some of the main criticisms made against 
the legitimacy of collective moral responsibility and established that ascribing 
collective moral responsibility in the context of men’s violence against women 
poses no plausible danger of allowing direct perpetrators to escape legal 
sanctions, nor is it an attempt to demonise all men by attributing guilt. In 
concluding that men bear the greatest ethical obligation to act against this 
injustice, part two acknowledges reasons why men do not see violence against 
women as their responsibility in the first place. A discussion on the sources of 
men’s moral paralysis is significant as a recognition of the various ways in 
which men’s moral agency is limited in this area has profound implications for 
prevention work in developing appropriate strategies to engage men.  
   
Part Two  
 
Sources of moral paralysis  
 
It is true that most men do not commit acts of violence against women. However, 
it is also true that most men aren’t doing much to help end this violence, either. 
When significant harms are being enacted by a specific collective, it is 
reasonable to expect individuals belonging to that collective to examine their 
own attitudes and practices that may contribute to the likelihood of these harms 
occurring, even if they do not participate in them directly. At the same time, 
there are good reasons to believe that a belief system reinforced by institutions 
and embodied by a collective can significantly infringe on an individual’s ability 
to grasp important moral facts. Our socio-cultural environment determines, in 
large part, the values, attitudes and fundamental beliefs available to us. Many 
men are therefore unlikely to critically examine their own behaviours or beliefs, 
or ever even entertain the possibility that their actions may be seriously harmful 
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to women. In this sense, institutional conditions and socio-cultural norms 
constitute a serious impediment to men’s moral perception and agency.  
 
Men’s collective responsibility (and in turn, culpability) for rape is part of a much 
larger structural/moral agency debate concerning whether individual agents are 
unable to know or question that practices in their society are morally wrong, or 
whether they choose to remain actively ignorant of their role in wrongdoing. For 
example, there are good reasons to believe that cultural membership can be 
“ethically disabling”, 241  meaning that widespread moral ignorance may be 
attributed to agents being genuinely unaware of the immorality of the norms to 
which they routinely adhere to. Conversely, Michelle Moody-Adams (1994) 
dismisses claims of impairment and highlights cases where individuals may 
choose not to investigate their beliefs because the practice in question benefits 
them in some way.242 For example, Neil Levy (2003) notes that “slave-owners 
benefit from the institution of slavery; male chauvinists benefit from patriarchy; 
and Nazis from anti-Semitism”.243 It is therefore plausible to believe that moral 
agents are capable of pragmatically turning down a series of opportunities to 
learn alternative moral outlooks in order to maintain false beliefs that satisfy 
their own self-interests. While the debate surrounding the various ways in which 
individual morality is socially constructed, conditioned and constrained raises a 
plethora of interesting questions concerning the principle of diminished 
responsibility, the following section assumes that men’s collective failure to see 
violence against women as an institution in which they are all implicated, 
appears to be a mixture of both inability and motivated ignorance. Despite this, 
there are still sufficient grounds to hold men collectively responsible for the 
prevalence and fear of rape.  
 
In recognising the effects of structures on individual moral agency, ideas of 
collective responsibility appear to be undermined. It seems questionable that we 
could ever hold individuals collectively morally responsible for failing to 
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investigate the acceptability of institutionalised practices that they have good 
reasons to believe are permissible.244 However, there are of course, a number 
of problems with identifying ‘culture’ or ‘patriarchy’ alone as that which explains, 
in virtue of its causal effects, individual beliefs and behaviours. As Michelle 
Moody-Adams (1994) identifies, what is wrong with blaming culture is that such 
blame ignores the various ways in which “cultural conventions are modified, 
reshaped and sometimes radically revised in individual action.” 245  In other 
words, a ‘culture’ cannot exist independently of individual agents, as they are 
active interpreters of culturally prescribed norms and practices. Thus, while men 
cannot be blamed for being born into a patriarchal social order, they can be 
considered complicit for their actions that maintain it. While an individual’s moral 
perception may be corrupted by a variety of factors such as their background, 
experience and own pragmatic self-interest, one’s culture does not fully 
determine how they think and act, and therefore cannot absolve the 
responsibility of actors for their wrongful behaviour within assigned social roles 
on an individual or collective level.  
 
While culture does not wholly determine action, there are real barriers to men’s 
involvement in ending rape and kindred phenomena.. Most men do not regard 
other men’s violence against women as something that they should do 
something about. If they are not physically violent themselves, they do not see it 
as being their problem. In May and Strikwerda’s (1998) view,246 the fact that the 
vast majority of men do little to actively oppose rape makes them complicit with 
the perpetration of rape. An assessment of forward-looking collective moral 
responsibility therefore requires an acknowledgement of the various sources 
that constitute serious impediments to men’s moral agency. It is clear that 
institutions can structure the options of participants and others in ways so that 
they would never foresee their own complicity in harmful acts. For example, 
Claudia Card (2010) states that while we may come to see that a 
slaughterhouse does intolerable harm, what we do as consumers, restaurant 
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workers, reporters or teachers is framed as being remote from that harm.247 In 
exploring how specific discourses produce particular understandings of rape 
and acts of men’s violence towards women more broadly, this section exposes 
the institutional conditions that allow men to believe that this issue is irrelevant 
to them, beyond their individual control or not worth intervening.  
 
Men’s Violence against women is a ‘women’s issue’ 
Generally speaking, efforts to prevent men’s violence against women have 
garnered much more support from women than men. It is as if men and women 
have been on a tandem bicycle, but it has mostly been women who have been 
doing all the pedalling. In understanding why this is, the widespread assumption 
that rape and sexual harassment are ‘women’s issues’ can be seen to function 
as a significant barrier to men’s involvement in ending violence against women 
by rendering men invisible from discourses that are primarily about them. In 
doing so, this process exposes one of the key characteristics of power and 
privilege: the ability to go unexamined.248  
 
There are two main ways in which framing men’s violence against women as a 
“women’s issue” culturally inoculates men. Firstly, there is a general level of 
social discourse that shifts individual moral perceptions on issues of men’s 
violence against women. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, there is an exclusive 
fixation on policing women’s behaviour and appearance in order to try and avoid, 
not prevent, men’s violence against women. This is problematic, as this focus 
makes women responsible for their own conduct and partly responsible for the 
actions of a potential perpetrator. Discussing men’s violence against women in 
this way absolves men of responsibility and instead, blames women for 
provoking it. This is significant as it means that the primary perpetrators of these 
crimes are rarely ever challenged to think about their position as men in relation 
to the prevalence of rape.  
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Secondly, organisations, projects and campaigns dedicated to ending men’s 
violence against women are primarily made up of women. In many respects, 
this is justified. Female victims who have been violated or abused by men 
reveal that they feel more comfortable in women-only spaces. Additionally, 
research has found that women working within women’s support services are 
sceptical about men wanting to get involved in the fear that their participation 
runs the risk of jeopardising resources and funding directed at women, or that 
they will “take over”.249 On the other hand, some women recognise that while 
not all women’s projects have to involve men, they acknowledge that men’s 
involvement is both strategic and necessary in the belief that they can 
contribute as influential agents of change. In light of these views, it is clear that 
men’s position as allies remains tenuous. With a pre-existing ambivalence 
about men’s involvement, lack of male-role models in this field and a general 
level of social discourse that fixates exclusively on the responsibility of women, 
it is unsurprising that most men are complacent with issues relating to the 
prevalence of men’s violence against women. 
 
Rape is only committed by bad or mad men   
Most men do not consider themselves as participants in the institution of rape. 
Instead, men are encouraged to believe that acts of violence against women 
belong to deviant and deranged men, or innocent men who have been falsely 
accused. In this view, while acts of violence against women are primarily 
committed by men, perpetrators of these crimes are portrayed as being 
fundamentally different to other men in society. However, the sheer prevalence 
of violence against women around the world cannot be explained through 
individual abnormalities alone. As Michael Kimmel (2008) questions, “how can 
such a pervasive event be the work of a few lunatics?”250 Although it may be 
comforting for all of us to believe that only ‘sick’ or ‘insane’ people could commit 
such morally reprehensive acts, historical acts of institutional wrongdoing clearly 
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demonstrate that seemingly ordinary, responsible and decent people also have 
the capacity to inflict harm on others.  
  
The Stanford Prison Experiment conducted in 1971 by Philip Zimbardo offers a 
morally relevant example of the capacity for ‘normal’ individuals to act in cruel 
and harmful ways to others. Described as “normal healthy male college 
students”, twenty-four men were divided into roles of a prisoner or guard and 
put into a prison-like environment located in the basement of the Psychology 
Department at Stanford University.251 The study was designed to last two weeks 
but had to be terminated after only six days. Zimbardo (1971) reported to 
Congressional Hearings two months later that the reason for the premature 
termination of the mock prison experiment was because the ‘guards’ voluntarily 
descended into barbarity:  
At the end of only six days we had to close down our mock prison 
because what we saw was frightening… in less than a week, the 
experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; 
human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged, and the 
ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were 
horrified because we saw some boys (‘guards’) treat other boys as if they 
were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys 
(‘prisoners’) became servile, dehumanised robots.252 
Later described by Zimbardo (2007) as the “Lucifer Effect”, 253  Zimbardo 
demonstrated that the potential for people to support and engage in morally 
abhorrent acts is not a consequence of straightforward pathological dispositions. 
This famous experiment is significant because it demonstrates that the capacity 
to inflict harm on others is not limited to people who we consider to be deviant, 
mentally ill or psychologically disturbed.   
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In the context of ordinary men’s capacity to commit rape, the history of rape in 
war undermines popular socio-cultural explanations of sexual offenders as 
constituting “a unique clinical or psychopathological type”.254 For example, May 
and Strikwerda (1998) note that during the first few months of the Bosnian war, 
it is estimated that approximately 30,000 to 50,000 women were raped by 
Serbian soldiers.255 In an everyday context, claims of violence against women 
belonging to ‘normal’ men have been met with significant backlash by men who 
counter-argue that feminists have painted an unduly negative account in 
labelling all men as “essentially bad”.256 However, these men are ‘normal’ in the 
sense that they are acting largely in accordance with the dominant gender 
norms and values which they have been socialised into. In other words, there is 
a connection to how macro-level powers, such as the patriarchy, contributes to 
micro-level manifestations of everyday violence against women. This claim is 
supported by a wide variety of studies which have found that men’s adherence 
to sexist and patriarchal values are an important predictor in violence against 
women.257 If we expand notions of violence beyond severe physical force and 
obvious forms of sexual abuse, it becomes clear how many men are implicated 
in social norms and practices that facilitate, excuse and downplay violence 
against women. Firstly, men may facilitate this violence by saying nothing when 
a friend makes a derogatory comment about women, by turning a blind eye 
when a friend is treating his girlfriend in coercive and controlling ways or 
engaging in forms of street harassment. Secondly, men may hold attitudes that 
excuse or justify violence by saying “she wanted it” or “oh, he or she was just 
drunk”.258 Lastly, men downplay this violence by disassociating and detaching 
themselves from the issue. When taken individually, these actions may appear 
inconsequential. However, the rules of social structures can collide in 
unforeseen ways with other rules and give rise to serious moral wrongs. In 
attributing the prevalence of violence against women to mad or bad men we 
render the collective actions of ‘normal’ men invisible and mistakenly accept 
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that there are a minority of deviant or psychologically disturbed men causing 
widespread harm instead of asking why this is a real problem in our society.  
 
The social cost of men’s engagement  
Lastly, a source of men’s inaction may be a result of motivated ignorance. 
Efforts to involve men in violence prevention must acknowledge why men may 
be unwilling to engage with this issue out of self-interest. Indeed, there are real 
costs to men in undermining the patriarchal privileges that underpin this 
violence. Literature on men’s collective moral responsibility for violence against 
women has been overly enthusiastic in emphasising the positive elements, 
while simultaneously minimising the resistance that men have in relinquishing 
their privilege and acknowledging their complicity in the reproduction of violent 
supportive attitudes. 259 Intuitively, men’s involvement in the anti-violence 
movement is presumably working against their own interests in mobilising 
around the goal of eliminating male power and privilege. For the same reason 
high earning individuals are less likely to support a political party who vow to 
increase income tax – people rationally make these choices because the 
outcomes directly serve their own self-interests. While it would be easy to 
condemn men for their silence as a form of complicity, in order for agents to be 
genuinely motivated by claims of responsibility, we must first understand and 
acknowledge their position more clearly.  
 
Refusing to be a bystander is no easy task. Affronts to dominant masculinities 
require changing norms in male groups that are often used for male bonding 
experiences and involve challenging aspects of masculinity that men may deem 
fundamental to their identity. May (1998) starts his chapter on rape and 
collective responsibility by reflecting on how both he and his male peers would 
draw “strength and camaraderie” in talking about their sexual exploits and 
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yelling obscenities at women on the street as they drove by.260 Men and boys 
may therefore risk losing status among their male peers by speaking and acting 
out against sexist and harassing ways. For example, Bill Patrick (2010) reflects 
on the time at University when he had “Bill Patrick sucks cock” spray-painted on 
the wall outside his room in retaliation for his pro-feminist activism on 
campus.261 Similarly, in response to one of Michael Flood’s online articles on a 
pro-feminist website, one man sent an email declaring that he was a “fucking 
faggot, feminazi pussy licker.” 262  Such responses demonstrate how men’s 
public challenge to hegemonic masculine norms attract ridicule, contempt, and 
anger. 
 
How then, do we provide men with reasons to avoid and repair collective harms 
to women? As established in Chapter 2, the existence and prevalence of men’s 
violence against women threatens women’s full participation in public life as 
equal citizens. It harms women’s physical and emotional health, restricts their 
sexual and reproductive choices, their autonomy, self-esteem, mobility and 
safety. Despite the challenges that men may face, the social sacrifice of status 
among male peers appears minimal in comparison to the harms that women 
collectively bear. Peter Singer’s (1972) widely cited example of our moral duty 
to help a child drowning in a pond reflects this point. Say that you are walking 
past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, you ought to intervene if it 
comes at no significant cost (such as your own life). While intervening may 
result in getting your clothes muddy or shoes ruined, these consequences are 
insignificant in comparison to the death of a child. 263 This example highlights 
that if it is within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we have a moral 
responsibility to do it. To name a few appropriate actions, refusing to be a 
bystander, practicing good consent, and engaging in activist communities all 
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come at a less significant cost. It would then appear reasonable to suggest that 
men have a moral duty to prevent the harms that burden women’s lives.  
 
However, considering that men continue to fail to address and understand 
men’s violence against women as a men’s issue, it is clear that mere moral 
argument is not enough. Claims that men’s privileges are unjust, unearned or 
that it is simply unfair to women all do very little to prompt collective action. In 
many ways, self-sacrificing altruism is an insufficient basis for engaging men in 
the movement to reduce the prevalence of men’s violence against women 
Although highly controversial, we have to be able to demonstrate how this 
change is also good for men. I attended a workshop last year that discussed the 
role of men in the theory and practice of feminism.264  During one of the 
seminars on engaging men, one man said that we need to be able to appeal to 
men’s concerns for their children,265 personal health, and relationships with the 
women in their lives if we expect their participation on gender-related issues. 
The majority of the women in the group appeared noticeably annoyed by this 
claim, and stated that men’s involvement has to come from a broader ethical 
and political commitment to gender equality, not an enlightened self-interest. 
However, I believe his claim has some pragmatic merit. Although it is 
disappointing that we may need to personalise the issue to engage men to give 
up the unfair privileges that they hold, we have to at least get men through the 
door. The opportunity for men to profess and act on a broader ethical and 
political commitment to gender inequality can then come later. There is a cost to 
men’s engagement that must be acknowledged, and while this might appear 
justifiably insignificant to women, we need to accept that it is likely to appear 
significant to men.  
 
While most men abhor rape and show sympathy for victims of sexual violence, 
part two of this chapter has demonstrated how a general level of social 
discourse shapes men’s moral perceptions of men’s violence against women. 
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  For example, these appeals may involve questions like “what kind of future and world do you 
want for your daughter?”	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As the dominant group who currently reap the benefits of this social order, and 
in turn, violence against women, this section also acknowledged that men might 
pragmatically turn down opportunities to engage with the issue due to their own 
motivated ignorance. As Susan Griffin (1977) asserts “rape is not an isolated 
act that can be rooted out from patriarchy without ending patriarchy itself.”266 
Eradicating the harmful institutional conditions that give rise to men’s violence 
against women should have enough altruistic appeal to motivate all. However, 
the lack of progress so far suggests that this approach is too idealistic. 
Consequently, building momentum by appealing to the personal benefits that 
men may gain should be considered. This point has important implications for 
prevention work as it demonstrates that if we want to engage men, we have to 
do more than explain how the prevalence of men’s violence against women in 
society harms women – we have to show how this revolutionary change will be 
good for men. Lastly, the third and final part of this chapter will reflect on 
theoretical and practical considerations of men’s engagement in activist 
communities and conclude that ascribing forward-looking collective moral 
responsibility holds hopeful and optimistic prospects in ending men’s violence 
against women.  
 
Part Three 
 
Grounds for cautious optimism  
 
Efforts to engage men in preventing men’s violence against women are gaining 
momentum all around the world. Since the 1970s, the scholarly project of 
making gender visible to men has considered appropriate primary prevention 
strategies to change the social norms, gender roles and power relations that 
feed into men’s violence against women.267 As a result, increasing numbers of 
men are taking part in efforts to end violence against women. Men are 
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becoming involved as audiences for social marketing, participants in education 
programs, activists and advocates, community leaders, and policy makers.268 
  
The best known example of an organisation that promotes men’s collective 
moral responsibility for violence against women in practice is the White Ribbon 
Campaign. Founded in 1991 in response to the Montreal Massacre, where a 
male student murdered fourteen fellow female students in the claim that 
“feminism ruined his life”, 269  a group of men from Toronto formed the 
organisation to highlight the positive role that men can play in ending violence 
against women. As the world’s largest movement of men and boys working 
together to end violence against women, promote gender equality, healthy 
relationships and a new version of masculinity, the White Ribbon Campaign 
focuses on primary prevention – stopping violence before it occurs by 
challenging the deeply engrained attitudes, social norms and power inequalities 
that give rise to men’s violence against women and gender inequality.270 In 
recognising that change is unlikely to stem from men simply being critically self-
reflective of their beliefs, values and practices, White Ribbon have made 
systemic efforts in lobbying governments to make the rights of all women a 
policy priority, calling for better sex and healthy relationship education in 
schools, greater media accountability in reporting men’s violence against 
women, and providing workplace accreditation incentives for traditionally male-
dominated organisations to take up the cause of preventing and reducing men’s 
violence against women.271  
 
Alongside these notable achievements, there are also real challenges and 
controversies in this work. For a sustainable, self-transformative and politically 
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engaged way of life, men must find constructive ways to act sceptically towards 
themselves and others. Efforts to engage men have therefore had to balance 
the assertion that all men are complicit and collectively morally responsible for 
violence against women while reconciling with the fact that this does not mean 
to imply that all men should feel guilty for their role in maintaining and 
reproducing systems of oppression. In trying to encourage men’s involvement, 
activists and organisations have attempted to uphold men’s desires to feel good 
about being men by framing men’s violence against women as a problem with 
dominant constructions of masculinity, not men themselves. Instead of 
abandoning hegemonic traits associated with masculinity such as toughness, 
strength, power, dominance and so on, recent campaigns have sought to 
redefine and reshape what it means to be a man in a way that is beneficial to 
both men and women.  
 
A clear illustration of this approach is evident in the widely popular ‘My Strength’ 
campaign. In 2002, the US-based organisation ‘Men Can Stop Rape’ released a 
poster series titled ‘My strength is not for hurting’. 272  The images in the 
campaign posters depict men who look traditionally ‘masculine’ in their 
appearance with captions stating: “My strength is not for hurting, so when she 
said no, I said OK”, “My strength is not for hurting, so when I wasn’t sure how 
she felt, I asked”, and “My strength is not for hurting, so when she was drunk, I 
backed off”.273 The campaign draws upon dominant masculine ideals to expand 
the meaning beyond physical strength to include an inner moral strength. In 
other words, they attempt to raise the bar for what it means to be a so-called 
‘real man’.  
 
This approach has important implications for violence prevention work as 
separating men from masculinity allows for activists to feel good about their 
involvement, but also feel like men in doing so. As highlighted earlier in the 
responses to Michael Flood and Bill Patrick’s involvement in pro-feminist work, 
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a common tactic employed by other men is to undermine the masculinity of anti-
violence male activists by labelling them as “wimps and sissies, gays or 
traitors.”274 Katz (2006) calls this the ‘macho paradox’, where men who engage 
in anti-violence work have their manhood called into question, yet in his view, it 
takes more courage and strength to stand up against a dominant group and 
fight against injustice.275 This strategy demonstrates that it is possible for men 
to be critically self-reflexive with a way of calling out other men, without 
abandoning their own sense of identity in the process.276 
 
While engaging men in activist communities is important, there is also a real 
danger in speaking to their concerns, interests and problems.277 Flood (2003) 
states that men’s collective and pro-feminist mobilisation on issues of violence 
against women is a “delicate form of political activity” 278 . Indeed, it is a 
particularly delicate activity because it involves the mobilisation of members of a 
privileged group in order to undermine that very same privilege. Research 
based on qualitative interviews indicates that women are concerned that men’s 
involvement in violence prevention will reduce funding for women’s services, 
dilute feminist messages and marginalise women’s voices.279  For example, 
Tracy Castellino (2010) found that when men are involved in prevention work, 
women speak differently about the issue in fear that they will offend men, 
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resulting in less honest and open dialogues on pertinent issues.280 This is 
significant, as it has made some organisations hesitant to share a realm which 
has historically been a place of sanctuary for women.  
 
Men’s engagement in organisations and projects relating to ending violence 
against women is also shaped by patriarchal privilege. Kristen Macomber (2012) 
found that there is a “glass escalator” effect for men working in women-
orientated projects. Despite their minority status within women’s organisations, 
men are often glorified as the “good guys” and given greater power and 
recognition than women who are doing similar work.281 As a result of their 
heightened status in the field, Kimmel (2015) humorously highlights that some 
men see addressing gender equality as something akin to the cavalry: “thanks 
very much for bringing this to our attention ladies, but we’ll take it from here.”282 
This is problematic, as it reinforces the same systems of power and oppression 
within organisations and projects dedicated to eliminating them. 
 
Despite these legitimate challenges and concerns, engaging men to be positive 
partners in violence prevention can be seen as a promising catalyst for social 
change. While both men and women bear a shared responsibility for the 
institution of rape, it is men as a collective who hold the most power and 
privilege, meaning that they are best socially positioned to act against and 
transform this systemic injustice. In accordance with Pettit’s (2007) view, 
whether or not you are fundamentally convinced by the claim that men share a 
collective moral responsibility for rape, it is difficult to deny the positive potential 
this reclassification could have. Reconsidering the responsibility for rape as a 
collective moral responsibility draws attention to how men and women’s values, 
beliefs and actions belong to larger institutional systems that distribute harms 
and benefits inequitably; a process that is inevitably missed when the 
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prevalence of rape is only considered to be the responsibility of individual 
perpetrators. 
 
The claim that men share a forward-looking collective moral responsibility for 
rape is an optimistic view. If we understand rape as an act that is inextricably 
linked to a masculine identity that is socially and institutionally formed, there are 
good reasons to believe that the social conditions which shape individual 
attitudes and learned behaviours can be reformed. While this prospect may 
seem inconceivable at the moment, it is important to remember that it also now 
seems inconceivable that women were once not allowed the right to vote and 
that rape in marriage was legal until 1991. Although cultural change is slow, it 
does happen. The existence of organisations like the White Ribbon Campaign 
and Men Can Stop Rape demonstrate that there are grounds for cautious 
optimism in providing examples of what men’s collective moral responsibility for 
violence against women looks like in practice.  
 
In imagining new possibilities for positive social change, we need to rethink 
institutional settings and what it would mean for individual moral agents to 
position themselves in relation to institutional injustices. Despite the primacy of 
individual moral responsibility in Western conceptions of morality, there are 
many urgent issues that require collective and concerted action, such as climate 
change, global poverty, refugee crises and racial discrimination. This chapter 
has provided a basis to understand what it would mean to think carefully about 
the question of forward-looking collective moral responsibility.  
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Conclusion 
 
Rape is preventable, not inevitable. Rape as an act of institutional wrongdoing 
is the idea that men’s violence against women is a social practice perpetrated 
directly by individual offenders and perpetuated indirectly by normal, everyday 
men in normal, everyday circumstances. If we do not understand men’s 
violence against women beyond the level of the individual, we will continue to 
misdiagnose the problem and thus misprescribe the cure. We will fail to 
understand the true character of rape, we will fail to address its real causes and 
foundations, and we will fail in our efforts to reduce and prevent its prevalence.  
 
In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how the capacity of the law and law enforcement 
agencies are significantly limited in their capacity to address and combat rape. 
Rape is a complex social problem that cannot be solved through legislative 
reform alone. Instead, a broader approach which recognises the various socio-
cultural conditions that make women vulnerable to men’s violence is required. 
This would involve educational and behavioural change strategies targeting the 
very institutions responsible for producing and maintaining a deeply unequal 
society; one that does not actively encourage sexual negotiation and mutuality 
in choice. While the law has a powerful and symbolic role to play, its capacity to 
successfully prosecute cases of sexual violations will remain extremely limited 
unless the features of women’s continuing inequality are addressed first.  
 
Chapter 2 builds on the need to understand the broader context in which rape 
occurs. In outlining how philosophers have approached the question of why 
rape is wrong, I demonstrate the seemingly obvious point that why we think 
rape is wrong matters – it determines how we understand the crime and the 
solutions we devise to combat it. Previous attempts to understand the 
wrongfulness of rape in individualistic terms have fallen short given their failure 
to capture the moral harm rape does to all women. Consequently, this 
understanding has impacted the measures we take as a society to address rape; 
practical measures have focused on addressing individual behaviour, 
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particularly women’s avoidance of rape through gender policing, instead of 
addressing the harmful collective behaviour of men.  
 
If a dimension of the wrongfulness of rape lies in the harmful collective 
behaviour of men, what responsibility do men then have as a collective to 
address it? Chapter 3 provides a critical assessment of men’s collective 
responsibility for rape and concludes that men have a forward-looking collective 
moral responsibility. This claim is substantiated by existing movements, such as 
the White Ribbon Campaign and Men Can Stop Rape who have already taken 
practical steps in this direction. While cultural change is slow, this chapter 
concludes by suggesting that there are grounds for cautious optimism in 
addressing acts of institutional wrongdoing in this way.  
 
In imagining new possibilities for positive social change, we need to rethink 
institutional settings and what it would mean for individual moral agents to 
position themselves in relation to institutional injustices. Reconceptualising rape 
as an act of institutional wrongdoing is therefore philosophically significant as 
this model provides a practical way to think about combating men’s violence 
against women and accounts for the very fact that rape is both an individual 
transgression and a practice with institutional implications. As a society, we can 
do more than merely seek to control and avoid men’s violence against women 
on an individual basis. We can seek to eradicate it. 
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Appendices 
 
[Document 1] ‘My strength is not for hurting’ campaign posters283   
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[Document 2] Dr Michael Flood interview transcript 
Friday 29th July 2016  
1:02:05.  
 
In your keynote address at the White Ribbon Conference in 2013, you 
stated that men’s use of violence is enabled by wider gender inequalities. 
Can you expand on how everyday attitudes, interpersonal interactions 
and institutions contribute to men’s use of violence against women?  
There are three dimensions of gender inequalities that are critical: social norms, 
social practices and social structures. We did a comprehensive literature review 
on the ways in which each of those feed into some men’s use of violence. Just 
to give an example of that, there’s good evidence that men are much more 
likely to perpetrate violence against women if they perceive that their peers are 
supportive or tolerant of violence against women, or are using violence against 
women themselves. So there is good evidence around male peer support. So 
that’s one way in which one aspect of gender inequalities in this case to do with 
social norms and particularly men’s beliefs or male peer beliefs about gender, 
masculinity and so on feed into some men’s perpetration of violence. So they 
legitimise violence and lead some men to operate with a false consensus that 
other men think the same thing that they do.  
 
To take another example, social practices. We know that at a key risk factor for 
men’s use of violence relates to if they are engaged in other forms of coercive 
and controlling behaviours. And easy way of putting it is let’s say that your 
friend is single, she wants to have a boyfriend and there are one thousand men 
in the room next door and she wants to figure out which of those thousand men 
are going to treat her with respect and care and which of those thousand men 
might be likely to use violence against her. The question I have for you is what 
information about those men would be useful in predicting which of those men 
would use violence and which won’t. One of the most useful things you could 
know about them is how they have treated their previous girlfriends. Even if 
they’ve never used physical or sexual violence against their previous girlfriends, 
if they are already invested in various kinds of abusive and dominating 
behaviour that then can extend itself into violence in various sorts of ways. 
Maybe a slightly more sophisticated example that is less directly tied to 
individual perpetration is if men are involved in a set of social relations that 
involve power over women, where they routinely experience women as second 
class citizens, men as more important and so on, then that too can reinforce 
and condone their perpetration of violence.  
 
I’ve talked briefly about social norms and social practice, now the last one is 
social structures and again there is good evidence that if there are structural 
gender inequalities to do with for example economic decision-making, political 
power or to do with women and men’s access to public life, again they can feed 
into men’s use of violence against women. This one is complex though, and you 
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may know this, because there is debate over between structural gender 
inequalities and men’s violence against women, there is some evidence for 
example that where you get countries moving towards gender inequality and 
becoming more progressive, you sometimes see an increase in violence 
against women. And this seems counterintuitive. You would think that as we get 
more gender equality, men’s violence against women would decline, and in 
general it does, but there is also evidence of a backlash dynamic where some 
men resist that progress towards equality and one of the ways they resist that is 
through the use of violence.  
 
Which countries in particular has research shown to have this sort of 
backlash?  
Predominantly countries in the Global South. Qualitative research among men 
also demonstrates that there is a backlash because they find that they don’t 
know what their role is as a man anymore. They feel uncomfortable with 
women’s growing economic power or power in households, and they try to 
reassert that power.  
 
In focusing on the social and structural foundations of this violence, do 
you believe that this has any role in diminishing the culpability of 
perpetrators who commit acts of sexual violence? 
I think there are some really difficult political issues here. As you probably know, 
feminists and others have worked for several decades to make two kinds of 
arguments. I’m not speaking out of a fluent grasp on the scholarship here, I’m 
sure there are particular feminist writers who have written a lot more on this 
than I’ve thought about it, but off the top of my head I think there is a different 
political challenge. On one hand, we want make the argument that individual 
men who use violence are personally responsible in a profound and 
fundamental sense for the use of violence and that is a reaction in particular 
against victim blaming – culturally and socially victim blaming has been 
pervasive in our culture and as a feminist critique of that, I and others argue 
instead that it’s not the victim who is to blame, the responsibility fundamentally 
rests with the perpetrator. So that has been one key feminist argument and it 
has achieved some traction. There is data in Australia for example that shows 
that the proportion of people who believe that men who use violence are 
responsible for that violence has increased, and the proportion who believe that 
victims somehow bring violence upon themselves has decreased. So we’ve got 
longitudinal data in showing that there has been some success in changing 
attitudes. So that’s one argument. The other argument is that rape and 
domestic violence are profoundly cultural – they are fundamentally cultural 
phenomena. The perception of a mad, bad rapist or the mentally ill, or disturbed 
individual is atypical and deviant, instead frames violence against women as 
normalised as culturally sanctioned and culturally legitimated. I’m sure you’ve 
come across the phrase ‘rape culture’ and the notion of rape culture builds on 
that. It builds on the idea that this is a behaviour that is culturally organised and 
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that in some ways is entirely unsurprising given how we socialise boys and 
media through media representations in our culture. There are all sorts of ways 
in which for example rape is constructed as normal sex, violence against 
women is legitimised or made invisible and so on.  
 
So the notion of men’s collective responsibility I think has been less visible in 
feminist arguments. It is there and you can find it in feminist arguments, and in a 
sense it follows from key feminists claims. If men’s violence against women is 
the product of structural gendered inequalities (which it is) and if men in general, 
as a group, are the beneficiaries of these gender inequalities – that is, if men as 
a group experience privilege, which women as a group experience 
disadvantage, then in many ways it follows that men have an ethical 
responsibility to address those gender inequalities. So in other words, a 
collective responsibility. You see that argument made in appeals to men who 
don’t use violence against women. Because men will say things like “well I treat 
the women in my life with respect. I don’t use violence, what has this got to do 
with me?” Campaigns such as the White Ribbon Campaign and campaigns 
elsewhere make the claim that ah yes, but there may be ways in which you 
condone that violence in failing to speak up on men’s use of violence or 
violence-supportive comments, you allow that violence to occur. In other words, 
to the extent where you’re not part of the salutation, you’re part of the problem. 
But this has been an argument that has been hard to make I think.  
 
Regarding culpability, if we argue that rape and domestic violence are 
fundamentally cultural and structural, then potentially yeah, it runs the risk of 
men saying “it wasn’t me, I blame society, I’m just a product of my socialisation 
and that’s why I raped her”. Now, men typically don’t say that. There’s good 
qualitative research among perpetrators who typically say things like “she 
deserved it” or “I didn’t do it” or “it wasn’t as bad”. Male perpetrators typically 
minimise and victim-blame and do a serious of things, but they don’t tend to get 
all sociological. While it would be interesting if they did, they don’t tend to offer a 
sophisticated social account. But I think there is a risk there. In a sense, I don’t 
think it’s a big risk because our behaviour is social in all sorts of ways, where it 
is a man sexually assaulting a woman, enjoying a nice meal, or watching the 
footy – all those things are social in all sorts of ways. The mere fact that these 
behaviours are social I think in no way diminishes men’s personal and ethical 
responsibility to address their own behaviour.  
 
In addressing the social and structural foundations of men’s violence 
against women, I’ve found that one of the main challenges is moving 
beyond the public’s fixation on labelling an individual perpetrator and 
instead placing a greater emphasis on all men’s collective responsibility 
to act. What are some of the key barriers you’ve encountered in appealing 
to, and engaging men?  
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The very first one there is that violence against women is a women’s issue. 
Many men have sympathy for the issue of sexual violence, but say “what’s it got 
to do with me?” and so there is very much a sense that they themselves are not 
perpetrators, it is the crimes of Other (capital ‘O’ other) so therefore how of this 
of concern to me? One of the key tasks that I and others face when trying to 
engage men in violence prevention is how to give men a sense of the role they 
can play and the responsibilities that they do have to address this issue. There 
are three dimensions to that. One is that they may be perpetrating violence in 
various ways that as soon as we expand notions of violence beyond severe 
physical violence or obvious forms of sexual assault, then many men are 
involved in those forms of violence and one of the first things men need to do in 
general is look at our own behaviour and think of the ways that we may coerce, 
pressure or dominate women in our lives. So that’s one appeal to men, but this 
isn’t where I’d start. Trying to get men to think about their own use of violence is 
hard and makes men hostile to appeals of engagement. We can try to appeal to 
men through the impact of other men’s violence on the women and girls they 
care about. You see that appeal in campaigns such as He For She for example, 
but it’s limited and vulnerable to the criticism that it’s paternalistic. That second 
part about getting men to think critically about their own behaviour is important, 
but another piece to this work is getting men to think about how their own 
everyday behaviour in fact may legitimise, allow or condone other men’s use of 
violence. So that other point I made earlier about saying nothing when a man 
rapes a rape joke, or turning a blind eye when a mate is treating his girlfriend 
badly.  
 
So in terms of key barriers just to go back to your question, a key barrier is that 
violence against women is a problem of Other men. A problem of a tiny minority 
of men. You might have read literature regarding ‘real rape’, a feminist critique 
on a very narrow stereotype of what rape is. That it is sort of the stranger in an 
overcoat leaping out of the bushes and sexually assaulting a women unknown 
to him, using severe physical force resulting in injury and so on. Instead of what 
is far more typical in sexual assault where it’s a man known to the woman, in a 
setting that’s familiar to her, his house, her house, or a car, there aren’t any 
serious physical injuries, no use of weapons and so on. In terms of barriers, the 
othering of violence against women constitutes a narrow perception and 
definition of what that violence is, who perpetrates that violence. Obviously 
another barrier is that men in general often have sexist and violence-supportive 
attitudes and there is a consistent gender gap. Men in general have worse 
understandings and attitudes towards violence against women than women.  
Men tend to define violence against women more narrowly, tend to blame the 
victim more enthusiastically, tend to subscribe more strongly to rape myths and 
this is also true for beliefs surrounding gender and sexuality in general. So 
again, I don’t know what the data is like in the UK, but in Australia, there is good 
data to show that more men than women believe that rape results from men not 
being able to control their need for sex. So here’s a belief that very much takes 
responsibility away from men. It says he uses violence or rapes women 
because of an uncontrollable need for sex. Very clear diminishing of personal 
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responsibility. And men believe that more than women. In fact, there has also 
been some good research in Australia trying to chunk or thematise certain types 
of beliefs about women and violence, beliefs that justify violence that it’s 
legitimate to use violence against women if she sleeps with another man, 
beliefs that justify and beliefs that excuse. In Australia, there is clear evidence of 
beliefs that excuse violence - Oh he was drunk or she was drunk, or an 
uncontrollable need for sex, beliefs that justify violence. I’m not sure if that 
distinction is clear to you, but some of the research has talked about attitudes in 
terms of different ideas.  Attitudes that justify, attitudes that excuse and thirdly, 
attitudes that minimise violence.   
 
Despite some of the barriers that you’ve noted, how successful education 
workshops, anti-sexism campaigns been in altering masculine ideals and 
learned behaviours that men hold so strongly? 
So I’ve reviewed the published research on efforts to shifts men’s attitudes and 
behaviours and some of that research is largely concerned with face-to-face 
educational programs often on university campuses or in high school, mostly 
secondary schools. Much of it comes from North America, but there is also 
research in the UK, Australia and elsewhere and from outside western countries. 
What that does show is that if it’s done well, and that’s a big IF, workshops can 
shift attitudes and more encouragingly can shift behaviours. For example, 
healthy relationships or respectful relationship programs among young men, or 
mixed sexed groups can diminish the attitudes supportive of violence against 
women and can also lead to lower rates of perpetration by participants in those 
workshops. Most of these workshops are methodologically pretty poor, but 
better evaluations ask about attitudes and behaviours, have long term follow 
ups (3-6 months or further down the track). Certainly there are some 
evaluations that do show long term and positive impacts on behaviour. Having 
said that, many programs aren’t evaluated and existing evaluations show that 
programs don’t work – they have no impact or a negative impact. So I can send 
you that write up, but it’s kind of incontestable these days that if you do 
educational programs well you can make a positive difference. 
 
What’s the demographic of these groups? Is it targeted towards offenders, 
or is it mostly targeted towards ‘ordinary’ men? 
What I was talking about then was mostly primary prevention work. So work that 
isn’t targeted towards offenders but aimed at general populations, first year 
students of universities or groups of students in classes at school. All of the 
boys in year 10 go through an education program, or 200 university students in 
a particular psychology course go through a healthy relationships program. In 
other words, they’re not being recruited on the basis of their perpetration or 
victimisation. These are general primary prevention programs. They do of 
course include perpetrators and victims, because of course there are 
perpetrators and victims in general populations but what I’ve described is a 
different body of work from the work with perpetrators and again, as you know, 
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there is a body of scholarship on work with particularly men who use domestic 
violence against women and men who’ve used sexual assault against women 
and it also shows some evidence of effectiveness, but it’s much more mixed in 
fact.  The research on perpetrator programs is quite uneven and it shows that 
these programs are in fact ineffective for particular groups of men – men who 
have longer histories of violence or greater involvement with violence or men 
who are involved in not only involved in violence against women, but greater 
criminal activity – they’re selling meth and betting up people at the park and so 
on. So the evidence on perpetrator programs is mixed.  
 
In what ways are women also collaborators in rape culture?  
I think it would be fundamentally dangerous to imply equal responsibility. 
Certainly people do argue that, but I think it would be fundamentally dangerous 
politically because it would take away too much from the point that it’s the 
perpetrators of violence and the beneficiaries of inequality that structure that 
violence that have the greatest ethical responsibility to address that violence.  
So when it comes to men’s violence against women for example, because 
obviously there are other forms of interpersonal violence we might want to 
address, including men’s violence against men, but when it comes to men’s 
violence against women, and most rape and sexual assault is men’s violence 
against women, then I think above all it is men who have that collective, ethical 
responsibility.  However, there are clearly ways in which women too are 
socialised into rape culture.  Women too take on a set of ideas about sexuality 
and gender that increase the likelihood of their own victimisation. Women may 
experience things that fit the legal definition of sexual assault, where they are 
unable to consent or in fact didn’t consent but in fact may not name that as rape. 
And they don’t name that as rape precisely because of a rape culture where 
there is a very narrow definition of rape and one that blames women for the 
sexual assault and victimisation that they experience. Men may do this too. Men 
may come home and thought they’ve had sex, as far as they’re concerned it 
was a great or nice night of sex. But that woman was at home thinking what a 
horrible experience she had. I think there are some ways to put it bluntly in 
which we teach men to be rapists – We teach men not to take women’s no for 
an answer, to interpret women’s talk or touch in sexual ways, to see women as 
perpetually sexually available, to ignore women’s signs of disinterest, to push 
past women’s resistance, we teach men to be rapists in all sorts of ways. The 
problem of seeing rape as sex is more of a problem for men than women in that 
if you like, the proportion of sexual acts between men and women where the 
woman thought it was sex but it was rape is much smaller than when the man 
thought it was sex when it was in fact rape.  
 
I’d be very careful about the idea of women having a shared responsibility as 
collaborators in a rape culture. But certainly part of the work that needs doing is 
working with women, and that has been a lot of the work that has been done up 
until relatively recently. It was about teaching women to stay safe, carrying their 
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keys in their hand so they can stab an attacker and so on. There’s an obvious 
kind of victim blaming that has been part of existing efforts. It’s still very 
important to work with girls and women and I see value in self-defence training. 
But not self-defence training that focuses on stranger danger, or leaves women 
feeling responsible, but empowers women in a rape culture.  
 
From your experience in an Australian context, what has been done to 
address systemic failings in State and non-State institutions?  
So I worked briefly with the Australian defence force, and was commissioned to 
write a curriculum on healthy relationships. Essentially, it was sexual consent 
101 and this was after a series of alleged sexual assaults by young men in the 
military and I had similar experiences working with the AFL and NFL after 
alleged sexual assaults by players. I know that there has been a massive effort 
in intuitional change in the wake of these scandals that was pushed by the 
Human Rights Commission to make a culture change, to shift formal and 
informal norms, to have good processes for reporting unacceptable behaviour 
and so on. This is well documented. But to answer your question more 
generally, there is an extraordinary amount of momentum in Australia at the 
moment, in terms of addressing and preventing violence against women. 
There’s a national plan of action that began under the previous Labour 
government, and continues under the contemporary Coalition government. At a 
national level, there’s momentum to craft multilevel and comprehensive plans to 
reduce the prevalence of violence against women. There is an extraordinary 
amount of policy and community attention to violence against women in 
Australia. I’ve been in this field for twenty-five years and it is historically new. 
There are some very valuable initiatives that are doing what you’re describing 
here. For example, there have been some reforms in relation to protection 
orders and domestic violence orders. So if a woman is living with an abusive 
male partner, she can take out what is called a protection order or an 
apprehended violence order, they have various kinds of names, and essentially 
that order does things like prohibiting him from coming within 200 metres of her. 
Basically, he has to stay away and the police will respond very quickly if 
someone who has a protection order rings them or makes a complaint. It’s 
basically a set of protections for victims of violence and one recent reform is 
that these protections now work across state boundaries. It used to be the case 
that let’s say you were assaulted by your male partner in one part of the UK and 
you take out a protection order there, and then you move to another part of the 
UK or you’re on holiday and the protection order no longer exists so he can 
come and sit next to you at a café and harass you or whatever. So that’s just 
one small example of a series of reforms in Australia. On the one hand, there’s 
a positive story I can tell about state and non-state institutions responding to 
violence. It has been focused particularly on secondary and tertiary intervention, 
on responding to victims or survivors and holding perpetrators accountable. 
There has been less work to do with primary prevention in terms of shifting 
social norms and gender inequalities. Anyway, having told you the positive story, 
there are also ways in which the Federal and State Governments also have 
been acting in regressive or negative ways. For example, the Federal 
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Government stripped funding recently from community legal centres. Now, 
community legal centres are one of the first places that women fleeing sexual or 
domestic violence go to. They seek cheap of free services and assistance. Now 
they are far less able to do so because community legal centres have been 
stripped of funding. So I just want to make the point that there isn’t an incredibly 
good thing going on. 
 
I’ve been writing a section of my thesis on consent, and I saw that you 
posted on your website the tea and consent video that has been hugely 
popular here. Do you think that a focus on consent education is one of the 
most effective strategies to prevent and combat rape?  
In terms of consent, there are multiple strategies that are relevant and again I 
don’t think I’ve thought about this very systematically. But it is certainly one 
important strategy to teach people about consent, to teach them what consent 
is and what consent looks like. This does have real political value and change-
making value given the narrow and problematic ways our culture constructs 
consent, when consent is the absence of resistance. One problem is that 
consent is very widely understood as the mere absence of resistance, so men 
to take a stereotypical example, men think that they have consent from women 
because the woman is not pushing them off, actively saying no or screaming at 
them. So I think there is political value in trying to re shape basic norms of 
consent and construct a positive norm, where consent is not the absence of 
resistance, but the kind of explicit agreement to every single sexual activity that 
is taking place, rather than we’ve agreed to kiss and therefore agreed to have 
every other sexual activity imaginable. There is some really valuable work that 
the tea and consent video and other campaigns do in terms of redefining our 
understandings of what consent is and what consent looks like. 
 
However, the second piece of that work and what you pick up on, is that we 
also have to highlight the value of consent and necessity for consent. Some, 
many? Let’s say some men don’t give a shit. They don’t care whether a woman 
consents or not. So in a sense, this won’t change their behaviour radically 
because they’re invested in coercive norms of sexuality in general so they’re 
willing to push past, ignore and actively violate women’s consent. So expanding 
definitions of consent won’t make a difference there. Part of this work has to 
look at tackling men’s sense of sexual entitlement, there’s good feminist 
literature on this, but sexual entitlement refers to men’s sense that they have a 
right of access to women’s bodies. A right in terms of what women should do for 
them. There are all sorts of ways we socialise that into boys and men, explicitly 
in relation to sexuality in terms of privileging men’s sexual pleasure, privileging 
men’s sexual desires, the routine portrayal of women as only sexually available 
or sexual objects and so on. Then there’s way we socialise men into entitlement 
more broadly, that through structural gender inequalities and gender norms. For 
example, I as a man learn that my voice is more important than a woman’s 
voice and what I say matters more. We socialise men that they can take up 
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space on a subway, they can spread their legs over three seats. We socialise 
men literally to take up space, in public, in meetings, through their voice, bodies 
in meetings on the street and so on. So there are all sorts of ways I think we 
have to address patriarchal entitlement.  
 
I completely agree that consent education does of course have value and 
I’m not wholly critical of it. However, it seems that portraying consent as a 
simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ is more applicable to stranger rape cases where it is 
very obvious when there is a lack of consent. Given that the majority of 
rape victim’s know their perpetrator, I think it’s important to highlight that 
there are in fact ‘gray areas’. 
It’s interesting that you mention a gray area, there is good feminist scholarship 
on consent that I’ve read some of, I think there’s both insight and danger in the 
notion of a gray area. So where I’ve sometimes heard the term gray area is in 
anti-feminist resistance to the idea that consent should be important in people’s 
sexual relations. In Australia, there have been commentators who have used 
this to say that women should have sex with their partners when they don’t want 
to. Sex for me and my partner may be an important way in which do intimacy 
and show love for each other, and there might be a night for example where 
one of us is feeling a bit tired, bit of a headache but we kind of go along and 
have sex anyway because the other person wants to. This doesn’t feel coercive 
or abusive and there’s no sense of profound harm, but if the other person hadn’t 
wanted to, they probably wouldn’t have had sex. So I don’t think that is the 
same behaviour as completely coercing your partner into sex. It’s not ideal, but 
I’m far less troubled by it than I am far more obvious forms of sexual coercion. 
So it depends what you mean by gray area, but certainly, we need to move 
consent beyond simple notions of a simple yes and no. I can’t remember well 
enough it speaks to any kind of non-verbal forms of consent, or the ways they 
may negotiate sex in much more subtle ways of yes and no. It’s a real limitation 
of consent campaigns if they focus solely on explicit verbal negotiations. 
There’s some good work by a colleague of mine from New Zealand called 
Melanie Beres, I’ll send this to you as well, about that, and about the ways that 
young people negotiate consent. She finds that the vast majority of young 
people don’t negotiate consent through explicit statements of yes or no, but 
negotiate it in other subtle and sensitive ways. Some people say ah that’s really 
dangerous. I know I’ve said to men in workshops to not rely on your perceptions 
of women’s body language, partly because men are socialised to interpret 
women’s touch in more sexualised ways, but there are some ways in which one 
could imagine a substantive practice of consent that is non-verbal. I’m not so 
hard lined that I think explicit verbal consent is mandatory in all and every 
sexual interactions. However, there are ways in which you could make consent 
sexy, playful and erotic rather than formalised and legal. I see verbal consent as 
a very good thing. But you have got a valuable point here. Consent by itself 
doesn’t guarantee the ethical desirability of an ethical sexual interaction.  In 
other words, it’s not enough. For example, people may consent to things that 
will in fact harm them. Classic example is someone consents to have unsafe 
sex with their HIV positive partner. So they risk contracting HIV themselves, 
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harms to their physical health, but they’re consenting. Another example is let’s 
say that a couple consents to have sex in the lounge room in front of their five 
and six year old children. Some people may think this is fine, but many would 
say that this is inappropriate and problematic for children to see. So again, 
there’s consent, but it is doing third party harms. The other example I give is the 
obvious one where people are consenting because of limited alternatives. 
Because of profoundly low self-esteem and the presence of power inequalities. 
A substantial sexual ethics needs to go beyond a libertarian ethics of consent. 
There are various ways in which a simple ethic of consent is not enough to 
guarantee ethically desirable sex. But it’s not a bad place to start. The tea and 
consent video is a lot better than other campaigns that I’ve seen which say 
things like “just say no” or “if you rape, you’ll go to jail and get raped yourself”- 
which is extremely unlikely that they would even end up in jail. Tea and consent 
looks fantastic in comparison and I think it’s a good campaign, but there is other 
work on consent that also needs doing. Tea and consent teaches what consent 
is, but there’s three other things you need to do: how to do consent, why 
consent is valuable and other ways to negotiate consent beyond explicit verbal 
consent.  
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[Document 3] Interview with Fee Scott 
Chief Executive Office of Devon Rape Crisis and Sexual Abuse Services 
27th September 2016  
1:03:18.  
 
How would you classify the act of rape?  
Rape doesn’t happen in a vacuum and the level of rape, sexual violence and 
childhood sexual abuse doesn’t happen in a vacuum. So I suppose if you know 
that something is happening, time and time again, hundreds of thousands of 
times, not just in this country, but across the world, you have to start asking 
yourself why - why is it that something like this continues. As a feminist, I make 
sense of rape through the lens of feminism and an understanding of the 
patriarchy – an understanding that it is a means of maintaining control or 
ensuring power imbalances. The word for me that is most relevant for me in this 
is entitlement. So if you are a little boy growing up in this world, then you will 
know very very early on that there is something a bit different about you. That 
you have more rights, more status, more authority, more power, more 
entitlement and more privilege. On the other hand, the little girl you know 
(because you get messages from all over the place), that your job is to fit in, 
give way, hold things back, support men, and to manage your own behaviour 
and other people’s. These are quite stark statements really. But when it comes 
to rape, we’ve got a whole load of things going on, one of which is male 
entitlement – If I want something I should have it. Particularly, a power 
imbalance – I am better than women, therefore if I want to take something I can 
justify it I can do so internally and externally to myself. I think we also get who 
creates the narrative around rape, the dominant people in society, which is men, 
(lots of bloody weird narratives), but the main narrative is: Male sexuality is so 
big, so immense and so out of control that when a man gets to a certain point 
sexually, he can’t stop himself. So then women have a responsibility to manage 
not only their own sexuality, but also somebody else’s as well. I talk to some 
women, and they remember being told by their mums “to be careful not to get a 
man too excited”. But because it is so pervasive that rape is about sex, not 
power, then the thing about men’s sexual drive and how a woman might drive a 
man to the point where he can no longer control his desires by what she wears, 
talking, flirting, smiling by her presence alone – all of these things are what rape 
culture pushes back on women. This is what allows rape to become a crime 
where the victim is the one who becomes the accused. What was she wearing, 
what was she doing, why was she there, why did she smile at him and why did 
she take the drink from him? It stops us from asking “why was he buying her all 
those drinks that night?” and “why did he offer her a lift home?” We don’t tend to 
ask these questions. She is culpable. Unless of course, in the vast minority of 
crimes, she happens to fit the ideal victim stereotype –stranger rape, she might 
be in a great scenario a virgin walking home from Church.  
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These real rapes make other rapes appear illegitimate in comparison. There 
was a minister from the Coalition Government who worked within the Ministry of 
Justice for a while who was responsible for funding our Rape Crisis Centres 
who said that real rapes are stranger rapes. The way this view gets propagated 
in direct (media) and indirect ways (socialisation) means that there is a 
spectrum of male power and privilege to which we are all exposed. This 
includes something looking as trivial as a marriage proposal, but it’s about male 
power being active, women being passive, women waiting to receive and men 
being the people who decide when things are going to happen. It’s all 
connected. I mean Nottingham have just redefined street harassment as a hate 
crime.  
 
What do you think about the classification of street harassment as a hate 
crime? 
I’ve always been amazed that given what we know about the figures, that the 
vast majority of victims are women and the vast majority of perpetrators are 
men – it’s a gendered issue and it’s a gendered crime. Why isn’t it called a hate 
crime anyway? I’m disappointed that sexual offences aren’t called a hate crime. 
Then it would naturally extend to harassment and stuff on the streets. But why, 
when all the evidence is there that this is a gendered crime. Even when the 
victims are men, the perpetrators are still predominately men. Sorry I can’t 
remember what the first question was. 
 
Ah no you’ve covered it really well! You also touched upon something 
really interesting, which is a reluctance to see rape as an act violence 
which sort of ties into my last question. I mean, rape does fall under 
‘Sexual Offences’ and I think there is some sort of assumption within that 
that there it is some type of sex which obviously has a whole host of 
implications. How do you conceptualise rape in regards to it its legal 
definition as non-consensual sex? 
I do see it as an act of power and control. I don’t buy the stuff around it being 
sexual because I think that it is connected to the idea that men have urges and 
cannot control themselves. It is crap to say that men have urges that they 
cannot control. All the newspapers – none of them are blameless in presenting 
the case all women’s characteristics and not his. The fact that conviction and 
reporting rates are so low is linked to the fact that externally, it’s condoned. I 
think it was best and most horribly summed up a couple of years ago there was 
a website ‘Uni Lads’ it was in Plymouth and there was a ‘joke’ made that said 
“Only 15% of women report to the police lads, I think that’s good odds if you 
want to go and rape somebody”. They took the site down in the end, but that’s 
the kind of thing that was quite an extreme offensive joke, but generally, it 
reflects ideas about women simply regretting it and ‘crying rape’.  And most of it 
isn’t reported because women know that the odds are stacked against them in 
being believed. They don’t even make an intellectual or cognitive decision about 
that. It’s instant and internal. The most common question we have here (Devon 
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Rape Crisis) is “I’m not sure if this was rape or not… I was crying, and I said get 
off me. But I’m not sure if it was rape or not”. It doesn’t occur to most women to 
even tell anybody because internally, everything they’ve been fed externally 
which now exists internally is saying “you must have asked for this in some 
way”. I mean, why would you?  
 
As a centre, you primarily offer counselling services. Do you also refer 
victims onto the police? 
Absolutely. I’m really happy to refer women on. But it’s not our agenda. And we 
do support people through it. Women sometimes come to us and want them to 
go to the forensic exam or court with them and we will. Happy to do anything. 
But just because I know how much it takes to overcome that internal message, 
we don’t promote it. Because then there is another thing when they’re already 
being punished for getting themselves them rape, and then we might punish 
them for not reporting it. So, we haven’t got an agenda.  
 
Is the other organisation the Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC)? 
What is their role and how do you work alongside them?  
We work with SARC really really closely. So SARC deal with 15% of women 
who report the crime. They are a criminal justice organisation and they collect 
forensics. Their job is to collect enough evidence to get something through court, 
and also to keep the witness, the woman herself, supported while she goes 
through this process. It can take up to two and a half years – from reporting to 
actually going to court. Of course SARC have a huge case load. So you will get 
a big flurry of support at the beginning, and then you’ll be left for a long time, 
and then get a big flurry of support at the end. So in their period of waiting, we 
often support these women. They have workers who have over 70 cases, so 
you might only get a phone call once a month. Whereas here, each employee 
sees 4 people a day because we are doing therapeutic work. SARC also have a 
counselling service but it’s limited – you can only go to 6 sessions. Whereas 
ours is unlimited – as long as women take or need. So we might refer onto 
SARC if someone wants to report, and they might refer to us if someone needs 
support throughout the process then once someone has been through the 
criminal justice system, they might also get referred onto us again. So I sit on 
the SARC board and I meet with the manager Lyndsay every other month and 
we’re in contact over on the phone every week.   
 
So I know you do have some collaborative power with Devon and 
Cornwall Police as well, I was wondering if you can talk me through their 
recent Good Consent Guide Campaign? 
We had some indirect involvement with it. I think the Police are still trying to… 
One of the things that we find difficult is that people (the University, Student 
Guild and the Police) tend to go away and come up with a campaign, splash it 
for a couple of weeks and then disappear. And I think the Guild’s NeverOk 
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campaign is really good. But what happens is that it’s a two week wonder. I say 
the same every year – look to have a consistent message all year around. It’s 
not a thing to win student guild elections on, it’s a message of everyday 
importance for people. I did a lecture for some psychology undergrads last year. 
It was a group of about 35 women and I showed them the Laura Bates 
YouTube video on how she set up the everyday sexism project. I asked if 
anyone in the room had experienced any form of harassment as Laura Bates 
described, and every single woman in the room put her hand up. Every single 
person related to that – not once but hundreds of times. Every time they went, 
to the cash point, to the club, to do some shopping. And none of them had ever 
reported it. They thought that while it would obviously be nice not to worry about 
it, they just want to go out and have a good time and if they were to report it, 
that’s all they would ever spend their lives doing. That stuff is not understood by 
the University. I don’t think the depth, complexity and just everyday 
bombardment of it is understood by the Guild. 
 
In some ways, I understand it for a campaign. I mean, I suppose what 
they’re trying to do is create something very catchy and simplistic point 
about consent. But to not acknowledge the context in which consent 
operates does it a huge injustice.  
We need a community organisation, academics with expertise in this area and 
the University with the money and resources to make it happen. On another 
note, it’s sort of like the tea and consent video. And people love it! I suppose 
they love it because it’s quite innocent. It feels a bit divorced from the actual 
subject. And it makes people think well of course I wouldn’t make anyone drink 
a cup of tea! It allows everyone to go, “yeah yeah yeah, absolutely, not me 
though”. Cases we have here demonstrate that a lot of the time it is not that 
consent isn’t sought, it’s that it’s irrelevant. It’s not an issue. It’s not “I wonder if 
she’d like a cup of tea or not” it’s “I want a cup of tea and I’m going to have one” 
and the other person is invisible in that. We have a lot of situations where 
women say things like “I was crying”, “I said no”, “I wasn’t there” or “I was 
frozen”. In these cases, it’s not like someone has misunderstood the cues, they 
have not been looking for them or interested in the cues. Explicit consent for 
every part of the sexual contact is a bit ridiculous, but also ridiculous at the 
other end is the idea that once consent is given, everything is fair game. I think 
the phrase I like is ‘active and enthusiastic participation’ that’s really easy to 
spot. If someone is saying “please please make me a cup of tea now!” – It’s 
hard to misjudge that. I think ‘consent’ makes it sound a little bit clinical and 
contractual. Enthusiastic participation would be a radical campaign for the 
University. I can’t see why men and women wouldn’t get behind that. One of the 
problems is that the University as an institution, all Universities, but particularly 
this one with such a high reputation, does not want to be seen as a place where 
women are at risk of assault or sexual violence. I was involved in a task force 
during the summer term drawing up some new protocols around the reporting of 
sexual violence, but they don’t really want to collect the figures because we 
know that if you start collecting figures they shoot through the roof. In the short 
term, you have to hold your nerve with that and know that it’s a good thing. Well 
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actually, one of the top 100 in the world don’t want their figures to go through 
the roof because if Oxford aren’t keeping the figures, it looks like this is a ‘rapey 
city’.  
 
I mean, it could have the completely opposite effect. Prospective students 
might think wow I really want to come to this University, look at how 
they’re leading the way in their attempts to tackle sexual violence on 
campus. That’s the sort of place I want to be – the sort of place that 
stands up to that. 
Definitely! One of the things I did talk about with Alec (Student Guild Welfare 
Sabb) was that they’re going to be doing some training of door staff. My fear is 
that the training of door staff is going to be focused on women: how are we 
going to police her and keep her safe? I’m fed up with that discourse. So there’s 
some potential there. We need to remind them of the dangers of colluding out of 
lack of awareness.  
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